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“Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and 
steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me…. I see 
them before me and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my existence.” 
- Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason 
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General overview of the thesis 
Since the two landmark publications in moral psychology (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, 
Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Haidt, 2001), the field has experienced an affective revolution that has 
put emotions at the center of the stage. Although work on exploring role of emotions in assessing 
morality of various types of moral acts (impure, unfair, etc.; Haidt, 2007) abounds, studying its 
role in harmful behaviors presents a unique challenge. The aversion to harming others is an 
integral part of the foundations of human moral sense and it presents itself in the form of deeply 
ingrained moral intuitions (Haidt, 2007). Since creating laboratory situations to investigate harm 
aversion raises ethical issues, research has primarily relied on studying hypothetical cases. In the 
current thesis, we utilize hypothetical vignettes to explore role of emotions in both moral 
judgment and behavior in harmful contexts, both when harm is carried out intentionally or 
produced accidentally.  
Study 1 investigates the role of emotion in motivating utilitarian behavior in moral dilemmas 
when presented in contextually salient virtual reality format as compared to judgment about the 
same cases for their textual versions.  
Study 2 investigates divergent contributions of two different sources of affect, one stemming 
from self-focused distress and the other focused on other-oriented concern, on utilitarian moral 
judgments in autistics.  
Study 3 investigates the role of empathic arousal in condemning agents involved in unintentional 
harms and why harmful outcomes have a greater bearing on blame as compared to acceptability 
judgments.   
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Chapter 1 
Affective basis of Judgment-Behavior Discrepancy in Virtual 
Experiences of Moral Dilemmas*  
 
 
 
 
*This chapter is based on the following published article: 
Patil, I., Cogoni, C., Zangrando, N., Chittaro, L., & Silani, G. (2014). Affective basis of 
judgment-behavior discrepancy in virtual experiences of moral dilemmas. Social Neuroscience, 
9(1), 94-107. doi:10.1080/17470919.2013.870091
 18 
 
Abstract 
Although research in moral psychology in the last decade has relied heavily on hypothetical 
moral dilemmas and has been effective in understanding moral judgment, how these judgments 
translate into behaviors remains a largely unexplored issue due to the harmful nature of the acts 
involved.  To study this link, we follow a new approach based on a desktop virtual reality 
environment. In our within-subjects experiment, participants exhibited an order-dependent 
judgment-behavior discrepancy across temporally-separated sessions, with many of them 
behaving in utilitarian manner in virtual reality dilemmas despite their non-utilitarian judgments 
for the same dilemmas in textual descriptions. This change in decisions reflected in the 
autonomic arousal of participants, with dilemmas in virtual reality being perceived more 
emotionally arousing than the ones in text, after controlling for general differences between the 
two presentation modalities (virtual reality vs. text). This suggests that moral decision-making in 
hypothetical moral dilemmas is susceptible to contextual saliency of the presentation of these 
dilemmas.   
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1. Introduction 
Hypothetical moral dilemmas have been a useful tool in understanding moral decision-making, 
especially in elucidating the affective and cognitive foundations of moral judgment (Christensen 
& Gomila, 2012; Cushman & Greene, 2012; Waldmann, Nagel, & Wiegmann, 2012).  A typical 
example of such dilemmas is the trolley dilemma (Thomson, 1985): 
“A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it proceeds on its 
present course. The only way to save them is to hit a switch that will turn the trolley onto 
an alternate set of tracks where it will kill one person instead of five. Is it appropriate for 
you to turn the trolley in order to save five people at the expense of one?” 
Psychological investigation of people’s moral judgments has relied on the way people respond to 
these dilemmas. Affirmative response to this dilemma is said to be utilitarian, since it agrees with 
John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism which argues that those moral actions are good which maximize 
the wellbeing of the maximum number of agents involved in the situation (Mill, 1998). On the 
other hand, negative response is said to be non-utilitarian or deontological, referring to Kantian 
deontology which evaluates the moral status of an action based not on its consequences but 
based on the features of the act itself, relative to the moral rules regarding rights and duties of the 
agents involved in the situation (Kant, 2005). Moral psychologists are concerned with the 
cognitive processes mediating these responses and the appraisal mechanisms that motivate these 
processes. The aim of studying moral judgments has primarily been about understanding how 
people distinguish between right and wrong, but the issue of how these moral judgments 
translate into behavior remains still unclear: would someone who judges switching the trolley as 
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morally appropriate actually resort to this course of action when the full repertoire of contextual 
features come into play?   
A recent study (Tassy, Oullier, Mancini, & Wicker, 2013) showed that there is a discrepancy 
between judgments people make and the choice of action they endorse in moral dilemmas. 
People were more likely to respond in a utilitarian manner to the question “Would you do….?” 
(which was a probe question for choice of moral action) than to the question “Is it acceptable 
to….?” (which was a probe question for moral judgment).  Or, in other words, people showed a 
tendency to choose actions they judged to be wrong.  Another study (Tassy et al., 2012) showed 
that objective evaluative judgment and subjective action choice in moral dilemmas about harm 
might rely on distinct cognitive processes.  These studies are suggestive of the hypothesis that 
the selection of moral behavior and endorsement of an abstract moral judgment in a moral 
dilemma are mediated by partially distinct neural and psychological processes.  But shortcoming 
of these studies was that they relied completely on self-report questionnaire data and thus could 
not ascertain if what participants considered their choice of moral action on paper would indeed 
be their actual action if they were to face the same situation in more salient situations.  
In a more realistic setting, a recent study (FeldmanHall et al., 2012) used a pain-versus-gain 
paradigm to show that in the face of contextually salient motivational cues (like monetary gain) 
people were ready to let others get physically hurt, which contrasts starkly with the previous 
research showing that aversion to harming others is one of the most deeply-ingrained of moral 
intuitions (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Haidt, 2007).  They also showed that the behavior 
of participants in real life increasingly deviated away from the judgment they made as the 
presentation of moral situations became increasingly contextually impoverished. As the 
experimental setup became progressively estranged from real-life setting, people had to rely 
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more and more on the mental simulation of the situation and had to make decisions without the 
context-dependent knowledge which would otherwise have been available to them in the real-life 
setting (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007).  Qualitatively, the pain-versus-gain paradigm differs from the 
trolley dilemmas, the former pitting self-benefit against welfare of others while the latter pitting 
welfare of two  sets of strangers. Nevertheless, it is legitimate to assume that the same concerns 
apply to hypothetical moral dilemmas, which are usually presented in text format with all the 
non-essential contextual information stripped away (Christensen & Gomila, 2012), leading 
participants to rely more on the abbreviated, unrepresentative, and decontextualized mental 
simulations of the considered situations (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007). 
The advantage of relying on text- or graphic-based questionnaires is its great experimental 
controllability, but the downside is that it greatly simplifies the issue at hand by removing all the 
non-essential contextual features of the dilemmas, raising issue of generalizability of the 
obtained results. The impoverished and unrealistic experimental stimuli limit participant’s 
engagement and thus cannot affect participants with the targeted experimental manipulation. On 
the other hand, more elaborate experimental designs engender increases in cost and may cause 
loss in experimental control. This trade-off has been a hallmark feature of research in 
experimental social psychology (Blascovich, Loomis, & Beall, 2002).  
Moral dilemmas are especially difficult to create realistically in laboratory settings because of 
the ethical problems associated with violent and harmful experimental situations. Virtual reality 
(VR) helps to take a step forward in studying such situations in a more ecologically valid 
manner. A number of studies have investigated behavior in situations containing elements of 
violence rendered using VR and  show that people respond realistically to such situations (for a 
review, see Rovira, Swapp, Spanlang, & Slater, 2009). This is an indication that VR can provide 
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a good middle ground in terms of experimental realism and control to study social situations 
involving physical harm.   
To the best of our knowledge, only one study (Navarrete, McDonald, Mott, & Asher, 2012) used 
contextually rich, immersive VR reconstructions of trolley dilemmas to address the relationship 
between moral judgment and moral behavior. They compared the behavior (proportion of 
utilitarian decisions taken) of participants in VR with judgments of participants from previous 
studies which relied on the text-based scenarios (Cushman et al., 2006; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, 
Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene et al., 2001; Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007; 
Mikhail, 2007; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006). They found that the behavior of participants in VR 
(proportion of utilitarian decisions: 88.5-90.5%) was congruent with the judgment-data from 
previous research, which led to the conclusion that there was not a significant difference between 
judgment and behavior in situations where an individual is harmed for the greater good, at least 
so far as the decision-making goes in situations involving salient sensory input in the absence of 
real-life consequences. One shortcoming of the study is that the decisions taken by participants 
were not compared with their own judgments but with the judgments of people who participated 
in previous experiments, making it a between-subject design. As a result, the experiment could 
not address the relation between judgments and behavior for the same individual.   
Our study tries to address this issue and differs from Navarrete et al. (2012) in some crucial 
aspects: (a) we use a within-subject design, as opposed to  between-subject design; (b) we use 
desktop VR hardware (a common LCD monitor), as opposed to immersive VR hardware (Head-
Mounted Display); (c) we use four different moral dilemmas involving harm, as opposed to just 
one; (d) we focus just on action conditions, instead of both action and omission conditions; (e) 
we record skin conductance in order to characterize physiological responses associated with 
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moral judgments and moral behavior (after controlling for the general differences in VR and text 
scenarios).   
Contextual saliency refers to the ability of the experimental stimuli to supply contextual 
information which is available in real-life situations, rather than being limited to just necessary 
and sufficient amount of information. In the current study, we observed differences in the 
contextual saliency between the two modes of presentation of the moral dilemmas and a resultant 
differential capacity of these modes to engage affective processing. We therefore expected that 
people would respond differently in judging text dilemmas (which are limited in emotional 
engagement) as compared to acting in VR situations (which are more life-like and hence could 
be more emotionally arousing). We also expected any difference between the judgments people 
make in text dilemmas and their actions in VR dilemmas sessions to be due to the putative 
differential propensity of the two modes of presentation of the moral dilemmas to engage 
emotions and would thus reflect in the skin conductance data (Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2007), 
because it would index the ability of the presentation modality to engage emotional processing. 
Although it remains controversial if emotions are necessary and/or sufficient for moral 
judgments (Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 2009), it is well-established that emotions either co-
occur or ensue from moral judgments (Avramova & Inbar, 2013). Thus, our first prediction was 
that the observed judgment-behavior discrepancy would have an affective basis, as indexed by 
SCR activity.  
Further, participants could show judgment-behavior discrepancy in two ways: by making either 
more or less number of utilitarian decisions in VR as compared to text session. To predict in 
which way emotions would influence this discrepancy, we relied on Greene’s dual process model 
(Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Greene et al., 2004, 2001). This model 
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posits two types of computational processes to explain the observed behavioral pattern in moral 
dilemmas: intuitive emotional processes that automatically evaluate the stimulus on the moral 
dimensions of right/wrong to come up with a judgment and support non-utilitarian decision and 
controlled reasoning processes that rely on deductive reasoning and cost-benefit analysis to 
arrive at a judgment and support utilitarian decision.  Additionally, these two processes 
contribute to the final decision differently, depending upon the nature of the dilemma and its 
ability to engage emotional processing. For example, personal moral dilemmas (e.g. footbridge 
dilemma in which the agent in the scenario can save maximum number of lives by pushing a 
large man standing next to him/her off of a footbridge) are found to be more emotionally 
engaging than the impersonal moral dilemmas, as shown by both neuroimaging data (Greene et 
al., 2004, 2001) and skin conductance activity (Moretto, Làdavas, Mattioli, & di Pellegrino, 
2010), and elicit more non-utilitarian judgments. In the current study, we focused exclusively on 
impersonal moral dilemmas. Since we expected VR dilemmas to engage emotional processing 
more than their textual counterparts, we predicted that a smaller proportion of utilitarian 
responses will be observed for VR than text dilemmas.     
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2. Methods and Materials 
2.1 Participants 
In this study, we recruited 40 healthy participants (24 female, 16 male) between ages of 18 and 
28 (M = 22.8, SD = 2.6 years). Each participant was paid €15 as a compensation for his/her 
travel and time. All participants were native Italian speakers and had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. Except for one participant, all of them were right-handed. The study was 
approved by the ethics committee of the hospital "Santa Maria della Misericordia" (Udine, Italy). 
The experiment was carried out at the Human-Computer Interaction Laboratory (HCI Lab), 
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science (University of Udine, Italy). 
2.2 Experimental stimuli 
In each (text/VR) session, subjects faced 8 moral dilemmas, divided equally into 4 experimental 
conditions and 4 control conditions, for a total of 16 dilemmas in the two sessions.  Control 
conditions controlled for the general differences across text and VR presentation modalities: 
length of the trial for a given session, attention deployment, visual complexity of the stimuli, etc. 
Experimental condition dilemmas pitted welfare of one individual against welfare of 2 or 5 
individuals, while the control condition scenarios pitted welfare of one individual against 
damage to empty boxes and thus posed no dilemma between different moral ideologies. Hence, 
the experimental conditions specifically tapped into the decision-making in dilemmatic 
situations, while this was not the case for control conditions. For example, in the train dilemma, a 
train was directed towards 2 or 5 humans walking on the track and participants had to switch the 
train onto an alternative track if they wanted to save this group of people by sacrificing a single 
human walking on the alternative track. In the control condition version of the same dilemma, 
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the train was directed towards one human and participants could divert it on the alternative track 
on which there were just empty boxes and no humans.  To summarize, control conditions were 
used not only to control for differences in the presentation modalities, but also to study the 
emotional response which was specific to decision-making in moral dilemmas. In any session, 
the experimental and control conditions were presented randomly. We included variation in 
number of victims in the dilemmas so as to avoid the dilemmas becoming too predictable, which 
could have resulted in subjects premeditating the response even before they read or saw the 
dilemma.  It needs to be mentioned that though the number of victims in each dilemma was 
randomized, the total number of victims for each session was same for both text and VR sessions 
and for all participants. There were always two experimental dilemmas with two number of 
victims, while the other two experimental dilemmas with five number of victims. All the 
dilemmas used in this study were impersonal moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2004, 2001).    
The virtual environments were implemented using the C# programming language and the 
Unity3D game engine; see Figure 1 for a film-strip of the VR version of the train dilemma and 
Appendix S1 for description of text dilemmas (videos of VR scenarios can be downloaded from 
here: http://www.sissa.it/cns/cescn/SupInfos/vr_scenarios.zip).  For each VR dilemma, a textual 
version of the same dilemma was written for use in the text session. One aspect of VR scenarios 
that needs to be stressed here is that participants had to witness highly salient consequences of 
their actions, e.g. in the train dilemma, participants saw virtual agents getting hit and run over by 
the train and their bleeding corpses lying on the track afterwards (Figure 1C). 
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Figure 1: Film-strip of one representative dilemma from virtual reality session: the train 
dilemma. Participants had to make a decision in 10 seconds, before the train crossed the 
yellow-black striped line (highlighted in red circle). Train was by default directed at the 
maximum number of virtual agents, as shown by the green signal for the respective rail-
track.  (A). If  participants wanted to achieve an utilitarian outcome, they had to change 
the signal for the track where two people were walking from “green” to “red” by pressing 
a button on the joystick, which automatically turned the signal to “green” for the 
alternative track where one virtual human was walking (B). After 10 seconds, the 
response buttons were automatically disabled and participants could not change their 
decision. After this, participants witnessed consequences of their actions (for 8 seconds) 
as the train progressed on the selected course and ran over the virtual human(s) (C). In 
this particular instance, participant endorsed a utilitarian outcome by choosing to actively 
divert the train on the alternative track.  
2.3 Procedure 
We followed a within-subjects design, whereby each participant had to face the same dilemmas 
in the text session that employed textual descriptions and in a VR session that presented the 
dilemmas as interactive virtual experiences. The order in which participants performed the task 
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was counterbalanced: half participants performed the text session first, the other half the VR 
session first. Participants were randomly assigned to a particular order. Participants performed 
the second session after a variable number of days in order to avoid spillover effects of decisions 
made in the previous session.  The average interval between two sessions was 102 days (SD= 53) 
and did not differ for the two orders (t(32) = -1.028, p = 0.31). Large variation in the interval 
between two sessions was due to the practical concern of availability of different participants.   
Behavioral task 
After the participants arrived in the laboratory, they were told that the study concerned decision-
making in social settings. To address concerns about social desirability bias, the computer 
console for the participants was separated from experimenters using curtains. All scenarios in the 
experiment were displayed on a 30-in. LCD computer monitor with speakers. Subjects were 
seated in a semi-dark room at a viewing distance of 100 cm from the screen. Responses were 
recorded using a Nintendo Nunchuck joystick. 
Before beginning with the experiment, participants were familiarized with the virtual experiences 
and the text scenarios, using training sessions. For the text scenarios, participants were trained to 
use joystick in an example situation containing non-meaningful verbal text, and were instructed 
about how to use the response button in order to change the screen and select the response. For 
the VR training sessions, we used four parts of tutorial environments, each of them introducing 
the virtual environment which would later be presented in experimental trials. Participants were 
instructed about the meaning of different visual signals present in all the scenarios and how to 
use the response button in order to make a choice.  For example, in the tutorial for the train 
dilemma (see Figure 1), they were explained that the presence of a green or red light indicates 
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the track available for the train to continue on (green: pass, red: no pass); while a yellow-black 
striped line marked the point till which it was possible for them to make a choice by switching 
the red and green lights via the joystick (also see Appendix S2 for details on how participants 
kept track of available time). After the training session, all participants were asked to operate 
these tutorials without experimenter’s help.  After making sure that they understood the 
procedure, they were presented with the actual experimental stimuli. 
In the text session, the trial started with a period of silence for 1 minute with fixation cross on the 
screen and then the text of the scenario appeared. The dilemma description remained on the 
screen for the rest of the trial. A second press on the same button presented the question asking 
for the judgment from the participant (“Is it appropriate for you to [nature of the action]?”) and 
lasted for 12 seconds (see Figure 2). By default, the option highlighted was non-utilitarian (no) 
and participants had to press again the same button to change it to utilitarian (yes) if they wanted 
to endorse a utilitarian outcome. Once the response was made, it could not be changed. After the 
response, the text faded and was replaced by fixation cross.   
In the VR session, participants were presented with the VR versions of the dilemmas on the same 
computer screen and asked to respond with the same button of the joystick used in the text 
session. The trial started with a period of silence for 1 minute with fixation cross on the screen 
and then the virtual scenarios appeared. Each experimental and control scenario lasted for 18 
seconds and participants had to respond within 10 seconds from the beginning of the scenario 
(see Figure 2), after which it was not possible for them to make a choice. Participants could keep 
track of the time limit by a pre-specified event (as explained during the familiarization phase 
using training environment), e.g. in the train dilemma, they had to respond before the train 
crossed the yellow-black striped line (indicated with red circle in Figure 1).  In all the VR 
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scenarios, the threat was by default directed towards the maximum number of virtual humans (2 
or 5), e.g. in the train dilemma, the signal was green for the track on which two/five virtual 
humans were walking (see Figure 1). Thus, participants had to press the button on the joystick to 
change the signal from green to red for the track on which there were five virtual humans, which 
automatically gave a green signal for the train to pass on the alternative track on which there was 
one virtual human walking (of course, only if they wanted to achieve a utilitarian outcome in this 
situation).  
 
Figure 2: Design of the experiment. Participants completed the task in two sessions, 
separated by a variable number of days. In the text session, participants read the 
dilemmas at their own pace and then gave their judgments in 12 seconds, while in the VR 
session they had to act within 10 seconds since the beginning of the virtual environment 
and witnessed consequences of their actions afterwards for 8 seconds.  
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In the post-experiment debriefing, we explicitly asked participants about any difficulties or 
technical snags they faced during the session. None of them mentioned of failure to respond due 
to unavailability of sufficient time or having pressed a wrong button in confusion. This gives us 
more confidence to conclude that participants’ responses were a result of their true moral choices 
rather than failure to respond in time or confusion. 
Electrodermal activity recording 
While participants performed the task, their electrodermal responses were monitored as an index 
of arousal and somatic state activation (Dawson et al., 2007). For each participant, prewired 
Ag/AgCl electrodes were attached to the volar surfaces of the medial phalanges of the middle 
and index fingers of the non-dominant hand, which left the dominant hand free for the behavioral 
task. The electrode pair was excited with a constant voltage of 0.5 V and conductance was 
recorded using a DC amplifier with a low-pass filter set at 64 Hz and a sample frequency of 256 
Hz. As subjects performed the task seated in front of the computer, SCR was collected 
continuously using a Thought Technology Procomp Infiniti encoder and stored for off-line 
analysis on a second PC. Each trial (experimental or control) was preceded by a 1-minute 
baseline recording period during which participants rested in the chair, while their SCR activity 
returned to baseline. Presentation of each dilemma was synchronized with the sampling 
computer to the nearest millisecond, and each button press by the subjects left a bookmark on the 
SCR recording. Subjects were asked to stay as still as possible in order to avoid any introduction 
of noise in the data due to hand movements. SCR activity was not recorded for the 
familiarization/training phase of the VR session.  
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Questionnaire 
At the end of the experiment, a recall questionnaire asked participants about how much could 
they remember about their decisions in the previous session. Participants had to qualitatively 
describe what they could recall, instead of reporting it on a scale. This data was later quantified 
by two referees blind to the purpose of the experiment. The responses were categorized into a 5-
point Likert scale ranging from -2 (can’t remember anything) to 0 (remember something) to 2 
(remember everything).  
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3. Results 
3.1 Responses 
For each participant, we computed the proportion of utilitarian decisions by calculating the 
number of experimental dilemmas in which a utilitarian decision was taken divided by the total 
number of dilemmas (which was four for all the participants), e.g. if the participant made 
utilitarian decision for 2 out of 4 dilemmas, the score was 0.5 for that participant for that 
particular session. Control condition data was not analyzed for this dependent variable because it 
did not pose any dilemma. Indeed, all the participants saved the virtual human over the empty 
boxes in the control condition. The proportions of utilitarian decisions were computed for each 
participant for each session separately. The average of these proportions was computed across 
subjects for each session and compared between the two sessions to check for the discrepancy 
between judgment and behavior. The data was analyzed for 34 participants for the reasons 
described in the Electrodermal Activity results section. Statistical Analysis was carried out using 
SPSS 11 Software (SPSS Inc., Chertsey UK).  
In the text session, the average proportion of judgments endorsing utilitarian outcome was 0.76 
(SD = 0.32); while for the VR session, the average proportion of actions that endorsed utilitarian 
outcome was 0.95 (SD = 0.14) (see Figure 3).  
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Figure 3: Proportion of utilitarian decisions made in the two sessions differed 
significantly with people acting in more utilitarian manner in virtual reality (VR) 
dilemmas as compared to their judgments in the same dilemmas presented with text. 
Error bars indicate standard errors.   
The distribution of utilitarian proportions did not follow normal distribution for both sessions 
(Shapiro-Wilk test: ps < 0.01). Thus, we compared mean ranks of these proportions from two 
sessions using related-samples Wilcoxon signed rank test and found a significant difference:  Z = 
-3.35, p = 0.001 (two-tailed). Therefore, the difference between the proportions of utilitarian 
decisions taken in the two sessions was significant, with people acting in more utilitarian manner 
in VR session than they judged in text session. Unexpectedly, this effect was dependent on the 
order (see Table 1) in which participants carried out the sessions (text-first [n = 19]: Z = -2.98, p 
= 0.003; VR-first [n = 15]: Z = -1.52, p = 0.13). To further investigate the order effects, we 
computed a discrepancy index for each participant as the difference between proportion of 
utilitarian decisions taken in VR and text session. One-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test (two-
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tailed) showed that median of discrepancy index was significantly different from zero for text-
first order (Z = 2.98, p = 0.003), but not for VR-first order (Z = 1.86, p = 0.063). Additionally, 
chi-square test for independence with order of sessions (dummy coded 0: text-first and 1: VR-
first) and judgment-behavior discrepancy (dummy coded as 0: no discrepancy and 1: exhibited 
discrepancy) as numerical variables gave a marginally significant result (χ2( 1) = 3.348, p = 0.06, 
φ = -0.323). In other words, ratio of participants who exhibited to who did not exhibit judgment-
behavior discrepancy was dependent on the order in which participants faced the sessions. 
Table 1: The judgment-behavior discrepancy between two sessions was dependent on the 
order in which participants performed sessions.  (VR: virtual reality) 
0 > 0 < 0
Text-first 19 8 11 0
VR-first 15 10 4 1
Order
Sample 
size
Change in proportion of 
utilitarian decisions (VR-text)
 
Hence, participants behaved in more utilitarian manner in the VR session as compared to the text 
session, but the effect was strongest when they faced text first. Our prediction about 
inconsistency between judgments and actions was thus borne out by these results.  
3.2 Response Time 
Since the non-utilitarian response was the default choice, subjects did not have to press any 
button to take a non-utilitarian decision, which meant that we could not collect data regarding 
response time for these decisions. The response time data could only be recorded for the 
utilitarian responses. In the text session, the reaction time for the utilitarian decision was taken to 
be the time difference between the appearance of the question on the screen and participant’s 
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response, while in the VR session, it was the interval between the time at which the virtual 
scenarios started and the time at which response was given. Since the two sessions featured 
different presentation modalities with different cognitive requirements, one requiring language 
comprehension while the other requiring visual perception of the situation, the elicited response 
times were not directly comparable. We harnessed control conditions from the respective 
sessions for this purpose. We computed a response time (RT) index for each subject by 
computing the difference between response time for utilitarian decisions in experimental 
condition and control conditions (in control condition, utilitarian decision was saving virtual 
human over empty boxes), denoted by RT (uti-con). Two subjects did not take any utilitarian 
decision in experimental condition of one of the sessions, so the sample size for this analysis was 
32. The distribution of response time indices for both sessions followed normal distributions 
(Shapiro-Wilk test: ps > 0.2).  
Paired-samples t-test showed that the difference in RT (uti-con) for VR (M = 0.72s, SD = 1.50) 
and text (M = 0.21s, SD = 1.33) dilemmas was not significant (t(31) = 1.547, p = 0.132). This 
result was independent of the order in which sessions were performed by participants: for text-
first, t(16) = 1.027, p = 0.32; while for VR-first, t(14) = 1.240, p = 0.24. Thus, controlling for the 
differences in the presentation of the dilemmas in two sessions, subjects who endorsed utilitarian 
options did not differ in the amount of time they required to respond in text and in VR.  
3.3 Electrodermal Activity 
For the VR session, skin conductance data was analyzed for the entire length of the trial (which 
lasted for 18 seconds since the beginning of the scenario). For the text session, the skin 
conductance data was analyzed for a window of [-53, + 5] seconds, centered on the appearance 
of the question. This particular window was selected because 53 seconds was the average time 
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required by participants to read the description of the dilemma, after which the question 
appeared, and 5 seconds was the average response time.  These two time segments were 
comparable across two sessions, since they included the time period in which participants 
comprehended and contemplated over available options, formed a preference, and executed the 
response. But there was one difference between the two SCR windows analyzed for two 
sessions: only the window in VR session included witnessing distressing consequences
1
 for 8 
seconds, while no such condition (e.g. reading the consequences) was present for the window in 
text session (See Figure 2). 
Skin conductance data of three participants was removed for being outliers (2 SD away from 
mean value).  Additionally, skin conductance data could not be recorded from one participant 
during the VR session and from two participants during the text session due to a temporary 
malfunction in the recording device. Skin conductance data were thus analyzed for both sessions 
for 34 participants. For the analysis of skin conductance data, we used Ledalab software 
(http://www.ledalab.de/) on Matlab (v 7.12.0) platform. Ledalab performs a continuous 
decomposition analysis to separate the phasic and tonic components. We defined SCR as the 
maximal conductance increase obtained in the SCR window of 1s to 3 s relative to the onset of 
the analysis window.  To avoid false positive signals, the minimum threshold for SCR to be valid 
was 0.02 µS. We then computed SCRs for all the trials as “area under curve” (Moretto et al., 
                                                          
1
 In addition to other differences mentioned in the Introduction section, our study also differed in this crucial aspect 
from the study of Navarrete et al. (2012), since in their study participants did not witness death of any virtual agent: 
“Screams of distress from either one or five agents became audible depending on the direction of the boxcar and the 
placement of the agents. Screaming was cut short at the moment of impact, and the visual environment faded to 
black.” (p. 367) 
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2010). The “area under curve” measurement is the time integral of phasic driver within response 
window with straight line between the end points of the window taken as baseline rather than 
zero. The area is expressed in terms of amplitude units (microsiemens, µS) per time interval 
(sec).  Area bounded by the curve thus captures both the amplitude and temporal characteristics 
of an SCR and therefore is a more valid indicator than either aspect alone (Figner & Murphy, 
2010). All SCRs were square-root-transformed to attain statistical normality (Shapiro-Wilk test: 
ps > 0.2). 
We carried out repeated-measures ANOVA on SCRs with session (text, VR) and condition 
(experimental, control) as within-subjects factors (see Figure 4). The ANOVA revealed a main 
effect of session (F(1,33) = 65.15, p < 0.001, pη2 = 0.67) which was independent of the order of 
sessions (for order VR-first: F(1,14) = 26.45, p < 0.001 and for order text-first: F(1,18) = 41.07, 
p < 0.001).  Thus, the moral dilemmas were more emotionally arousing when presented in VR 
than when presented in textual format, irrespective of the condition. The ANOVA also revealed a 
main effect of condition (F(1,33) = 11.28, p = 0.002, pη2 = 0.26), which meant that the moral 
dilemmas in experimental conditions were perceived to be more emotionally arousing than the 
control conditions. This effect was independent of the order; for order VR-first: F(1,14) = 7.65, p 
= 0.016, pη2 = 0.37 and for order text-first: F(1,17) = 5.44, p = 0.032, pη2 = 0.24. 
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Figure 4: Skin conductance responses in the two sessions for making decisions in 
experimental and control conditions. Taking decisions in virtual reality (VR) dilemmas 
was more emotionally arousing than in textual dilemmas, even after controlling for 
general differences in the two modalities of presentation using the respective control 
conditions. Only in VR session taking decisions in experimental conditions was more 
emotionally arousing than control conditions. Error bars indicate standard errors. 
Post-hoc t-tests revealed that the experimental conditions were more arousing than control 
conditions only for VR session: t(33) = 3.68, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.28 (for order VR-first: 
t(14) = 3.58, p = 0.003, Cohen’s d = 1.91 and for order text-first: t(18) = 2.28, p = 0.036, 
Cohen’s d = 1.07). But experimental conditions were no more arousing than the control 
condition for the text session:  t(33) = 0.67, p = 0.51 (for order VR-first: t(14) = -.05, p = 0.96 
and for order text-first: t(18) = 1.40, p = 0.18). This is consistent with our hypothesis: because of 
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the contextually impoverished nature of the text dilemmas, the experimental conditions failed to 
push the emotional buttons and, thus, making decisions in experimental conditions was no more 
arousing than in control conditions.  But this was not the case for (possibly ecologically more 
valid) VR dilemmas; for VR dilemmas, making choices in experimental dilemmas was more 
emotionally arousing than in control conditions. Finally, we observed a robust interaction effect 
between session and condition: F(1,33) = 12.72, p = 0.001, pη2 = 0.28. This interaction effect 
was independent of the order in which participants faced the two sessions (for order VR-first: 
F(1,14) = 10.28, p = 0.007, while for order text-first: F(1,18) = 4.31, p = 0.052).   Thus, taking 
decisions in experimental moral dilemmas was more emotionally arousing in the VR session as 
compared to the text session, after controlling for the differences in these two presentation 
modalities.  
In the preceding analysis, we have not analyzed the data for utilitarian and non-utilitarian 
decisions separately and thus it can be argued that the SCRs for non-utilitarian decisions might 
have confounded the results. Thus, we performed another analysis using only the experimental 
conditions (from both sessions) in which utilitarian decisions were taken and removed the trials 
in which non-utilitarian decisions were taken. This led to reduction in the sample size, since 
three subjects had not taken any utilitarian decision in one of the sessions. All the previous 
results were replicated in this analysis; main effect of session (F(1,29) = 73.74, p < 0.001, pη2 = 
0.73), main effect of condition (F(1,29) = 9.20, p = 0.005, pη2 = 0.25), and interaction (F(1,29) = 
11.50, p = 0.002, pη2 = 0.29). Additionally, these results were true for both order VR-first 
(session: p < 0.0001, condition: p = 0.03, session by condition: p = 0.05) and text-first (session: p 
< 0.0001, condition: p = 0.016, session by condition: p = 0.007). A similar ANOVA model could 
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not be constructed for non-utilitarian decisions because there was not enough SCR data for VR 
session; non-utilitarian decision was taken only in 5% of experimental trials.  
3.4 Questionnaire 
Recall questionnaire data showed that participants could recall (M = 0.77, SD = 0.77) their 
decisions from the previous sessions fairly well (one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test: Z = 
3.758, p < 0.000) in both sessions orders (VR-first: p = 0.014, for text-first: p = 0.006). This 
could potentially have confounded the main behavioral result: participants who could remember 
better would show less discrepancy to remain consistent as compared to participants who could 
not. This explanation seems unlikely because there was no significant correlation between recall 
and discrepancy index (ρ(32) = 0.13, p = 0.50) for both session orders (VR-first: p = 0.77, text-
first: p = 0.36). Additionally, there was no correlation between session gap (in number of days) 
and discrepancy index (ρ(32) = 0.06, p = 0.79; VR-first: p = 0.34, text-first: p = 0.75) or recall 
(ρ(32) = -0.07, p = 0.71; VR-first: p = 0.83, text-first: p = 0.96).  
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4. Discussion 
In this experiment, we showed that a change in contextual saliency in the presentation of 
dilemmas led to differences in autonomic arousal and endorsement of utilitarian principle in 
hypothetical moral dilemmas, but these differences were dependent on the order in which 
dilemmas were presented.  In the following sections, we discuss various aspects of the observed 
results.  
4.1 Judgment-behavior discrepancy and order effects 
Moral dilemmas create a decision space which pits the utilitarian rule dictating preference for 
lives of many over lives of few against the deontological rule prohibiting actively or passively 
killing innocent few to save many. We predicted that the choice people would make in this 
dilemma would depend on the contextual saliency of the presentation of the dilemma; in the 
contextually more salient presentation of the dilemmas, people would have to rely less on the 
abridged and unrepresentative mental simulations of the dilemma (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007). As 
per this prediction, we found that participants exhibited judgment-behavior discrepancy by 
endorsing utilitarian principle more in contextually salient VR dilemmas as compared to the 
same dilemmas presented using  relatively arid text format. To put it differently, even though 
some of the participants judged sacrificing one to save many as morally inappropriate in text 
dilemmas, when full spectrum of contextual cues was provided using VR environment, they 
resorted to act in utilitarian fashion contradicting their earlier endorsement of deontological 
principle.    
Interestingly, these results were dependent on the order of sessions (see Table 1) such that only 
the participants who completed the text dilemmas first and then faced VR dilemmas exhibited 
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the judgment-behavior discrepancy. In the VR-first order, participants were consistent in the 
moral principle they endorsed. In other words, participants exhibited more discrepancy (or less 
equivalency) in endorsing utilitarian principle across text and VR dilemmas only when the text 
dilemmas were presented first.  
These results raise a number of questions: Why are the same dilemmas treated differently when 
presented in two different modalities? Why do people show judgment-behavior discrepancy in a 
particular direction? Why is this discrepancy dependent on the order in which the dilemmas are 
presented? We posit that answers to all these questions are connected via a common element of 
emotional processes to which we turn next.    
4.2 Role of emotions in judgment-behavior discrepancy        
We had predicted that the superior contextual saliency of the VR environments would elicit 
higher emotional arousal in participants. Accordingly, we found that VR trials were indeed 
emotionally more arousing than text trials. We found that the experimental conditions 
(containing dilemmas) were emotionally more arousing than the control conditions (no 
dilemmas), but post-hoc comparisons showed that this was true only for VR dilemmas. Thus, the 
text dilemmas were no more arousing than the control conditions without any dilemmas as a 
result of reliance on abstract, abridged, mental simulations of the text scenarios that left 
participants affectively cold (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007). But the heightened skin conductance 
activity in VR with respect to text dilemmas could have been due to the general differences in 
the two presentation modalities, thus we checked if VR dilemmas were more emotionally 
arousing than the text dilemmas controlling for these differences using control conditions from 
the respective sessions. Control conditions were matched with the experimental conditions in a 
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given presentation modality for most of the cognitively important aspects of the stimulus that can 
elicit SCR activity, e.g. length of the trial, cognitive load, stimulus novelty, surprise, etc. 
(Dawson et al., 2007), except for the dilemmatic aspect. Thus, we interpreted any difference in 
skin conductance activity between the two conditions as a gauge of emotional arousal in 
decision-making in dilemmatic situations. This dilemmatic emotional arousal was significantly 
higher for VR dilemmas (VR[experimental-control]) than text dilemmas (Text[experimental-
control]): t(33) = 3.57, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.24. We maintain that the observed judgment-
behavior discrepancy was a direct result of differential ability of these two presentation 
modalities to effectively engage affective processing.  
Based on Greene’s dual process model (Greene et al., 2008, 2004, 2001), we had predicted that 
this increase in affective arousal would be associated with decrease in proportion of utilitarian 
responses. But we found exactly the opposite result; higher emotional processing led to more 
utilitarian responding. Previous studies using either just text dilemmas (for a review, see Greene, 
2009) or just virtual dilemmas (Navarrete et al., 2012) overwhelmingly support predictions of the 
dual process model:  increase in emotional processing/arousal was associated with lower 
likelihood of a utilitarian response and higher likelihood of a non-utilitarian response. This is the 
first study involving both text and VR dilemmas investigating the role of emotion in judgment as 
well as behavior. Additionally, we did not have enough skin conductance data for non-utilitarian 
responses in VR session (only 5% trials) to conduct any meaningful statistical analysis on skin 
conductance data for non-utilitarian choices. Thus, implications of results of this study for 
Greene’s dual process model are unclear. 
One possible explanation for our results in this framework is the following. The dual process 
model posits that intuitive emotional processes support non-utilitarian decisions, while 
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deliberative reasoning processes support utilitarian decisions. Although these processes agree 
most of the time with the responses they come up with (e.g. a negative response to the question 
“Is it morally appropriate to torture people for fun?”), sometimes they can conflict (e.g. in the 
trolley dilemma, where there is an intense pang of emotions at the prospect of sacrificing 
someone, while the cost-benefit analysis is demanding it). This cognitive conflict is detected by 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), resolved with the help of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) 
(Greene et al., 2004). But it has been shown that cognitive conflict resolution is accompanied by 
autonomic arousal (Kobayashi, Yoshino, Takahashi, & Nomura, 2007). Thus, it is possible that 
the association between increase in utilitarian responding in VR dilemmas and heightened 
autonomic arousal in VR with respect to text actually represent the greater demand for cognitive 
conflict resolution in VR dilemmas, which are perceived to be more difficult than the text 
dilemmas (as shown by both objective SCR data) and might elicit stronger cognitive conflict. 
This explanation makes a testable prediction that considering VR dilemmas will lead to higher 
activity in ACC and dlPFC, as compared to text dilemmas. Future studies should investigate if 
this is indeed the case.  
That said, we think that our results fit with the predictions of Cushman's version of the dual-
process model (Cushman, 2013a). In this model, the two processes that compete with and 
(sometimes) complement each other depend upon different value-representation targets. One 
process assigns value directly to the actions (e.g. negative value to the representation of pushing 
someone off the bridge or positive value to the representation of giving food to a beggar), while 
the other process assigns value to the outcome (e.g. negative value to the representation of 
physical harm to the person pushed off the bridge or positive value to the representation of 
content face of a beggar). Given that deontological decisions focus more on the nature of actions, 
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while utilitarian decisions focus more on consequences of an action, it follows that this model 
associates utilitarian decisions with a cognitive process dependent on outcome-based value 
representations while deontological decisions with a cognitive process dependent on action-
based value representations. The model contends that both processes have some affective content 
and are responsible for motivating the respectively endorsed behavioral responses.  
In the light of this model, we hypothesize that in VR participants could have been more sensitive 
to outcomes because they witnessed distressing consequences (gory deaths of virtual humans) of 
their actions and emotions motivated them to act in order to minimize the distress by choosing 
the best of two emotionally aversive options in which either one or numerous (2 or 5) deaths 
occur. We posit that outcome-based value representation for not acting to save numerous 
innocent individuals from harm and seeing them die has more negative value than choosing to 
act and see the death of one innocent individual. With textual descriptions, people need to rely 
more on mental simulation of the situation and, given the paucity of the contextual features 
(audio and visual representations) which are accessible to people during such mental simulation, 
they cannot access context-dependent knowledge important for decisions that would otherwise 
be accessible to them in a more ecologically valid situation (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007). As a 
result, they tend to focus more on their basic duty of not being responsible for the death of any 
individuals. This attributes more negative value to the representation of an agent's action which 
is responsible for the harm than to the representation of an agent's inaction which is responsible 
for the harm. Thus, in the text session, people judge that actions maximizing aggregate welfare at 
the expense of physical harm to someone are inappropriate.  
Outcomes are made more salient by the VR session in at least two ways: (i) the number of bodies 
that are going to be harmed are easily comparable on the screen before making a choice. This 
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would predict increased utilitarian choice beginning with the very first experimental VR 
dilemma; (ii) since participants watch somebody get harmed in a violent and gory way after 
making a choice, this might influence their subsequent choices, making them more sensitive to 
outcomes.  This would predict that participants' first choices in the VR dilemmas would be 
similar to their text choices, but that subsequent choices in the VR dilemmas would be more 
utilitarian. In order to arbitrate between these two possibilities, we carried out a new analysis. 
We noted that out of 33 participants only 3 (out of which 2 later changed to utilitarian choices) 
made a non-utilitarian decision on their first dilemma in VR, while 10 made a non-utilitarian 
decision on their first dilemma in the text session.  Binary logistic regression with categorical 
predictor variables (VR, text) and response on the first dilemma as dependent variable (dummy 
coded as 0: non-utilitarian and 1: utilitarian) showed that participants were highly more likely to 
give a utilitarian response from the very beginning of the session in VR session than the text 
session (OR = 7.75, Wald’s χ2 = 6.27, p = 0.012). This analysis supports the first hypothesis that 
the outcomes are made more salient due to the foregrounding of the virtual humans on the screen 
and not due to watching the gory deaths in the first non-utilitarian decision in VR. It could also 
be that the foregrounding of the virtual humans invokes the prospect of watching gory deaths, 
which motivates people to minimize the distress by choosing a utilitarian option. But this is just a 
speculation with no data from the current experiment to support it. 
4.3 Role of emotions in order effects  
As mentioned above, observed asymmetric order-dependent judgment-behavior discrepancy was 
due to more labile judgments on the text dilemmas across orders (Mann-Whitney U test (2-
tailed): p = 0.08), while actions in the VR dilemmas were relatively more stable across orders 
(Mann-Whitney U test (2-tailed): p = 0.39). This response pattern is reminiscent of the finding 
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that when people face the trolley dilemma after considering the footbridge dilemma, they are 
significantly less likely to endorse utilitarian resolution, but making a judgment about the trolley 
dilemma has little to no effect on judgments about the footbridge dilemma (Schwitzgebel & 
Cushman, 2012). Schwitzgebel & Cushman (2012) suggest that participants’ desire to maintain 
consistency between their responses (Lombrozo, 2009) is upheld when the emotionally more 
arousing case (e.g. footbridge) comes first and exerts influence on the emotionally less arousing 
case (e.g. trolley) so that these two cases are judged in a consistent manner, but overridden when 
the emotionally less arousing case comes first and fails to exert influence on the emotionally 
more arousing case and the two cases are judged in an inconsistent manner.   
Similarly, in our experiment, when the participants acted in the emotionally salient VR dilemmas 
in the first session, these choices influenced the judgments in the text session and no discrepancy 
was observed. On the other hand, when the participants first judged emotionally flat text 
dilemmas in the first session and then faced the VR dilemmas, the desire to be consistent with 
responses from previous session was overridden by emotional impact of VR dilemmas. It is 
important to note that there was no significant difference in the ability to recall choices from the 
previous session for the group of participants in these two orders (Z = -0.57, p = 0.62). 
Therefore, variation in the ability to recall choices can’t explain the observed pattern of order 
effect.  
Thus, we assert that the differences in the inherent ability of the dilemma presentation modalities 
to elicit emotions were responsible for the observed asymmetric order effect. 
4.4 Alternative explanations  
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An alternative explanation for our behavioral results can be that the change in decisions is due to 
the different amount of time available for deliberation decisions in the two sessions, which can 
affect moral judgments (Paxton, Ungar, & Greene, 2012; Suter & Hertwig, 2011). Since the text 
session was self-paced, people had ample amount of time to ponder over the nature of the 
dilemma and then decide in 12 seconds. On the other hand, in the VR session, people had to 
comprehend and respond to these dilemmas within 10 seconds. It can thus be argued that people 
depended on quick affective processes while acting in the VR session but relied on slower, 
conscious reasoning processes when they made judgments in the text session. However, this 
seems unlikely because people took an equal amount of time in both sessions for endorsing the 
utilitarian option once controlled for differences specific to modality of presentation. 
Additionally, Suter and Hertwig (2011) showed that people, when pressured to give a response 
as quickly as possible, gave a smaller number of utilitarian responses but only in case of high-
conflict moral dilemmas. There was no effect of available deliberation time on the likelihood of 
making a utilitarian response on impersonal and low-conflict moral dilemmas. The same 
reasoning holds for the study by Paxton et al. (2012) which focused on moral judgments about 
sibling incest. In our experiment, we exclusively focused on impersonal dilemmas. This bolsters 
our contention that differences in the available time budget to make a decision cannot explain the 
observed pattern of discrepancy. 
Another explanation can be that differences in cognitive load (reading vs. watching) intrinsic to 
the presentation modalities can explain this pattern of results, because cognitive load can 
modulate utilitarian decisions (Greene et al., 2008). However, effects of cognitive load cannot 
account for our results for three reasons.  First, Greene at al.’s study showed that cognitive load 
affects utilitarian decisions but just in case of personal, high-conflict moral dilemmas (our study 
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involved only impersonal dilemmas). Second, more importantly, the same study showed that 
there was a significant difference in the reaction time for utilitarian decisions in two conditions 
(load and no-load), but there was no change in the proportion of utilitarian decisions in these two 
conditions. So, although participants took more time to come to a utilitarian resolution under 
cognitive load, they made utilitarian decision nonetheless. Third, in our study, we controlled for 
the general differences in the presentation modalities using appropriate control conditions which 
were matched for most of the cognitive aspects except for the dilemmatic one. These 
considerations together with our reaction time data (people took equal amount of time to make 
utilitarian decisions in two sessions) make it highly unlikely that differences in cognitive load 
can explain the observed discrepancy.  
4.5 Shortcomings of the study 
Relying on impersonal moral dilemmas might have reduced the discrepancy. A significant 
percentage (53%) of the sample did not show any judgment-behavior discrepancy due to ceiling 
effect. It has been consistently found (Greene et al., 2004, 2001; Hauser et al., 2007; Mikhail, 
2007) that there is a wide agreement among lay people that the best action in impersonal 
dilemmas is the one that allows an innocent individual to be physical harmed to achieve the 
maximum welfare for the maximum number of agents involved, with as many as 90% people 
endorsing this utilitarian outcome. However, there is a wide disagreement (Greene et al., 2004, 
2001; Hauser et al., 2007; Mikhail, 2007) over the best course of action in case of personal moral 
dilemmas where an agent needs to be intentionally harmed as a mean to achieve the end of 
aggregate welfare, with proportion of people endorsing utilitarian outcomes varying widely 
depending on the context of the dilemmas at hand. Thus, it was not surprising that out of the 18 
people who did not change their decisions, 17 had endorsed utilitarian actions in all the moral 
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dilemmas in both sessions. Since this group of participants endorsed the maximum number of 
utilitarian decisions in both sessions, there was no room for judgment-behavior discrepancy to 
manifest.  Future studies should extend current findings by using VR renditions of personal 
moral dilemmas. We speculate that the discrepancy would be greater for these dilemmas.  
Another drawback of this study was that the moral behavior was investigated using virtual 
situations, which, although perceptually more salient and ecologically more valid, were still 
improbable. This poses limitations on the generalizability of these results to real-life setting. But 
we would like to note that predicting real-life behavior was not the primary objective of this 
study (cf. Mook, 1983).   
5. Conclusion 
To summarize, in this study we have demonstrated that people show an order-dependent 
judgment-behavior discrepancy in hypothetical, impersonal moral dilemmas. This discrepancy 
was a result of the differential ability of contextual information to evoke emotions which 
motivate behavior, as indicated by the difference in SCR between the two modalities (VR vs. 
text).  People judged in less utilitarian (or more action-based) manner in emotionally flat and 
contextually impoverished moral dilemmas presented in text format, while they acted in more 
utilitarian (or more outcome-based) manner in the emotionally arousing and contextually rich 
versions of the same dilemmas presented using virtual environments.  
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Abstract 
This study investigated hypothetical moral choices in adults with high-functioning autism and 
role of empathy and alexithymia in such choices. We used a highly emotionally salient moral 
dilemma task to investigate autistics’ hypothetical moral evaluations about personally carrying 
out harmful utilitarian behaviours aimed at maximizing welfare. Results showed that they 
exhibited a normal pattern of moral judgments despite the deficits in social cognition and 
emotional processing. Further analyses revealed that this was due to mutually conflicting biases 
associated with autistic and alexithymic traits after accounting for shared variance: (a) autistic 
traits were associated reduced utilitarian bias due to elevated personal distress of demanding 
social situations, while (b) alexithymic traits were associated with increased utilitarian bias on 
account of reduced empathic concern for the victim. Additionally, autistics relied on their non-
verbal reasoning skills to rigidly abide by harm-norms. Thus, utilitarian moral judgments in 
autism were spared due to mutually conflicting influence of autistic and alexithymic traits and 
compensatory intellectual strategies. These findings demonstrate the importance of empathy and 
alexithymia in autistic moral cognition and have methodological implications for studying moral 
judgments in several other clinical populations. 
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“[Autistic people are] cold, calculating killing machines with no regard for human life!” 
- Facebook post by “Families Against Autistic Shooters” in response to the mass-shooting 
incident at Umpqua Community College, Oregon (as reported in The New York Times Op-Ed 
article “The Myth of the ‘Autistic Shooter’” by Andrew Solomon, October 12, 2015)  
1. Introduction 
Harmful behaviours are inherently dyadic, comprising of an agent who harms and a victim who 
gets harmed (Gray & Schein, 2012). Accordingly, moral evaluations in healthy individuals about 
such behaviours hinges on two different routes to the understanding of other minds (Bzdok et al., 
2012): a cognitive route that represents agent’s beliefs and goals (called theory of mind (ToM) or 
sociocognitive route), while an affective route that identifies feeling states in the victim and 
elicits isomorphic feeling states (e.g., pain) in the observer (called empathy or socioaffective 
route).  
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterized by problems with reciprocal social interaction, 
impaired communication, repetitive behaviours/narrow interests and impairments in these very 
aspects of social cognition and emotional processing necessary for proper moral reasoning (Bird 
& Cook, 2013). Although past work has investigated impact of ToM deficits on moral 
judgments, the effect of empathy deficits remains to be thoroughly investigated. Furthermore, 
recent body of work shows that only ToM deficits are inherent to the autistic phenotype and the 
empathy deficits are due to co-occurring alexithymia (Bird & Cook, 2013) (a subclinical 
condition characterized by difficulty in identifying and describing subjective feeling states, 
difficulty in differentiating feelings from bodily sensations, and diminished affect-related fantasy 
(Lane, Weihs, Herring, Hishaw, & Smith, 2015; Sifneos, 1973)). Thus, role of alexithymia in 
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moral evaluations in autism is to date largely unexplored (Brewer et al., 2015). The current study 
explores these issues further.     
1.1 Moral cognition in autism: an overview 
A number of prior studies have utilized variety of moral cognition tasks to explore if the capacity 
to judge third-party harmful behaviours is intact in ASD in the light of the deficits in social 
cognition and emotional functioning. This research shows that the distinction between intentional 
moral transgressions (that involve a suffering victim whose personal rights are violated; e.g. 
hitting others) and conventional transgressions (characterized by infraction of normative 
prohibitions but with no consequence for others’ welfare; e.g. talking out of turn) is substantially 
intact in children and adults with ASD (Blair, 1996; Leslie, Mallon, & DiCorcia, 2006; Shulman, 
Guberman, Shiling, & Bauminger, 2012; Zalla, Barlassina, Buon, & Leboyer, 2011). These 
studies underscore that ASD population (both children and adults) can distinguish between 
intentional good and bad actions and have preserved moral knowledge (Gleichgerrcht et al., 
2013; Li, Zhu, & Gummerum, 2014).  
Although autistics do not seem to be impaired in evaluating intentional third-party harm-doings, 
they exhibit more enduring deficits on more complex intent-based moral judgment tasks that 
require integration of information about mental states of the agents with the information about 
outcomes of these acts. In particular, they judge accidental harms more harshly, arguably due to 
their inability to form a robust representation of agent’s benign intentions (due to ToM deficits 
(Fletcher-Watson & McConachie, 2014)) that can be weighted up against a strong negative 
emotional response stemming from the victim suffering (Buon, Dupoux, et al., 2013; Koster-
Hale, Saxe, Dungan, & Young, 2013; Moran et al., 2011; Roge & Mullet, 2011) (but see Baez et 
 57 
 
al., 2012). Thus, this work is consistent with the profile of ASD featuring preserved 
psychophysiological/emotional response to others’ affective states (affective empathy) but 
reduced cognitive understanding about others’ internal states (ToM) and demonstrates how 
sociocognitive/ToM deficits in ASD modulate their moral judgments about third-party moral 
violations, but only when these processes need to operate in tandem with other processes (e.g., 
harm assessment) that provide conflicting contextual information that needs to be integrated for a 
final moral judgment (Baez & Ibanez, 2014; Zalla & Leboyer, 2011).  
Despite an abundance of work focusing on role of ToM deficits on performance on intent-based 
judgment tasks that involve conflict between intent and consequences, there is a paucity of 
literature exploring how empathy deficits in ASD translate into behavioural choices in 
hypothetical scenarios.  
1.2 Empathy and moral condemnation of harmful behaviour 
Emotions play a pivotal role in condemnation of harmful behaviours (Avramova & Inbar, 2013) 
and empathy is a social emotion that plays a crucial role in such moral evaluations (Decety & 
Cowell, 2014; Ugazio, Majdandžić, & Lamm, 2014). This is because (real or hypothetical) 
harmful encounters include a suffering victim and empathy allows moral judges to understand 
their suffering and use the resulting “gut-feelings” to either approve or disapprove of such moral 
actions (Ugazio et al., 2014). But empathy is a multidimensional construct (Davis, 1983) 
consisting of a cognitive component that is involved in merely understanding the emotional 
states in others, while affective empathy enable observers to share these feeling states in an 
isomorphic manner. Accordingly, affective empathy has been found to be more consequential in 
motivating behaviour (for a review, see Ugazio et al., 2014). But affective empathy itself has two 
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disparate facets that are associated with different motivational tendencies (Decety & Cowell, 
2014; Ugazio et al., 2014): (i) other-oriented empathic concern involves intuitions about 
protecting physical integrity of others and being apprehensive of any actions that result in harm 
to others and is associated with appetitive motivation to prevent harm to others; (ii) self-oriented 
personal distress reflects aversive feeling contingent on vicarious sharing of the others’ 
emotional and physical distress and sense of loss of control in emotionally charged harmful 
situations and is associated with avoidance motivation to escape such distressful situation. 
Given this crucial role of empathy in moral condemnation of harmful behaviour, ASD would be 
expected to have impairments in moral judgments in situations that harness these processes. But 
this simplistic picture is further complicated in light of the new insights provided by the 
alexithymia hypothesis (Bird & Cook, 2013) which postulates that only the deficits observed in 
the sociocognitive domain are unique to the autism phenotype, while the deficits associated with 
socioaffective domain are due to the co-occurring alexithymic phenotype and is not a feature of 
autism per se (Bernhardt et al., 2014). Although the preponderance rate of clinical levels of 
alexithymia in healthy population is at 10%, it is unusually prevalent (40-65%) in adults and 
children with ASD (Berthoz & Hill, 2005; Griffin, Lombardo, & Auyeung, 2015; Hill, Berthoz, 
& Frith, 2004; Salminen, Saarijärvi, Äärelä, Toikka, & Kauhanen, 1999). Therefore, it is 
important to account for its effects in emotional processing deficits observed in ASD, especially 
because trait alexithymia itself has been associated with impaired emotional processing (e.g., 
empathy (Grynberg, Luminet, Corneille, Grèzes, & Berthoz, 2010), emotion regulation(Swart, 
Kortekaas, & Aleman, 2009), emotional interoception (Silani et al., 2008), etc.). Thus, it is likely 
that, when observed, the emotional processing deficits in ASD are due to the presence of 
elevated levels of alexithymia. Indeed, after accounting for co-occurring alexithymia, autism is 
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no longer associated with aberrant neural activation while empathizing with others’ pain (Bird et 
al., 2010), self-reported deficits on dispositional empathy (Aaron, Benson, & Park, 2015), or 
deficits in interocepting on one’s own emotional states (Silani et al., 2008).  
Thus, any investigation gauging effects of aberrant emotional skills on moral cognition in ASD 
should also account for effects of prevalent alexithymia. Indeed a number of recent studies have 
begun to explore role of alexithymia in moral judgments in both clinical (Gleichgerrcht, 
Tomashitis, & Sinay, 2015; Patil, Young, Sinay, & Gleichgerrcht, 2016) and non-clinical 
populations (Koven, 2011; Patil & Silani, 2014a, 2014b), but only one study thus far has 
investigated this issue (Brewer et al., 2015) in the ASD population and found limited support for 
the alexithymia hypothesis. In the current study, we further investigate role of emotional 
processing deficits and alexithymia in autistics’ moral cognition with a well-validated moral 
judgment task. 
1.3.2 Utilitarian moral judgments on moral dilemmas 
One widely used task that assesses role of emotional processing in first-party, hypothetical 
harmful behaviours is the moral dilemma task (Christensen & Gomila, 2012; Greene et al., 
2004). Moral dilemmas are situations where two moral principles conflict with each other, e.g. 
“do not do harm unto others” against “act in a way so that maximum number of people will be 
better off”. In the harm domain, these dilemmas are instantiated by creating scenarios where the 
agent needs to act in order to produce the least harmful of possible outcomes (e.g., killing one to 
save many), i.e. situations where inaction would lead to more people getting hurt, but acting 
requires actively harming someone. These moral dilemmas are further divided into two classes 
based on the nature of harmful actions and their causal-intentional structure (Mikhail, 2007) (see 
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Figure 1 for examples): (i) moral dilemmas that require agents to harm someone in up close and 
personal manner, i.e. by executing a motor act (Greene et al., 2009), and where the victim needs 
to harmed as a means to achieve the greater good are called personal moral dilemmas (e.g., 
pushing someone to their death to save greater number of lives); (ii) moral dilemmas that feature 
harms that carried out not by physical force but by mechanical means and where the harm that 
befalls the victim is a side-effect of harmful act are called impersonal moral dilemmas (e.g., 
switching course of a trolley that kills someone to save more number of lives). Although the net 
outcome of choosing to act in both types of dilemmas can be the same (e.g., one life lost but five 
lives saved), most people endorse acting (which is said to be an utilitarian response) in cases of 
impersonal dilemmas but refuse to do so on personal dilemmas (which is said to be a 
deontological/non-utilitarian response (Greene et al., 2004)).  
The dual-process model posits two types of processes that support each type of response in 
respective dilemma-contexts (Greene et al., 2004): (i) automatic, affect-laden intuitions that 
surface as a reflex to aversive nature of the proposed harm and subserve non-utilitarian moral 
judgment; (ii) controlled, deliberative reasoning processes that engage in cost-benefit analysis 
and support utilitarian solution. Therefore, according to this model, individuals endorse 
utilitarian moral judgments more frequently on impersonal but not personal moral dilemmas 
because personal cases lead to a stronger negative affect in response to severe physical harm that 
needs to be carried out using personal force. There is plenty of evidence to support this claim 
(Greene, 2014): neuroimaging (Greene et al., 2004), psychophysiological (Moretto et al., 2010), 
and behavioural (Szekely & Miu, 2015) measures corroborate this model by revealing that 
indeed personal moral dilemmas elicit a more pronounced emotional response than the 
impersonal cases. Of interest to the current investigation, this negative emotional arousal 
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partially stems from the harmful outcome, viz. empathic concern for the (to be sacrificed) 
victim’s pain which causes personal distress in the moral judge (Ugazio et al., 2014). 
 
Figure 1: Stimulus examples. Three conditions from the moral dilemma task with 
representative examples from each category. Each type of dilemma was followed by two 
questions: behaviour and emotional arousal. Impersonal and personal conditions involved 
moral content (implications for others’ wellbeing), while the non-moral cases involved 
only pragmatic issues. 
Despite extensive use of this task in healthy controls, very little work has been carried out with 
the autistic population. Extensive prior work has focused on investigating moral cognition in 
clinical populations (e.g., patients with damage to the prefrontal cortex) and subclinical traits 
(e.g., psychopathy) characterized by social cognition and emotional processing disturbances 
using the moral dilemma task. These studies have consistently revealed that these populations 
have increased rate of utilitarian judgments on emotionally charged personal dilemmas as 
compared to control brain-damaged or neurotypical individuals (Chiong et al., 2013; Ciaramelli, 
Sperotto, Mattioli, & di Pellegrino, 2013; Djeriouat & Trémolière, 2014; Gleichgerrcht, 
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Torralva, Roca, Pose, & Manes, 2011; Koenigs et al., 2007; Moretto et al., 2010; Patil, 2015; 
Taber-Thomas et al., 2014). Drawing on this prior work, one would expect that ASD would also 
beget a similar utilitarian moral profile due to similar sociocognitive and socioaffective 
problems.      
Accordingly, one previous study has shown that ASD individuals are more willing to sacrifice 
someone for the greater good on personal moral dilemmas and report to perceive such situations 
to be less emotionally distressing as compared to controls, arguably due to reduced perspective-
taking (cognitive empathy) that normally enables individuals to see things from the perspective 
of the person that needs to be sacrificed (Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013). But this study used only one 
moral dilemma per condition and thus generalizability of these results remains to be assessed. 
This finding is also surprising in the light of evidence for prevalent negative hyperarousal in 
autistic individuals (Capps, Kasari, Yirmiya, & Sigman, 1993; Samson, Hardan, Lee, Phillips, & 
Gross, 2015; Smith, 2009), which would make it less likely that they would make utilitarian 
moral judgments (Greene et al., 2004; Greene, 2014). Indeed, another unpublished study did not 
find any evidence for such increased utilitarian proclivity in ASD (Dr. Geoffrey Bird, personal 
correspondence).  
The alexithymia hypothesis provides a plausible explanation for these conflicting findings in the 
past work. Recent research shows that elevated level of subclinical alexithymia is associated with 
utilitarian profile on personal moral dilemma (Koven, 2011), arguably due to reduced empathic 
concern (which stands for feelings of compassion and sympathy for the unfortunate others) for 
the victim that needs to be sacrificed (Patil & Silani, 2014b). Thus, it is possible that the prior 
finding about increased willingness to personally sacrifice someone for the greater good in ASD 
(Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013) was due to presence of greater number of alexithymics in the ASD 
 63 
 
group as compared to healthy controls, since alexithymia is associated with both reduced 
perspective-taking and empathic concern for others (Grynberg et al., 2010). Thus, increased 
tendency to endorse harmful sacrificial behaviours on moral dilemmas might have resulted from 
failure to empathize with the victim that needs to be sacrificed due to co-occurring alexithymia 
in ASD. Alternatively, it is also possible that utilitarian inclination due to alexithymic traits was 
counterbalanced by non-utilitarian inclination due to autistic traits. Severity of autism is 
associated with increased personal distress during demanding social situations (Gu et al., 2015; 
Smith, 2009), which persists even after accounting for co-occurring alexithymia (Y.-T. T. Fan, 
Chen, Chen, Decety, & Cheng, 2014), and this increased personal distress leads to withdrawal 
from engaging in personally carrying out harmful actions (Sarlo, Lotto, Rumiati, & Palomba, 
2014). Thus, the nature of between-group differences in utilitarian moral judgment in a given 
study may depend on these within-ASD-group interactions between autistic and alexithymia 
traits that exert mutually opposite influence on utilitarian moral judgments.   
Past work in autism also shows that autistics develop compensatory strategies from early 
childhood to counteract their lack of social intuitions (Frith, 2004) whereby they strictly adhere 
to explicitly learned social rules and conventions in an inflexible or stereotyped manner (Baron-
Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan, & Wheelwright, 2003). This can also be garnered from 
overreliance on rule-based thinking while making distinction between (third-party) conventional 
and moral norm transgressions (Shulman et al., 2012; Zalla et al., 2011), which are usually 
justified by healthy controls on the basis of considerations about victim suffering. Additionally, 
they rely less on emotional information and more on rule-based norm obedience while evaluating 
their own hypothetical choices about moral and prosocial behaviours (Brewer et al., 2015; 
Jameel, Vyas, Bellesi, Roberts, & Channon, 2014). Thus, it is possible that autistics rely on their 
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intellectual abilities to form strategies that help them deal with complexities of distressing social 
environments and make adaptive decisions in such settings. This important aspect of their 
cognition has gone understudied in the past work and we explore its role in utilitarian moral 
judgments in the current study in concert with other personality traits.  
1.3.3 Predictions  
Although we did not expect any group differences for utilitarian judgments on impersonal 
dilemmas based on prior work (Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013), we did not have any a priori 
predictions regarding the between-group difference for utilitarian judgments on personal 
dilemmas in light of the conflicting findings from past studies. Indeed, in our framework, this 
difference can vary from study-to-study depending on the intricate web of mutually conflicting 
inputs from a composite of personality traits in the ASD sample (autism, alexithymia, 
intelligence measures, etc.).  
We made following predictions for moral judgments in autistics on personal moral dilemmas: (i) 
alexithymic traits in the ASD sample would be associated with increased utilitarian inclination 
(Koven, 2011; Patil & Silani, 2014b) to endorse harmful sacrificial actions due to reduced 
empathic concern (Aaron et al., 2015; Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Gleichgerrcht & Young, 
2013; Grynberg et al., 2010; Guttman & Laporte, 2002; Miller, Hannikainen, & Cushman, 2014; 
Robinson, Joel, & Plaks, 2015; Royzman, Landy, & Leeman, 2015; Wiech et al., 2013); while 
(ii) autistic traits would be associated with reduced tendency to endorse utilitarian solution due to 
increased negative emotional arousal stemming from personal distress (Sarlo et al., 2014; Spino 
& Cummins, 2014) experienced by autistics while facing demanding social environments  
(Dziobek et al., 2008; Y.-T. T. Fan et al., 2014; Gu et al., 2015; Rogers, Dziobek, Hassenstab, 
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Wolf, & Convit, 2007; Smith, 2009). Note that although one may expect affective empathy 
(empathic concern and personal distress, i.e.) to predict greater endorsement for the utilitarian 
solution on personal dilemma due to greater empathizing with the many (Robinson et al., 2015) - 
who would die in case of inaction – this is not observed because the utilitarian course of action 
features causal intervention on an identifiable and singular victim (Wiss, Andersson, Slovic, 
Västfjäll, & Tinghög, 2015) that needs to be sacrificed and thus the other set of victims are 
pushed to the background in the causal model and does not elicit a robust empathic response 
(Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007; Wiegmann & Waldmann, 2014). Additionally, we note that 
although autism is associated with increased personal distress even after accounting for co-
occurring alexithymia (Y.-T. T. Fan et al., 2014; Patil, Melsbach, Hennig-Fast, & Silani, 2016), 
trait alexithymia itself is also associated with greater personal distress but this association seems 
to be due to prevalent anxiety and is not characteristic of the alexithymic phenotype (Grynberg et 
al., 2010).  
Additionally, we expected there to be a negative correlation between intelligence measure and 
utilitarian moral judgments in ASD representing rigid rule-based norm abidance, but we were 
agnostic as to which component of IQ (verbal or non-verbal) would be implicated as a 
compensatory strategy and made this decision based on the exploratory correlation analysis.  
Although recently a number of criticisms have surfaced that challenge interpreting affirmative 
response on moral dilemma as utilitarian (Kahane, 2015), we use utilitarian to mean 
“characteristically utilitarian” as a function of the response content and not the underlying 
motivation (Greene, 2014). Thus, if a given individual responds affirmatively on a moral 
dilemma, we do not take this response to denote explicit endorsement of utilitarian moral 
principle (“those acts are better that save more number of lives”) on her part, but only to mean 
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that this response coincides with a response that would be endorsed by a typical, card-carrying 
utilitarian moral philosopher (Greene, 2014).       
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2. Methods  
2.1 Participants 
The study sample consisted of 17 subjects (6 females) with a diagnosis of autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD group), who were recruited from autism-specific organizations, associations and 
internet communities via various information materials (e.g., print flyers and posters, digital 
flyers, and Facebook advertisings) and had undergone a screening for any current comorbid 
psychiatric or medical condition. Importantly, we did not exclude ASD participants who were on 
medication - 7 subjects were consuming psychoactive drugs, primarily for depression. The 
medicated ASD group did not differ on any of the variables of interest from the non-medicated 
ASD group. The diagnosis was carried out by experienced clinicians according to the 
internationally accepted ICD-10 diagnostic criteria (World Health Organization, 1992). In line 
with a prior study (Schneider et al., 2013) and DSM-V (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013), we do not further divide ‘ASD group’ into ‘high-functioning autism’ and ‘Asperger’s 
Syndrome’ subgroups. We use the terms ‘autism’, ‘on the autism spectrum’, ‘autistic,’ and 
‘autism spectrum disorder’ to refer to the ASD group as these terms are preferred by this 
population (Kenny et al., 2015). 
Seventeen age-, gender- and level of education-matched participants (4 females; χ2(1) = 0.567, p 
= 0.452) were also included in the healthy controls (HC) group after an interview to ensure 
absence of history of drug abuse, neurological or neuropsychiatric disorders. We note that 
although the final ASD group consisted of high-functioning autistic individuals with IQ 
comparable to the control group, the highest educational degrees that autistic individuals 
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possessed tended to be slightly lower than the healthy controls (see Table 1; presented after 
References).  
All participants were financially compensated for their time and travel expenses and gave written 
informed consent. The study was approved by the local Ethics Committee (University of Vienna) 
and conducted in accordance with the declaration of Helsinki.   
2.2 Questionnaires 
Various questionnaires (German-validated versions) were administered to assess individual 
differences in various aspects of the socioaffective processing: (i) Autism Spectrum Quotient 
(AQ) to assess severity of autistic traits (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & 
Clubley, 2001; Freitag et al., 2007); (ii) Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 
1994; Kupfer, Brosig, & Brähler, 2000) (TAS) to assess severity of alexithymic traits; (iii) 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983; Paulus, 2009) (IRI) as a self-report measure of trait 
empathy and Multifaceted Empathy Test (Dziobek et al., 2008) (MET; revised version provided 
by I. Dziobek, personal correspondence) as a performance measure of state empathy; (iv) 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Abler & Kessler, 2009; Gross & John, 2003) (ERQ) to 
assess emotion regulation profile; (v) Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; 
Hautzinger, 1991) (BDI) to assess severity of depression; (vi) short version of Raven's Standard 
Progressive Matrices (Bilker et al., 2012; Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998) (SPM) and 
Mehrfachwahl-Wortschatz-Intelligenztest-B (Lehrl, Triebig, & Fischer, 1995; Lehrl, 1995) 
(MWT-B; Multiple Choice Vocabulary Intelligence Test) to assess non-verbal and verbal 
intelligence, respectively.  
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Good internal reliability was observed for subscales of questionnaires (see Table 1). For more 
detailed discussion about the questionnaires and their internal reliability analyses, see Appendix 
(Text S1).  
2.4 Moral dilemma judgments 
Stimuli: Experimental stimuli were text-based scenarios. There were three conditions 
representing each class of scenario: non-moral practical dilemmas (n = 6), impersonal moral 
dilemmas (n = 6), and personal moral dilemmas (n = 6) (see Figure 1 for representative examples 
and Appendix (Text S2) for detailed description of the scenarios). All scenarios featured first-
person narrative.  
Personal dilemmas featured situations that demanded agents (read participants) to carry out 
actions using personal force that violated others’ personal rights (Greene et al., 2009). Compared 
to personal dilemmas, impersonal cases featured actions which were less emotionally salient and 
implicated the agent in the scenarios in less personal manner. The common denominator between 
moral dilemmas was that they pitted the normative injunction against violating someone’s 
individual rights by harming them in personal or impersonal manner against the utilitarian option 
of saving greater number of lives. 
Non-moral scenarios posed practical questions and lacked any moral content. Data from non-
moral scenarios are included in every model as a control condition. Thus, if any systematic 
differences are observed for moral dilemmas on any dependent variable, we can ascertain that 
this effect is specific to the moral domain by checking if the same effect is observed also for 
prudential, non-moral dilemmas. 
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Procedure: All participants were individually tested in a quiet room at the Faculty of Psychology 
of the University of Vienna. The experiment was carried out in two sessions separated on 
average by a week (MASD = 5.87±3.02 days, MHC = 6.13±2.00 days, t(24.046) = -0.279, p = 
0.783). In one session, participants completed the moral dilemma task; while in the other session, 
they completed another task (data not reported here). Similarly, in one session, participants 
completed AQ, IRI, TAS, and MET; while in the other session, participants completed ERQ and 
two other questionnaires (data not reported here). The moral tasks and questionnaire set pairings 
were randomized across sessions and participants. For the moral judgment task, before starting 
the actual experiment, each participant took part in one practice trial to ensure that they had 
understood all the instructions.  
Moral judgment task and MET were administered on a computer, while the questionnaires were 
administered in paper-and-pencil format. The stimuli for the moral judgment tasks were 
presented using Cogent 2000 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, 
http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php) running on MATLAB platform. The text of the stories 
was presented in a black 21-point Arial font on a white background with a resolution of 800 × 
600 pixels. MET task was presented using OpenSesame 2.8.1 program (Mathôt, Schreij, & 
Theeuwes, 2012) with a resolution of 1920 × 1080 pixels.  
For the moral judgment task, the order of presentation of scenarios from each condition was 
randomized within subjects. Each dilemma description was presented in a single screen. 
Participants could read this screen at their own pace and move to the questions, by pressing the 
spacebar on the keyboard. The next two screens, presented in the same order for all participants, 
contained questions assessing: behavioural choice and emotional arousal (for exact wording, see 
Figure 1). The behaviour and arousal questions lasted for as long as the participants needed. The 
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affirmative answer on the behaviour question always corresponded to commission of sacrificial 
action. The spatial location (left or right arrows on the keyboard) of two options (yes or no) was 
constant across scenarios and subjects in order to avoid confusion and reduce working memory 
demands, especially for the ASD group. The emotional arousal ratings were recorded using a 
computerized visual analog scale (VAS), implemented as horizontal on-screen bar and responses 
were later converted to standardized scores with [min, max] of [0, 20].    
We focused on behavioural choice of action (“Would you do it?”) over appropriateness of action 
(“Is it appropriate for you to do it?”) because: (i) it tends to be more emotionally arousing (Patil, 
Cogoni, Zangrando, Chittaro, & Silani, 2014), (ii) it tends to elicit more egocentric/self-focused 
(versus allocentric/other-focused) frame of reference because of potential self-relevant 
consequences (Tassy et al., 2013), and (iii) perceived appropriateness of utilitarian course of 
action on moral dilemmas does not differ in ASD (Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013) (as compared to 
healthy controls). Thus, the behavioural choice of action provides a more sensitive measure to 
tap into moral cognition in autism.  
Two ASD participants did not complete the moral dilemma task due to their unavailability for 
the second session, while data from one control participant could not be collected due to 
technical problems with MATLAB. The descriptive statistics for measures other than moral 
dilemma task thus include data from these additional participants. All results remain identical 
after excluding this data and thus they are retained in the current analysis. 
2.6 Statistical analysis 
All statistical analysis was carried out using JASP 0.7.1.12 (https://jasp-stats.org/). Effect size 
measures are reported as per prior recommendations (Lakens, 2013). All tests are two-tailed, 
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unless otherwise stated. As recommended (Weissgerber, Milic, Winham, & Garovic, 2015), we 
provide univariate scatter-plots instead of bar graphs, especially given the small sample sizes in 
the current study. We follow recommended guidelines (Nimon, 2012) to ensure that our data met 
the statistical assumptions associated with the general linear model-based statistical tests.  
Correlation analysis was carried out using Spearman’s rho as it is more robust to univariate 
outliers (Pernet, Wilcox, & Rousselet, 2013) than Pearson’s r. To compare significance of 
between-group differences in correlations, we used Fisher’s Z-test as implemented in FZT-
computator (http://psych.unl.edu/psycrs/statpage/FZT_backup.exe).  
2.7 Path analysis 
In order to study complex web of interactions between different personality variables for 
utilitarian moral judgments, we conducted path analysis. Path analysis was performed in SPSS 
Amos 22 using maximum likelihood estimation (Arbuckle, 2013). Path analysis is a multivariate 
technique that requires formal specification of a model to be estimated and tested based on prior 
research and hypothesis. It involves specifying relationships between study variables and 
multiple equations denoting these relationships are solved simultaneously to test model fit and 
estimate parameter estimates (Arbuckle, 2013).  Note that path analysis is concerned only with 
testing the validity of theoretically-inspired models by fitting them to the observed data and not 
with building models (Streiner, 2005). As such, it cannot arbitrate as to whether the given model 
is correct or not, but only whether it fits the observed data. In the current study, path analysis was 
used to study divergent contributions of personality traits in utilitarian moral judgments in ASD. 
To this effect, models were constructed based on past work in the field and our theoretical 
predictions. The model fit was further improved by reducing model misspecification error with 
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the inclusion of variables based on their correlation pattern with the variables of interest. As 
recommended (Streiner, 2005), model fit was not improved based on modification indices, but 
based on drawing paths that were theoretically meaningful.      
All variables were standardized and centred before the analysis. Presence of multivariate outliers 
was investigated using Mahalanobis distance (none found). Since all paths represent linear 
relationships with a theoretically predicted direction, the significance threshold for regression 
coefficients associated with each path was determined based on one-tailed tests. Although there 
was a possibility of mediation effect involving some of the paths, no formal mediation analysis 
was carried out because the sample size was insufficient to carry out such analyses (Fritz & 
MacKinnon, 2007).  
In order to assess goodness of model fit, we chose indices that have been found to be least 
susceptible to effects of sample size, model misspecification, and parameter estimates. Following 
guidelines provided by Hooper and colleagues (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008), we used - 
(i) model chi-square and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), along with the 
associated p-value for close fit, as the absolute fit indices (which measure the model fit in 
comparison to no model at all), (ii) comparative fit index (CFI) along with its parsimony index 
(PCFI) as the incremental fit indices (which gauge the model fit with respect to null model where 
all variables are uncorrelated). We do not report the standardized root mean square residual 
(SRMR) as Amos does not produce this index in the presence of missing data. The recommended 
cut-off values are (Hooper et al., 2008): RMSEA ≤ 0.07 (good), 0.07 < RMSEA ≤ 0.10 
(moderate), p for close fit > 0.05, CFI ≥ 0.95. There is no recommended cut-off for PCFI.  
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3. Results 
3.1 Elevated levels of alexithymia in ASD 
As expected, ASD group had higher alexithymia score than the HC group (see Table 1). There 
were 8 autistics (out of 17 or 47%) who were also clinically alexithymic (Bagby et al., 1994) (≥ 
54), while no participant from the control group scored above the clinical cut-off. The frequency 
of alexithymics differed significantly across groups (χ2(1) = 10.462, p = 0.001, ϕ = 0.555).    
3.2 Emotional processing deficits in ASD 
As expected autistics were impaired (as compared to controls) on a number of emotional 
processing measures (see Table 1): (i) they reported to have reduced dispositional tendency to 
adopt others’ perspective and to experience increased personal distress in interpersonal 
interactions; (ii) they also exhibited maladaptive emotion regulation profile that relied more on 
suppressing emotion-expressive behaviour rather than reappraising emotional response; (iii) they 
did not exhibit any impairment on performance measures of empathy but did take longer to 
complete this task, arguable by relying on compensatory mechanisms; (iv) they exhibited 
increased levels of depression. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistic and group differences for various demographic, clinical, 
and experimental variables of interest.  
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Mean SD Mean SD t df p Cohen's d
Clinical and demographic
Age - 32.03 9.44 37.35 13.02 -1.295 25.43 0.207 -0.470
Education - 4.50 1.41 3.40 1.92 1.807 25.67 0.083 0.656
SPM - 7.44 1.32 7.53 1.64 -0.179 26.84 0.86 -0.065
MWT-B - 29.94 2.82 31.13 4.21 -0.924 24.24 0.365 -0.336
BDI - 3.25 2.35 9.53 7.81 -2.992 16.37 0.008 -1.106
AQ-k 0.954 5.69 3.00 24.87 3.44 -16.49 27.88 < .001 -5.951
SIS 0.945 1.06 1.34 9.00 1.89 -13.41 25.10 < .001 -4.873
IC 0.861 2.19 2.23 8.53 1.55 -9.25 26.85 < .001 -3.286
CR 0.842 2.44 1.41 7.33 2.16 -7.42 23.89 < .001 -2.701
SPF-IRI 0.658 50.31 6.10 50.80 8.32 -0.19 25.59 0.855 -0.067
Fantasy 0.683 13.00 2.68 10.87 3.40 1.93 26.65 0.064 0.700
Empathic Concern 0.748 13.94 3.23 13.40 3.02 0.48 29.00 0.636 0.172
Perspective-taking 0.756 14.38 2.68 11.73 2.91 2.62 28.36 0.014 0.945
Personal distress 0.804 9.00 1.93 14.80 3.55 -5.60 21.32 < .001 -2.049
TAS 0.863 34.75 3.96 53.60 8.63 -7.74 19.37 < .001 -2.841
DIF 0.888 9.63 1.86 20.13 5.01 -7.64 17.56 < .001 -2.817
DDF 0.844 11.38 2.19 20.20 2.51 -10.40 27.84 < .001 -3.755
EOT 0.473 13.75 2.52 13.27 3.37 0.45 25.87 0.656 0.163
ERQ
ERQ - Reappraisal 0.873 27.13 7.08 20.53 8.41 2.35 27.47 0.026 0.851
ERQ - Suppression 0.726 12.69 3.20 15.87 6.70 -1.67 19.78 0.111 -0.613
MET
Cognitive - positive - 16.50 3.18 15.53 1.68 1.066 23.09 0.298 0.376
Cognitive - positive - RT (in ms) - 5563.28 1540.90 8609.84 3002.64 -3.519 20.59 0.002 -1.290
Cognitive - negative - 14.38 2.39 15.07 3.39 -0.653 25.02 0.52 -0.237
Cognitive - negative - RT (in ms) - 6103.65 2012.07 7979.87 2861.18 -2.099 24.98 0.046 -0.763
Affective - positive - 5.56 1.55 4.11 1.44 2.691 29 0.012 0.965
Affective - positive - RT (in ms) - 2933.40 1176.21 4663.17 2052.09 -2.855 22 0.009 -1.043
Affective - negative - 5.47 1.02 4.82 1.86 1.207 21.36 0.241 0.442
Affective - negative - RT (in ms) - 3796.17 1241.32 4819.58 2255.86 -1.551 21.46 0.136 -0.567
Variable
Cronbach's 
alpha
HC (n  = 16) ASD (n  = 15) Welch's t -test
 
Note that results from emotional processing measures are only briefly described here as data 
from these measures were ancillary to the main objective of the study. These results will be 
discussed in greater depth elsewhere (Patil, Melsbach, et al., 2016).  
3.3 Moral dilemma task 
The descriptive statistics for all variables associated with this task have been tabulated in 
Appendix (Text S3). Although we had response time data, we do not draw any inferences about 
underlying psychological processes from analysis of this data as this practice of reverse inference 
has recently been demonstrated to be problematic (Krajbich, Bartling, Hare, & Fehr, 2015). 
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Accordingly, analysis of response time data is provided in the Appendix (Text S4). Suffice it to 
note here that there were no group differences for any condition for any type of response 
(utilitarian or non-utilitarian). 
3.3.1 No group differences in behavioural choice on moral dilemmas 
A 3 (condition: non-moral, impersonal, personal) × 2 (group) mixed ANOVA for behaviour 
question revealed a main effect of condition (F(1.536,44.534) = 31.736, p < 0.001, pη² = 0.523, 
ω² = 0.494), but there was neither a main effect of group (F(1,29) = 0.293, p = 0.593) nor a 
group-by-condition interaction effect (F(1.536,44.534) = 1.032, p = 0.347). Thus, autistics and 
controls did not differ in terms of their willingness to act in utilitarian manner on moral 
dilemmas. Of interest to us was personal moral dilemma on which autistics reported to be 
slightly less utilitarian than controls (see Figure 2), although this difference was not significant 
(t(28.65) = 1.572, mean difference = -0.117, 95% CI [-0.268, 0.035], p(uncorrected) = 0.127, d = 
0.566).  
Decomposing the main effect of condition with planned Bonferroni-corrected comparisons 
revealed expected pattern of judgment for both groups: participants were more likely to be 
utilitarian on impersonal moral dilemmas as compared to personal moral dilemmas (HC: t(15) = 
4.652, mean difference = 0.302, 95% CI [0.180, 0.424], p < 0.001, d =1.163; ASD: t(14) = 8.000, 
mean difference = 0.444, 95% CI [0.318, 0.571], p < 0.001, d = 2.066) (see Figure 2).   
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Figure 2: Summary of results for the behaviour question. Univariate scatter-plots (and 
corresponding bar-graphs) for proportion of affirmative responses on each type of 
scenario for each group for the behaviour question. For impersonal and personal moral 
dilemmas, higher scores indicate increased utilitarian tendency. Error bar represents 95% 
confidence intervals.  
3.3.2 Group differences in emotional arousal while facing moral dilemmas 
A 3 (condition: non-moral, impersonal, personal) × 2 (group) mixed ANOVAs for the arousal 
question revealed was a main effect of condition (F(1.578,45.756) = 104.700, p < 0.001, pη² = 
0.783, ω² = 0.771) but no condition-by-group interaction (F(1.578,45.756) = 0.250, p = 0.727). 
Planned comparisons revealed that both groups felt more emotionally aroused while facing 
scenarios from impersonal (HC: t(15) = 9.517, mean difference = 10.419, 95% CI [8.085, 
12.750], p < 0.001, d = 2.379; ASD: t(14) = 9.203, mean difference = 11.495, 95% CI [8.816, 
14.170], p < 0.001, d = 2.376) and personal (HC: t(15) = 7.096, mean difference = 8.476, 95% CI 
[5.930, 11.020], p < 0.001, d = 1.774; ASD: t(14) = 6.161, mean difference = 9.336, 95% CI 
[6.086, 12.590], p < 0.001, d = 1.591) dilemma conditions as compared to non-moral conditions. 
But both types of moral dilemmas were rated to be equally emotionally arousing (HC: mean 
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difference = -1.942, p = 0.144; ASD: mean difference = -2.518, p = 0.096). Thus, autistics were 
not impaired in decoding emotional saliency of different types of scenarios.  
Interestingly, there was also a main effect of group (F(1,29) = 16.720, p < 0.001, pη² = 0.366, ω² 
= 0.336). Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons revealed that ASD individuals found all 
scenarios to be more emotionally arousing than controls (non-moral: t(18.92) = 3.690, mean 
difference = 3.736, 95% CI [1.616, 5.855], p = 0.006, d = 1.357; impersonal: t(28.81) = 3.552, 
mean difference = 4.812 , 95% CI [2.040, 7.583], p = 0.003, d = 1.270; personal: t(27.88) = 
2.556, mean difference = 4.596, 95% CI [0.912, 8.279], p = 0.048, d = 0.923; see Figure 3). Note 
that the emotional arousal was not specific to the moral domain, but was domain-general as 
would be expected based on prior studies (Samson et al., 2015).  
 
Figure 3: Summary of results for the emotional arousal question. Univariate scatter-plots 
(and corresponding bar-graphs) for self-reported emotional arousal (higher ratings denote 
more emotional arousal) while facing each type of scenario for each group. Error bar 
represents 95% confidence intervals. 
3.4 Correlations analyses for utilitarian moral judgments on moral dilemmas  
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Correlations between moral judgments, arousal ratings, empathy, emotion regulation, and 
intelligence measures were computed. Additionally, between-group differences in correlation 
patterns were investigated. Full details of these analyses are provided in Appendix (Text S5-10). 
In addition to the variables of a priori interest (AQ, TAS, EC, and PD), we used this correlation 
analyses to select additional variables that may have an influence on utilitarian moral judgments 
in ASD group. Interestingly, MWT-B was correlated negatively with utilitarian judgments on 
personal dilemmas in ASD (ρ = -0.739, p = 0.002), while SPM showed a marginally significant 
negative correlation (SPM: ρ = -0.459, p = 0.085). This pattern did not differ from the pattern 
observed in controls for MWT-B (ρ = -0.521, p = 0.039; Z = 0.926, p = 0.354), but it did differ 
for SPM (ρ = 0.392, p = 0.134; Z = 3.606, p < 0.001). Thus, while higher general non-verbal 
intellectual abilities were associated with higher endorsement for utilitarian option on personal 
dilemmas in healthy controls, the pattern was exactly opposite in ASD participants such that 
higher SPM scores were predictive of reduced tendency to behave in utilitarian manner, although 
the correlation was only marginally significant (see Figure 4; also see Appendix (Text S11) for a 
similar scatterplot for MWT-B). No such group difference was observed for a measure of verbal 
intelligence. Thus, we selected SPM as a measure of non-verbal intelligence in our path model 
that we suspected was utilized by autistics as a compensatory strategy to cope with arousing 
social situations. We note that non-verbal IQ was chosen to represent a possible compensatory 
strategy not based on where it was significant or not, but based on the fact that the correlation 
between non-verbal IQ and moral judgment differed across groups. 
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Figure 4: Non-verbal reasoning skills and moral judgments. The relation observed 
between non-verbal intelligence scores (as assessed by Raven’s Standard Progressive 
Matrices) and utilitarian moral judgment on personal moral dilemmas was diametrically 
opposite for the two groups (Z = 3.606, p < 0.001). In controls, higher SPM scores were 
associated with a greater tendency to make utilitarian judgments, while autistics with 
higher SPM scores exhibited less favourable position for utilitarian option. Note that the 
number of data-points in the scatterplot seems to be less than the sample sizes due to 
overlap between data-points (denoted by circles with thicker circumference). Reported p-
values are two-tailed.  
3.5 Path analysis of utilitarian moral judgments in ASD 
In order to assess why utilitarian moral judgments were preserved on personal moral dilemmas in 
ASD despite the prevalent deficits in social cognition and emotional processing associated with 
this disorder, we formulated a path model for the different processes that were predicted to 
mediate mutually conflicting influences to leave the final moral judgment intact.  
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As mentioned before, alexithymic traits were predicted to be associated with increased utilitarian 
profile (Koven, 2011) due to reduced empathic concern (Patil & Silani, 2014b), while autistic 
traits were expected to be associated with reduced utilitarian tendency on account of increased 
personal distress (Y.-T. T. Fan et al., 2014; Gu et al., 2015; Sarlo et al., 2014; Smith, 2009). 
Additionally, we included SPM as a measure of intelligence since our correlation analyses 
showed that higher SPM scores were associated with reduced utilitarian tendency in the ASD 
group and thus may index rule-based compensatory strategy to evaluate moral behaviour on 
hypothetical cases in ASD (Brewer et al., 2015; Jameel et al., 2014). We also accounted for 
possible effects of medication (Price, Cole, & Goodwin, 2009) status (dummy-coded as ON = 1, 
OFF = 0) on mediating variables; all effects of interest are observed even after exclusion of this 
variable and hence this variable was retained based on the improvement of the model fit. 
Although perspective-taking subscale of IRI has been implicated in increased utilitarian moral 
judgments on personal dilemmas in a prior ASD study (Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013), we did not 
include it in the path analysis because - (i) none of the previous studies investigating predictive 
ability of different aspects of empathy (using IRI) in utilitarian moral judgments reveal any 
association between these two variables (Gleichgerrcht & Young, 2013; Patil & Silani, 2014b; 
Sarlo et al., 2014), and (ii) inclusion of this variable led to a poor model fit (p < 0.05). 
Additionally, although we had both trait (IRI) and state (MET) measures of empathy we included 
only trait measures since a past study reveals that trait measures are better predictors of moral 
judgments on moral dilemmas than state measures (Choe & Min, 2011). Additionally emotion 
regulation measures were not incorporated in the path model because they were not correlated 
with moral judgments (Appendix (Text S6)). 
The final model created with the inclusion of these variables is shown in Figure 5.      
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Figure 5: Path diagram from the path analysis model for utilitarian moral judgment. 
The path analysis model showing the divergent influences of autistic and alexithymic 
traits on utilitarian moral judgments on personal moral dilemmas in the ASD group, 
mediated by empathic concern and personal distress components of trait empathy. 
Additional variables accounted for effects of medication status (some autistics were 
consuming medication (= 1), while some were not (= 0)) and non-verbal reasoning scores 
(as assessed by Raven’s SPM). Values shown are standardized parameter estimates 
(betas). Although not shown in the figure, all endogenous variables are associated with 
errors. Solid lines represent significant relationships between predictors and the criterion 
variables, while dotted lines represent no significant relationship. Asterisks indicate 
significance of paths (^p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, all one-tailed). 
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The model for behaviour question had a moderate fit (χ2(9) = 10.007, p = 0.350, χ2/df = 1.112, 
RMSEA = 0.089, 90% CI [0, 0.322], p for close fit = 0.378, CFI = 0.960, PCFI = 0.411). 
Together, the independent variables accounted for 69.5% of all variance (R
2
) in utilitarian moral 
judgments (for more details about betas from path analysis, see Appendix (Text S12)). 
As predicted, we found that once shared variance between autistic and alexithymic traits was 
accounted for, alexithymic traits exhibited increased affinity for personally carrying out the 
necessary harmful actions and autistic traits were associated with reduced tendency to endorse 
the utilitarian option. Furthermore, the influence of these two traits on moral judgments was 
mediated by dissociable components of empathy: (a) increased alexithymia score was associated 
with reduced dispositional empathic concern for others’ welfare, which itself was associated with 
increased tendency to endorse utilitarian solution; (b) greater severity of autistic traits was 
associated with empathic hyperarousal in response to demanding social situation, which itself 
predicted reduced tendency to engage in harmful behaviour. Furthermore, greater capacity to 
reason non-verbally was also associated with reduced utilitarian behaviour, arguably due to 
developmentally acquired compensatory strategy of rigid norm-compliance.   
Note that we did not carry out a similar path analysis with the control population because there 
was less amount of variation in personality traits (as compared to the ASD population; see Table 
1) to detect such subtle array of interactions between these traits (as assessed by Levene’s test, 
e.g., TAS: F(1,32) = 5.359, p = 0.027; personal distress: F(1,32) = 6.424, p = 0.016). Future 
studies can explore the same path model in a large control population with enough variation in 
the data to detect such interactions.  
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Since the estimates of the parameters are unstable in path analysis (Streiner, 2005) when the 
sample sizes are too small (like in the current study), we also assessed validity of the key results 
using a simpler model in a hierarchical regression analysis (Brewer et al., 2015) (for full details, 
see Supplementary Data (Text S13)). This analysis also revealed that after controlling for age, 
gender, and depression and after accounting for shared variance between autistic and alexithymic 
traits, severity of autism was associated with reduced utilitarian tendency (β = -0.701, p = 0.019), 
while alexithymia was predictive of increased utilitarian inclination (β = 0.840, p = 0.006).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 85 
 
4. Discussion 
Despite a large body of work investigating role of alexithymia in emotional processing deficits in 
autism (Bird & Cook, 2013), its role in autistics’ moral cognition remains to be thoroughly 
explored. Moral cognition lies at the heart of interpersonal interactions and thus it in important to 
investigate this aspect of autistic cognition. In the current study, we explored moral evaluations 
in autistic participants on hypothetical, emotionally charged moral dilemmas that assessed their 
behavioural tendency to physically carry out harmful actions to avoid greater harm from 
occurring. Three primary results emerged from the current investigation. First, adults with ASD 
could properly distinguish between emotionally aversive personal dilemmas from impersonal 
dilemmas and endorsed behavioural choices that were comparable to controls. Second, autistic 
and alexithymia traits were associated with opposite utilitarian inclinations due to dissociable 
roles of self-oriented unease and other-oriented feelings of concern. Third, autistics relied on 
their intact non-verbal reasoning skills while making normative choices, probably to compensate 
for their other deficits in the interpersonal domain.   
Preserved utilitarian moral judgments in autism 
As in healthy controls, autistic participants perceived making hypothetical choices on morally 
dilemmatic situations to be more emotionally arousing than finding solutions to practical 
problems and were more ready endorse utilitarian option on impersonal as compared to personal 
moral dilemmas. Moreover, ASD participants found all conditions to be more arousing than 
controls, which comports well with prevalent negative arousal states reported in literature on 
autism (Capps et al., 1993; Samson et al., 2015; Smith, 2009).  Remarkably, this elevated 
negative emotional arousal and social and emotional processing deficits notwithstanding, not 
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only did the autistic participants not show previously observed (Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013) 
utilitarian bias, they exhibited increased tendency to reject the utilitarian option on emotionally 
salient dilemmas that required direct physical harm to a victim (e.g. pushing someone to their 
death). Our proposed framework premeditated such pattern of response based on a web of 
mutually conflicting influences of various subdimensions of autistic personality on first-hand, 
hypothetical moral choices.    
Dissociable empathy-utilitarianism associations between autistic and alexithymic traits 
There is plenty of evidence to support the claim that emotions motivate individuals to reject 
harmful transgressions, even if such actions are necessary to stave off harm of bigger magnitude 
(Greene, 2014). Recent research also sheds light on the exact nature of psychological processes 
that constitute this negative affect (Miller et al., 2014): aversion to harmful outcome (e.g. victim 
suffering) and aversion to the nature of harmful action itself (e.g. sensorimotor properties of the 
action). But the motivations subserving rejection of actions with harmful outcomes are of two 
varieties (Sarlo et al., 2014): self-oriented personal distress and other-oriented empathic concern. 
Accordingly, since autistic traits are associated with increased personal distress during 
demanding interpersonal interactions (as shown by both self-reported ratings (Dziobek et al., 
2008; Rogers et al., 2007) and hemodynamic responses (Y.-T. T. Fan et al., 2014; Gu et al., 
2015)), we reasoned that their moral judgments would be influenced by this emotional bias 
against the utilitarian option(Sarlo et al., 2014).  On the other hand, since alexithymic traits are 
associated with reduced empathic concern for others’ wellbeing (as shown by both self-report 
(Aaron et al., 2015; Grynberg et al., 2010; Patil & Silani, 2014b) and neuroimaging evidence 
(Bird et al., 2010; FeldmanHall, Dalgleish, & Mobbs, 2013)), they would be more likely to 
evaluate prospect of personally harming someone in a hypothetical scenario in favour of the 
 87 
 
utilitarian solution (Gleichgerrcht & Young, 2013). Thus, given the prevalence (Berthoz & Hill, 
2005; Griffin et al., 2015; Hill et al., 2004; Salminen et al., 1999) of alexithymia in ASD (in the 
current sample: 47%), we expected these dissociable empathic motivations mediating influences 
of autistic and alexithymia traits to cancel each other out leaving the final moral judgment 
unimpaired. This is exactly what was observed in the data, as shown by its fit to this 
theoretically-constructed path model (Figure 5): egoistic motivation to reduce personal distress 
led to reduced utilitarian tendency for autistic traits, while reduced altruistic motivation to 
prevent harming others led to increased utilitarian proclivity for alexithymic traits. This model 
reveals that the spared moral capacity in autism to evaluate hypothetical harmful behaviours was 
a result of cancellation of opposite influences that are scaffolded on emotional biases introduced 
by dissociable empathic profiles of autistic and alexithymic traits. Thus, the current findings shed 
light not only on the different aspects of emotional empathy that autistic and alexithymic traits 
are associated with but also on how these traits relate to moral judgments.   
We note that the current findings are in conflict with a prior study (Brewer et al., 2015) that 
investigated role of alexithymia in moral acceptability of emotion-evoking statements (e.g., “I 
could easily hurt you” (fear), “I never wash my hands” (disgust), etc.) and found that alexithymia 
was predictive of acceptability judgments only in controls but not in ASD and concluded that 
autistics’ judgments were based on complying with social rules and were less susceptible to 
emotional biases. It is possible that these differences stem from emotional saliency of the stimuli 
used across studies; moral dilemmas involve situations where the individuals have to mull over 
behavioural choice of directly harming or even killing someone for the benefit of the many and 
are, thus, inherently highly emotionally evocative (Greene, 2014), while providing more 
objective acceptability judgments about emotional sentences may not engage emotional 
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processes to the same extent (Patil et al., 2014; Tassy et al., 2013).  Another possibility is that 
there was not enough variation in alexithymia scores in the ASD group to detect an effect 
(indeed, variance in alexithymia scores in the control group was higher than in the ASD group in 
this study).  
Compensatory intellectual strategies in autism 
Despite their social impairments, both children and adults with autism still manage to acquire 
knowledge about normative canon consisting of appropriateness of various moral behaviours 
(Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013; Zalla et al., 2011). For example, they can properly distinguish 
between moral norms that relate to suffering in victims from social conventions that are context-
bound societal rules (Blair, 1996; Leslie et al., 2006; Shulman et al., 2012; Zalla et al., 2011). 
Although neurotypical individuals justify such distinction by referring to considerations about 
emotional consequences for the victim, the justifications provided by autistics tend to lack such 
empathic discourse and involve more rule-based rationale (Shulman et al., 2012; Zalla et al., 
2011). It is possible that in the absence of recourse to strong moral intuitions, autistics 
developmentally acquire compensatory strategies (Frith, 2004) that rely on spared intellectual 
abilities; indeed research in moral development showing that children with intellectual 
disabilities lag behind their typically developing peers in terms of moral reasoning (Langdon, 
Clare, & Murphy, 2010) provides circumstantial evidence for this claim. These can enable them 
to make such normatively significant distinctions by conforming to normative rules, sometimes 
in an inflexible and stereotyped manner (Baron-Cohen et al., 2003) which can make them adopt 
even harsher criterion for moral evaluations (Li et al., 2014; Zalla et al., 2011). Accordingly, 
prior studies show that autistics exhibit a more rigid, rule-based profile to justify their moral 
choices on such tasks (Shulman et al., 2012; Zalla et al., 2011) and enhanced verbal intelligence 
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is predictive of quality of such justifications (Barnes, Lombardo, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 
2009; Grant, Boucher, Riggs, & Grayson, 2005), but these studies did not investigate role of such 
intellectual capabilities in moral judgments.  
In the current study, we found that even after accounting for variance associated with autistic and 
alexithymic traits, non-verbal IQ was negatively predictive of utilitarian moral judgments. Thus, 
it is possible that autistics relied on non-verbal reasoning to reject the proposition of directly 
causing harm to others. For example, instead of retrieving semantic representations (e.g. for 
personal dilemma (Greene et al., 2004), it can be “ME HURT YOU = WRONG”), they can rely 
on visual imagery of the same rule, which has indeed been shown to support non-utilitarian 
moral judgments in healthy individuals (Amit & Greene, 2012). Prior studies support this line of 
reasoning, e.g., a previous neuroimaging study (Carter, Williams, Minshew, & Lehman, 2012) 
showed that typically developing children automatically encode their social knowledge into 
language while assessing behaviour of others in paradigms with minimum verbal requirements, 
but no such pattern is found in autistic children. Anecdotal reports from autistic individuals also 
note that they primarily rely on non-verbal thoughts (Hurlburt, Happé, & Frith, 1994) (as one 
autistic noted (Carter et al., 2012): “I think in pictures. Words are like a second language to 
me…. When somebody speaks to me, his words are instantly translated into pictures.”). The 
current findings are also consistent with the prior findings that show - (i) verbal IQ is correlated 
with justifications but not the moral judgments in children with ASD (Barnes et al., 2009; Grant 
et al., 2005), (ii) no correlation between verbal IQ and utilitarian moral judgments in ASD 
(Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013), and (iii) some moral principles operative in moral evaluations seem 
to be inaccessible during conscious moral reasoning and seem to operate intuitively and are, thus, 
difficult to verbalize (Cushman et al., 2006).    
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Therefore, we maintain that the current findings hint at non-verbal intelligence as a 
compensatory strategy that high-functioning autistics rely on while endorsing moral choices that 
are in line with prevalent socio-moral norms. Although a prior study implicated intellectual 
abilities in forming compensatory strategies to perform a task in the perceptual domain 
(Rutherford & Troje, 2012), no study thus far has investigated the same for the social domain 
and future hypothesis-driven studies should investigate the effect observed in the current study 
further.   
5. Implications 
Current investigation underscores the importance of studying various aspects of cognition in 
clinical populations, even if they do not exhibit any visible deficits on the task being studied. 
More specifically, the current study raises a methodological concern for studies investigating 
moral cognition (especially in the harm domain) in clinical populations that have unusually high 
incidence rate of alexithymia (Bird & Cook, 2013) (e.g., schizophrenia (de Achával et al., 2013), 
multiple sclerosis (Gleichgerrcht et al., 2015), Parkinson’s disease (Fumagalli et al., 2015), etc.): 
all such studies should account for effects of co-occurring alexithymia on moral evaluations.  
6. Limitations 
Validity of the conclusions drawn from the current study is contingent upon the following 
limitations. The primary limitation of the current study was the sample size, which was relatively 
small for the complexity of the statistical model investigated. Although we demonstrated validity 
of the main results in a separate regression analyses, future studies can explore various 
hypotheses stemming from the current investigation in a bigger sample (even in healthy 
population). Another limitation of the current study is the use of IRI to measure various 
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components of empathy since the IRI items measuring empathic concern and personal distress do 
not seem to map well onto recent social neuroscience conception of empathy (Ugazio et al., 
2014) and also has psychometric problems (Koller & Lamm, 2015). Thus, the current findings 
should be replicated with other empathy measures. Additionally, the moral dilemma task has 
recently been criticized (Kahane, 2015) to have contexts that are too contrived and extreme to 
provide any cues about social behaviour in everyday life-like situations. We note though that 
such unfamiliar settings are especially helpful to shed light on processes that may not be robustly 
recruited while judging more mundane situations that can be resolved by easily accessible social 
rules (Christensen & Gomila, 2012). Future studies can explore the role of alexithymia in 
reduced prosocial sentiments in autism using a more ecologically valid paradigm (e.g. ‘Above 
and Beyond’ task (Jameel et al., 2014)), since this reduction in prosocial behaviour can be due to 
alexithymia (FeldmanHall et al., 2013). Another limitation is that the current study used a single 
moral judgment parameter that treats utilitarian and deontological tendencies as inversely related 
to each other and conflate disregard for deontic prohibitions and endorsement of utilitarian 
principles and future studies should use process dissociation approach to study these separable 
appraisals (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). Lastly, the diagnosis of autism was partially based on 
gold standard diagnostic instruments for ASD such as the Autism Diagnostic Interview – 
Revised (Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994) (ADI-R) or the Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule (Lord et al., 2000) (ADOS) because these documents were not available for all 
participants and, therefore, an additional inclusion criterion was based on AQ-k. Future studies 
should attempt to include these standard diagnostic instruments as well.       
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Chapter 3 
The role of empathy in moral condemnation of accidental harms and moral 
luck: An fMRI investigation 
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Abstract 
A number of past studies have investigated neural basis of the capacity for mental state reasoning 
(i.e., reasoning about beliefs and intentions) in drawing a moral distinction between intentional 
and accidental harms and also condemning agents unsuccessfully acting with intent to harm. 
Less attention has been paid to the role of empathic reasoning (i.e., reasoning about pain and 
emotions) in condemning accidental harm-doers. Additionally, past work shows that mere 
presence of harmful outcome amplifies condemnation (known as moral luck effect) and this 
effect is stronger for blame than acceptability judgments and possible role of empathy in this 
phenomenon remains unstudied. The current investigation focused on these questions revealed 
two important results. One, participants who exhibited greater magnitude of activity in posterior 
insula while reading information about harmful outcome (reflecting encoded intensity of victims’ 
pain) condemned accidental harm-doer more severely. Second, judgments about attributing 
blame to agents relied more on empathic assessment of the victim than making acceptability 
judgments, as reflected in the anterior insula activity and its increased functional connectivity 
with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex while making blame judgments. Thus, the current results shed 
light on the role of empathy in condemning unintentional harms and its role on mediating 
influence on greater relevance of harmful outcomes for blame as compared to other types of 
judgments.      
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1. Introduction 
On 15 February 2012, the Italian oil tanker MT Enrica Lexie was travelling in international 
waters, off the Indian coast, when the two Italian marines aboard noticed another ship nearby. 
They falsely believed it to be a pirate ship and opened fire, killing two Indian fishermen on 
board. Unsurprisingly, this incidence led to big diplomatic fallout between the two countries 
involving complicated legal jurisdiction and functional immunity. But, more interestingly from a 
psychological perspective, the public opinion in India differed widely with some focusing on the 
innocent intentions and mistaken beliefs of the marines, while others focusing on the disastrous 
outcome involving loss of two lives. Additionally, although the citizens of India understood that 
it was morally acceptable to shoot at another vessel in self-defense under the false belief about 
threat, they still could not curb their punitive instinct to see the marines punished for negligently 
killing the fishermen.  
This incidence nicely illustrates two features of the human moral mind we will be focusing on in 
the current study: (i) there are inter-individual differences, on a behavioral and 
neurophysiological level, in forgiving third-party unintentional harms; (ii) the presence of 
harmful outcomes has a greater influence on punishment than wrongness judgments. 
1.1 Neural basis of two-process model for third-party moral judgments 
The two-process model for intent-based moral judgments (Cushman, Sheketoff, Wharton, & 
Carey, 2013; Cushman, 2008, 2015a) posits two independent computational processes, each of 
which is capable of providing judgment based on separate analyses of the situation: (i) a causal 
reasoning process active in the presence of a harmful outcome (victim suffering) that provides 
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evaluation based on the analysis of the agent’s causal role in producing such outcome (“causal 
responsibility = bad”); (ii) an intent-based reasoning process that condemns the agent in the 
presence of a culpable mental state (“malicious belief/desire/intent = bad”).  
Based on past research, it can be argued that these two systems can rely for their inputs from two 
distinct routes involved in understanding other minds with dedicated neurocognitive 
mechanisms: empathy and theory of mind.  
On the other hand, empathy involves ability to understand and share others’ affective states 
(emotions, pain, etc.) in isomorphic manner while maintaining self-other distinction2 (de 
Vignemont & Singer, 2006). It has been consistently shown that perceiving others in pain 
activates a cluster of brain regions, known as the pain matrix, that encode nociceptive 
information while one is experiencing pain first-hand (Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011). The pain 
matrix consists of two distinct yet interacting areas (Peyron, Laurent, & García-Larrea, 2000) 
coding for the sensory-discriminative component of the painful stimulus (location, intensity, and 
duration) and the affective-motivational component of the painful experience (unpleasantness, 
negative affect). The former primarily consists of the somatosensory cortices (S1, S2) and the 
bilateral posterior insula (PI), while the latter consists of the bilateral anterior insula (AI), the 
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), and the anterior middle cingulate cortex (aMCC). Meta-
analytic evidence shows that witnessing or imagining someone else’s pain activates neural 
representations coding primarily for affective-motivational, but not the sensory-discriminative, 
feature of the experience during direct pain perception (Lamm et al., 2011). In other words, 
                                                          
2
 Note that this definition of empathy distinguishes it from other related but distinct concepts like empathic concern, 
sympathy, or compassion (Gonzalez-Liencres et al., 2013) as these constructs represent prosocial feelings - driven 
by empathy - that are not congruent with another’s affective state and induce caring and comforting behavior (e.g., 
we can be concerned about a grieving friend without sharing her grief). 
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empathizing with others leads to sharing affective consequences (like subjective unpleasantness) 
of this experience but not the full-blown nociceptive episode.  
On the other hand, Theory of mind (ToM) entails abstract inferential process via which we think 
about others’ thoughts that have some representational content, e.g. beliefs, desires, knowledge, 
intentions, etc. (Koster-hale & Saxe, 2013). This capacity is neurally implemented in a specific 
network consisting primarily of bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ), sections of medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and precuneus (PC).  
Although output from these systems do not conflict with each other when both pieces of 
information are mutually coherent (for neutral cases and intentional harm cases), conflict arises 
when the two systems provide different judgments (in case of accidental harm). The final 
judgment for such conflictual cases is the result of competitive interaction between these 
antecedent evaluations and it depends on the relative weight (which is itself determined by 
underlying personality traits; Prehn et al., 2008) given to the output from each system (Buckholtz 
et al., 2015; Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007).    
Mental-state reasoning process: There is plenty of evidence which shows that, when faced with 
third-party harm-norm violations, both older children and healthy adults assessments 
overwhelmingly predicate on the information about mental state (Alter, Kernochan, & Darley, 
2007; Baird & Astington, 2004; Cushman, 2008; Gummerum & Chu, 2014). Behaviorally, 
individuals tend to forgive accidental harm-doers based on their benign intentions, while they 
condemn attempted harms based on malicious intentions despite the non-occurrence of harmful 
outcome (Cushman, 2008). At the neural level, rTPJ has been shown to be the most important 
ToM node for mediating mental state attributions during moral judgment (for a review, see 
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Young & Tsoi, 2013). The rTPJ exhibits greatest magnitude of hemodynamic response while 
condemning attempted harm cases, where the perpetrator intends but fails to harm someone and 
thus the condemnation relies heavily on intent information (Young et al., 2007; Young & Saxe, 
2008), and disrupting activity in rTPJ leads to reduced severity of condemnation for attempted 
harms (Young, Camprodon, Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2010). Additionally, neurological 
patients (Baez et al., 2014; Ciaramelli, Braghittoni, & di Pellegrino, 2012; Young, Bechara, et 
al., 2010) and sadistic individuals (Trémolière & Djeriouat, 2016) with a reduced emotional 
response to harmful intent tend to have more favorable assessment of attempted harm cases. 
Note that no conflict between the two systems arise in case of condemning attempted harm cases 
because the causal reasoning process remains silent in the absence of harmful outcome and the 
intent-based process operates unabated to condemn the victim (Cushman, 2008; Young et al., 
2007).      
Compared to condemning attempted harm cases, a more difficult situation arises when one needs 
to forgive unintentional harms, where the harm-doer causes bad outcome while acting under 
false belief. Forgiving accidental harm thus requires a robust representation of innocent intent 
that can counteract prepotent tendency to condemn the actor based on harm assessment. 
Accordingly, individuals with higher magnitude of activity (Young & Saxe, 2009) and greater 
differentiation in spatial pattern of activity (Koster-Hale et al., 2013) in rTPJ distinguishing 
intentional from unintentional harms – which can happen as early as 62 ms post-stimulus 
(Decety & Cacioppo, 2012) - tend to forgive accidental harms more by down-regulating 
emotional arousal in response to harm (Treadway et al., 2014). Additionally, stimulating this 
patch of cortex increases role of belief information in moral judgments, as shown by reduced 
severity of evaluations for accidental harms (Sellaro et al., 2015; also see Ye et al., 2015), while 
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reducing the role of mental state information by cognitively exhausting participants leads to the 
opposite pattern (Buon, Jacob, Loissel, & Dupoux, 2013). Populations showing impaired mental 
state inference, like autism spectrum disorder, show abnormal pattern in rTPJ (Koster-Hale et al., 
2013) and are thus less likely to exculpate accidental harm-doers (Baez et al., 2012; Buon, 
Dupoux, et al., 2013; Moran et al., 2011).   
Causal reasoning process: Although the role of mental state inference in condemnation of 
attempted harm and exculpation of accidental harm abounds, much less attention has been paid 
to the neural basis of causal-system based condemnation of accidental harm cases. Causal 
analyses of accidental harm begins with the detection of harmful outcome and searches for an 
agent who can be held responsible in the causal model of the event (Sloman, Fernbach, & Ewing, 
2009) and be condemned for causing suffering in the victim. Thus, it is possible that the degree 
to which individuals pay attention to the causal role of actors who accidentally produce negative 
outcome is in turn determined by the extent to which they empathize with the victim. In other 
words, understanding and feeling victim distress can motivate individuals to condemn accidental 
harm-doers more by implicating them based on their causal involvement. Prior studies do reveal 
that people’s causal judgments are impacted by motivational factors. An agent who acts in a way 
judged to be immoral is ascribed more causality than one who abides by moral norms (Alicke, 
1992), e.g. a driver who runs over someone in an accident is held to be less causally responsible 
when he is rushing home to hide gift for his parents (not blameworthy) than to hide stash of 
drugs (blameworthy).  
There is some indirect evidence to support this claim. While evaluating harmful situations, 
participants spend greater time looking at the victim than the perpetrator and exhibit increased 
activity in the empathy network (Decety, Michalska, & Kinzler, 2012). Individuals who score 
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high on self-report measures of dispositional empathy are more inclined to condemn accidental 
harms (Trémolière & Djeriouat, 2016, Study 1). Also, individuals with a certain genetic variation 
of oxytocin receptor gene that predisposes them to be more empathic are more reluctant to 
exculpate accidental harm-doers (Walter et al., 2012). Subclinical (e.g.,  alexithymia; Patil & 
Silani, 2014) and clinical (e.g., psychopathy; Young, Koenigs, Kruepke, & Newman, 2012) 
personalities characterized by reduced empathic concern for others also exhibit increased 
tendency to forgive accidents, arguably because they are less motivated to hold the agent 
causally responsible in the absence of strong empathic aversion. The current study explores the 
neural basis of this behaviorally observed empathic condemnation of unintentional harms and 
explores if empathic arousal can be another motivational factor that influences causal system 
output.      
1.2 Acceptability vs. blame judgments and moral luck 
A further complication is introduced by recent work suggesting that not all types of moral 
judgments are equivalent and they can be distinguished based on their evaluative foci (Cushman, 
2015a; Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014). The wrongness/acceptability/permissibility 
(henceforth, represented only by the term acceptability) represent a class of judgments that are 
concerned with the evaluation of actions (or action plans) with respect to a norm system and 
functions as a way to declare that the behavior is incongruent with mutually agreed upon moral 
norms (e.g. “Do not harm others”). On the other hand, blame and punishment together represent 
a class of judgments that focus on evaluating agents for their involvement in norm violating 
events and functions as a social mechanism to regulate their behavior in order to deter repetition 
of such behavior in future. 
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Although adult human moral judgment is primarily modulated by information about an intent, 
outcomes play a substantial role too (Cushman, 2008) and plenty of psychological research 
provides evidence for this “outcome bias” in lay judgments (Berg-Cross, 1975; Cushman, 
Dreber, Wang, & Costa, 2009; Cushman, 2008; Mazzocco, Alicke, & Davis, 2004). More 
importantly, outcomes matter to a different degree for different classes of moral judgments: 
acceptability judgments exhibit lesser sensitivity to outcome information as compared to 
blame/punishment judgments (Cushman, 2008). A recent study attests to this putative differential 
reliance of acceptability3 and punishment judgments on subcomponent processes; in particular, 
the authors found that reducing cortical excitability of an area involved in integration of belief 
and outcome information (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, dlPFC) selectively impaired punishment 
but not acceptability judgments (Buckholtz et al., 2015). Thus, evaluation of acceptability of 
agent’s moral behavior primarily relies on assessment of actor’s mental state during the act and 
on determining culpability of this state with respect to normatively acceptable code of conduct, 
while the blame/punishment for the agent additionally involves appraisal of whether harm 
occurred, severity of harm caused, and actor’s causal involvement in production of harm 
(Cushman, 2015a). More concretely, in the example discussed above, although people are 
willing to deem behavior of marines who fired shots at another vessel - mistakenly believing it to 
be a pirate ship - as acceptable, they expect marines to be blamed and punished only when this 
action leads to death of innocent fishermen but not otherwise.  
                                                          
3
 Note that although the authors in the original study use the term “blameworthy” to describe the judgment we are 
referring to here as “acceptability,” we note that the question participants answered was “‘Please indicate how 
morally responsible [the agent] is for his actions described in the scenario.” and not “How much blame does the 
agent deserve?”. Additionally, past research shows that lay judgments do not treat responsibility and blame 
judgments the same way (Guglielmo, 2015).  
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Philosophers call the phenomenon whereby the mere presence of bad outcome contributes to 
moral evaluations of otherwise identical actions as moral luck (Nagel, 1985). Although there is a 
wide variation in the degree to which lay individuals endorse moral luck as a normative moral 
principle, their moral judgments are found to be amenable to it nonetheless (Lench, Domsky, 
Smallman, & Darbor, 2015). Thus, this body of research reveals that moral luck matters more for 
blame/punishment judgments than acceptability judgments because the causal system contingent 
on harmful outcome has a greater bearing on such judgments. This asymmetric reliance on 
outcomes while deciding on blame/punishment (vis-à-vis acceptability) has convincingly been 
argued to be an upshot of the ultimate evolutionary function of blame/punishment (Cushman, 
2013b, 2015b; Martin & Cushman, 2016), which is to utilize the learning capacity of social 
partners to modify their harmful behavior - even if it was unintended – by being more careful in 
the future. At the mechanistic level, however, this is implemented via inflexible moral outrage at 
the harm-doer for the harm s/he caused without any conscious computation of its adaptive value 
(Martin & Cushman, 2016).  
Although this literature demonstrates that outcomes - and, in turn, moral luck - matter more for 
blame judgments than acceptability judgments, it remains to be studied how this is implemented 
at the neural level and the exact psychological chassis that supports this effect. One previous 
study (Young, Nichols, & Saxe, 2010) revealed that people are driven to judge accidental harm-
doers to be more blameworthy not because someone got hurt, but primarily because false beliefs 
held by actors are deemed to less justified (“it is not reasonable to believe that the other ship is a 
pirate ship when there are no overt signs to suggest so”). Note that although this study shows that 
moral luck partly stems from mental state assessments, it does not explain why blame judgments 
are more susceptible to influence of harmful outcomes than acceptability judgments. After all, 
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agent’s false beliefs are as unjustified while assessing acceptability of their behavior as 
attributing blame to them. Thus, none of the existing data sheds light on the neural substrates that 
mediate influence of moral luck on different types of judgments. One possible source of this 
effect is empathy: neurobiological models of punishment posit that a suffering conspecific is a 
source of negative arousal in the observer (aversive excitator) and elicits an inflexible, 
Pavlovian-like response to blame/punish the agent (Cushman, 2013b; Seymour, Singer, & Dolan, 
2007). Thus, it is possible that moral luck matters more for blame/punishment as compared to 
acceptability judgments because such judgments rely to a greater degree on empathic assessment 
of the victim. A recent behavioral study (Patil, Young, et al., 2016) provides some preliminary 
evidence to support this hypothesis. This study found that when inter-individual differences in 
self-reported cognitive empathy (perspective-taking subscale of IRI, to be precise) in healthy 
adults is accounted for, moral luck no longer influences punishment judgments to a greater 
degree than acceptability judgments.  
Combining these insights with the two-process framework, we hypothesize that people are more 
likely to blame accidents than judge them to be wrong as compared to neutral cases because of 
the greater reliance on output from causal analyses of perpetrator’s involvement, which itself is 
provoked by empathic assessment of the victim. In other words, we predict that areas involved in 
empathizing with others’ suffering would be more active while assigning blame to the accidental 
harm-doers than while evaluating acceptability of their behavior.  
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2. Methods and Materials 
2.1 Participants: 
A total of 50 healthy community members (32 female) without any history of neurological 
problems were recruited to participate in this study and were financially compensated for their 
time and travel. Average age was 23.06 years (SD = 3.08), with a range of 18 to 35. All 
participants provided written informed consent and the study was approved by the local ethics 
committee. All data from one participant was excluded from the final analysis as he was 
consuming clinically-prescribed psychoactive drugs and did not divulge this information in pre-
scanning telephone interview. Functional data from two participants was removed due to 
excessive head motion (see below) and data from one additional participant could not be 
collected due to technical error. Thus, functional data was available for 46 participants, while 
behavioral for 49.   
2.2 Experimental stimuli and procedure: 
Moral judgment task: Experimental stimuli were text-based scenarios. Stimuli consisted of four 
variations of 36 unique scenarios for a total of 144 stories. All scenarios were primarily taken 
from previous studies (Cushman, 2008; Young, Camprodon, et al., 2010) and were adapted in 
Italian (see Appendix Text S1 for more details). The four variations were the result of a 2 × 2 
within-subjects design where the factors belief (neutral, negative) and outcome (neutral, 
negative) were independently varied such that agents in the scenario produced either a neutral 
outcome or a harmful outcome while acting with the belief that they were causing either a neutral 
outcome or a harmful outcome. Each possible belief was true for one outcome and false for the 
other. Each participant saw one variation of each scenario, for a total of 36 stories. All scenarios 
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were equivalent in word count across all four variations (ps > 0.05). A number of factors that 
have been varied in previous studies were hold constant in the current 2-by-2 design (for more, 
see Appendix Text S2).  
Each scenario lasted for 32 s and consisted of four cumulative segments (each lasting for 8 s): (i) 
background: this stem was common to all variations and provided settings in which the story 
took place; (ii) foreshadow: this segment foreshadowed whether the outcome will be neutral or 
harmful; (iii) mental-state information4: this segment provided information about whether the 
agent was acting with a neutral or harmful belief; (iv) consequence5: this final segment described 
agent’s action and its outcome. All story text was then removed and replaced with the question 
and response scale (see Figure 1). Note that all scenarios provided information only about beliefs 
with which the agents acted and the intent (harmful or neutral) had to be inferred. After reading 
each story, participants provided two types of moral judgments (Cushman, 2008) which were 
presented in randomized order:  
[1] acceptability - “How morally acceptable was [the agent]’s behavior?” (1: Completely 
acceptable to 7: Not at all acceptable); 
[2] blame “How much blame does [the agent] deserve?” (1: None at all to 7: Very much).  
Each question lasted for 6 s and participants could provide their judgment using a 7-point Likert 
scale on which cursor could be moved using two fingers. The location at which the cursor 
                                                          
4
 We use the term mental-state information instead of belief to avoid confusion as the latter term represents one of 
the factors of the experimental design while the former represents a story segment containing information about the 
mental state of the agent while acting.  
5
 We use the term consequence instead of outcome to avoid confusion as the latter term represents one of the factors 
of the experimental design while the former represents a story segment containing information about the nature of 
the outcome.  
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initially appeared on the scale was chosen at random on each trial to make sure that there were 
no systematic differences across conditions in terms of the required cursor movement, as this 
could have confounded effects of interest with movement-related activity (especially in ROIs 
like r-AI, cf. Mutschler et al., 2009). The response buttons were active as long as the question 
remained on the screen and so participants could move the cursor to one position and could later 
change it again to a new position. Note that this meant that we could not collect any meaningful 
response time data. After each scenario, participants viewed a fixation cross on the screen for a 
jittered ITI of 2-4 seconds. Additional details about the experimental protocol are provided in 
Appendix Text S3.  
 107 
 
 
Figure 1. Experimental stimuli and design. Each moral vignette consisted of the 
following text segments (each lasting for 8 seconds): a background stem providing set-up 
for the story, a foreshadow segment that foreshadowed the nature of outcome, a mental-
state information segment that provided information about actor’s belief, a consequence 
segment that described action and its outcome. These segments were then followed by 
questions assessing acceptability and blame judgments (each lasting for 6 seconds and 
presented in random order) that participants had to respond to using a 7-point Likert 
scale.  
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Functional localizer task: To localize functional empathy network in participants, we used the 
task from a prior study (Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007). Participants were told that they would 
be witnessing videos of people experiencing painful auditory stimulation. As opposed to the 
instructions provided in the original study, we did not tell participants that this stimulation was 
part of a medical treatment, as we suspected that this could have led to down-regulation of the 
empathic response (Lamm et al., 2007). Each participant was shown 18 videos, each lasting for 3 
s, featuring one individual (male or female) wearing headphone. The video showed these 
individuals displaying the transition from neutral facial expression (0.5 s) to exhibiting painful 
facial expressions triggered by auditory stimulation (2.5 s). After each video, participants 
responded to two questions: one assessing other-oriented empathic response by gauging intensity 
of the experienced pain (“How painful was this stimulation for this person?”; -3: not at all 
painful to 3: extremely painful), while the other assessing self-oriented distress via experienced 
unpleasantness (“How unpleasant was it for you to watch this person suffering?”; -3: not at all 
unpleasant to 3: extremely unpleasant) on a 7-point Likert scale. Mean inter-trial interval (ITI) 
was 2 s and was randomly jittered (jitter range: 0-2 s) to reduce predictability of the stimuli 
presentation (for schematics of the task design, see Appendix Text S4). 
2.3 fMRI data acquisition and preprocessing:   
All fMRI scans were acquired using a 3T Philips Achieva scanner at the Hospital ‘Santa Maria 
della Misericordia’ (Udine, Italy), equipped with an 8-channel head coil. High-resolution 
structural images were acquired as 180 T1-weighted transverse images (0.75 mm slice 
thickness). Functional images were acquired in interleaved manner using a T2*-weighted 
echoplanar imaging (EPI) sequence with 33 transverse slices covering the whole brain with the 
following parameters: slice thickness = 3.2 mm; interslice gap = 0.3 mm; repetition time (TR) = 
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2000 ms, echo time (TE) = 35 ms; flip angle = 90º, field of view = 230 × 230 mm
2
; matrix size = 
128 × 128, SENSE factor 2. The slices were oriented at a 30º oblique angle to the AC-PC. This 
slice prescription was selected for optimization of BOLD signal (by reducing drop-out effects 
caused by the air-tissue interface) in the orbitofrontal cortex (based on recommendations by 
Weiskopf, Hutton, Josephs, & Deichmann, 2006).  
Data were analyzed with SPM12 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm12). Each subject’s 
data were motion-corrected (outliers were detected using Art toolbox; see Appendix Text S5) 
and then normalized onto a common stereotactic space (the Montreal Neurological Institute 
template). Data were then smoothed by using a Gaussian filter (full width half maximum = 6 mm 
at first-level), and high-pass-filtered.  
2.4 fMRI data analysis at first-level: 
For each participant and for each task, the design matrices for fixed-effects General Linear 
Model were constructed by convolving a canonical hemodynamic response function or HRF with 
the stimulus function for events (boxcar function) to create regressors of interest along with its 
temporal and dispersion derivatives. For more details, see Appendix Text S6. 
Moral judgment task: For the main task, there were 72 regressors of interest (with additional 
nuisance regressors) from a 6 (text segment: background, foreshadow, mental-state information, 
consequence, acceptability question, blame question) × 2 (belief: neutral, negative) × 2 
(outcome: neutral, negative) × 3 (type of HRF: canonical, time derivative, dispersion derivative).  
Functional localizer task: In the first-level design matrix for empathy localizer task, there were 3 
regressors of interest corresponding to the informed basis set convolved with the event of 
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witnessing empathy-eliciting videos. There were 6 additional regressors for events involving 
ratings for perceived pain in others and experienced unpleasantness.  
ROIs selection: At first level, for each participant, the following ROIs for empathy for pain, 
based on the localizer task, were defined6 for both sensory-discriminative and affective-
motivational components(Bzdok et al., 2012; Y. Fan et al., 2011; Lamm et al., 2011): bilateral 
PI, bilateral AI, dACC, and aMCC.  (see Table 1; also see Appendix Text S7 for figure) At 
individual level, not all ROIs could be localized for all participants. For a list of coordinates for 
all ROIs for each individual, see Appendix Text S8. 
Table 1. ROI coordinates from the localizer experiments. 
n x y z x y z
dACC 41/49 2 32 23 10 28 26
l-AI 39/49 -36 13 2 -36 10 0
r-AI 43/49 37 16 1 40 12 0
l-PI 31/49 -37 -16 -10 -34 -22 4
r-PI 28/49 38 -10 4 38 -20 6
aMCC 44/49 3 5 38 -2 12 42
Type of 
ROI
ROI
Individual ROIs Whole-brain contrast
Empathy 
(> 
baseline)
 
Note: Average peak voxels for ROIs are in MNI coordinates (in mm). The “Individual 
ROIs” columns show the average peak voxels for individual subjects' ROIs. The “Whole-
brain contrast” columns show the peak voxel in the same regions in the whole-brain 
random effects group analysis. Results at both subject-and group-level were masked 
anatomically by neuromorphometrics atlas.  
                                                          
6
 A prior meta-analysis shows that somatosensory cortices (S1, S2) show increased hemodynamic activity in 
contralateral regions during experiencing painful stimulation administered to one’s own hand, while in ipsilateral 
regions while observing the same body part in pictures (Lamm et al., 2011). Since the current task of interest did not 
feature any salient information regarding laterality of body parts in pain, we did not include S1 and S2 in our ROIs.  
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Each subjects’ whole brain F-contrast image (experimental videos > baseline) was masked with 
anatomical atlas labels provided by Neuromorphometrics, Inc. (http://neuromorphometrics.com/) 
under academic subscription. Each ROI was defined by peak voxel of cluster containing more 
than 10 significantly active contiguous voxels (p < 0.001, uncorrected).  
ROI data analysis: The data from spherical ROIs with a radius of 8mm was extracted and 
analyzed using the MarsBar toolbox (v0.44) for SPM (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/) (Brett, 
Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002). Within the ROI, the average percent signal change (PSC) 
was computed relative to the adjusted mean of the time series (for more details, see Appendix 
Text S6). The responses of ROIs were measured while participants read the mental-state 
information (8 s) and consequence (8 s) segments of the moral stories and gave acceptability (6 
s) and blame (6 s) judgments. ROI analyses were not performed for the background and 
foreshadow segments from the stories as insufficient information was available at this stage for 
any morally relevant evaluation to commence. The current study is unique in investigating neural 
processes subserving moral judgments not only while the belief/intent information is presented 
(Young et al., 2007; Yu, Li, & Zhou, 2015), but also while information about consequences is 
provided and integrated into making acceptability and blame judgments.  
As recommended (Poldrack, 2007), data defining ROIs was independent from the data used in 
the repeated measures statistics. Restricting analysis to a few ROIs thus reduced Type-I error by 
drastically limiting the number of statistical tests performed (Saxe, Brett, & Kanwisher, 2006). 
2.5 Brain-behavior correlations:  
Correlational analysis was carried out to assess relationship between neural activity in each ROI 
(PSC) for story segments of interest and behavioral response (moral judgments) for all four types 
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of stories. To avoid false positive brain-behavior correlations, we followed recommended steps 
(Pernet et al., 2013; Rousselet & Pernet, 2012; Schwarzkopf, De Haas, & Rees, 2012) and 
computed Spearman’s rho as a correlation measure and ran a robustness check (for more, see 
Appendix Text S9). Note that these correlations were computed between PSC extracted from 
ROIs which were selected based on independent functional data. This helps us sidestep the 
nonindependence error (Vul, Harris, Winkielman, & Pashler, 2009) that can lead to spurious 
correlations and the observed results are thus unbiased and more trustworthy.  
2.6 fMRI data analysis at second-level: 
Moral judgment task: The group-level random effects analyses were conducted for each segment 
by contrasting the (canonical HRF) beta-weights from each subject’s first-level analyses in a 
single full factorial design generated using a 4 (segment) × 2 (belief) × 2 (outcome) design 
matrix.  
Functional localizer task: The empathy network at group-level was localized by entering beta-
weights from all HRF contrasts from first-level in a full factorial design (F-contrast). 
Whole-brain analyses were thresholded at p < 0.05, Family-wise Error (FWE) corrected at the 
threshold level (primary threshold: p < 0.001, extent threshold: k > 10). For additional details 
about second-level analyses, see Appendix Text S5. 
2.7 Psychophysiological interaction analysis: 
Functional connectivity was assessed using standardized psychophysiological interaction (sPPI) 
analysis (Friston et al., 1997); specifically, we explored which brain regions showed changes in 
information exchange with the areas involved in decisions about blame (vs acceptability) for 
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accidental harm cases. The ROI analysis revealed r-AI to be the only region which tracked 
outcome-by-judgment interaction (see Results) and thus this was chosen to be the seed region. 
We took the recommended precautions (O’Reilly, Woolrich, Behrens, Smith, & Johansen-Berg, 
2012) while carrying out PPI analysis (full details provided in Appendix Text S10).  
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3. Results 
3.1 Behavioral data:  
3.1.1 Effect of belief and outcome on behavioral ratings 
Descriptive statistics for moral judgments is provided in Appendix Text S11. A 2 (belief) × 2 
(outcome) repeated measure ANOVA carried out separately for acceptability and blame 
judgments showed that both main effects of belief (acceptability: F(1,48) = 211.55, p < 0.001, 
pη2 = 0.815, ω2 = 0.808; blame: F(1,48) = 203.72, p < 0.001, pη2 = 0.809, ω2 = 0.802) and 
outcome (acceptability: F(1,48) = 114.34, p < 0.001, pη2 = 0.704, ω2 = 0.694; blame: F(1,48) = 
119.67, p < 0.001, pη2 = 0.714, ω2 = 0.704) and also their interaction (acceptability: F(1,48) = 
22.76, p < 0.001, pη2 = 0.322, ω2 = 0.303; blame: F(1,48) = 29.14, p < 0.001, pη2 = 0.378, ω2 = 
0.360) were significant. 
As expected, participants assessed agents who acted with negative belief more severely (less 
acceptability and more blame) than agents who acted with neutral belief (see Figure 2). Also, 
agents who produced harmful outcome were condemned more severely than those who did not. 
But this condemnation was modulated by the information about agent’s beliefs, as shown by 
interaction between belief and outcome factors. For example, accidental harms were forgiven 
(compared to intentional harms) based on the innocent intentions, while attempted harms were 
condemned (as compared to neutral and accidental cases) based on the malicious intentions (ps < 
0.001).   
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Figure 2. Moral judgments about acceptability of behavior and blame for moral agents 
for different types of harms: neutral case (neutral belief, neutral outcome), accidental 
harm (neutral belief, negative outcome), attempted harm (negative belief, neutral 
outcome), and intentional harm (negative belief, negative outcome). Error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals. Higher scores represent more severe condemnation (less 
acceptable, more blame).  
3.1.2 Moral luck: acceptability versus blame judgments 
In order to assess if there was a difference in the degree to which participants relied on outcome 
information while judging acceptability of agent’s behavior versus deciding on severity of 
blame, we carried out a 2 (belief) × 2 (outcome) × 2 (type of question: acceptability, blame) 
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repeated measure ANOVA. We were interested in outcome-by-question interaction which was 
not significant (F(1,48) = 1.869, p = 0.178). Therefore, we split this 3-way ANOVA into 
separate ANOVAs for each type of belief, but still the outcome-by-question interaction was not 
significant (neutral belief: F(1,48) = 0.642, p = 0.427; negative belief: F(1,48) = 1.015, p = 
0.319).  
We argue that absence of this effect in the current study was due to small sample size in the 
current study (n = 49 versus n > 1000 in (Cushman, 2008). Alternatively, this discrepancy might 
be due to cultural differences as the current study was conducted in Italy, while study sample 
from Cushman (2008) consisted of Americans. But this is unlikely because another study 
conducted in Italy found this effect with a bigger sample size (n = 113, see Appendix in Patil et 
al., 2016). It is also possible that this effect is a result of differences between study designs: 
within-subjects (current study) vs. between-subjects (Cushman, 2008). In future analysis, we will 
be focusing only on each participant’s response on the first question7 in order to eliminate 
possible order effects (Cushman et al., 2013).  
3.2 Functional localizer results 
During the localizer task, the participants’ ratings revealed that although they recognized that the 
noxious stimulation was really painful for the protagonist in the video (M = 1.393, SD = 0.810), 
this did not elicit self-oriented unpleasantness in proportional manner (M = 0.244, SD = 1.599), 
although there was more variation in the latter than former ratings.   
Correlating ratings provided on questions probing other- and self-oriented empathic response 
with moral judgments revealed that only self-oriented experience of unpleasantness was 
                                                          
7
 We would like to thank Fiery Cushman for this suggestion.  
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predictive of endorsed moral condemnation, but solely for the scenarios with harmful intent 
(attempted and intentional harm, i.e.). Full details are provided in Appendix Text S12.   
3.3 ROI analysis results: 
The ROI analysis was carried out on PSC data from four conditions (neutral, accidental, 
attempted, intentional) and four text segments (mental-state information, consequence, 
acceptability, blame) with the objective of answering following questions: (i) if activity in ROIs 
was greater than baseline within each condition for each segment, (ii) if there were any 
systematic differences in activity across different conditions for each segment, (iii) if there were 
any differences in activity across both segment and conditions indexing effect of moral luck, and 
(iv) if activity within each segment for a given condition was correlated with moral judgment for 
that condition.  
3.3.1 Average ROI activity during consequence segment  
We assessed if the average PSCs during each segment of interest was greater than zero (with 
respect to rest) by carrying out one-sample t-tests (two-tailed). We predicted that empathy ROIs, 
especially the affective-motivational component, will exhibit increased activity during the 
consequence segment, when information about affective state of the victim is revealed, but not 
during the mental-state information segment that provides cues about actor’s intentions. 
Accordingly, we found that the bilateral AI, dACC, and aMCC all showed increased activity (ps 
< 0.05) during the consequence segment across all conditions, but not the bilateral PI (all 
statistical details along with bar graphs are provided in Appendix Text S13). Additionally, this 
response was primarily restricted to when outcome information was revealed and not when belief 
information was provided. Thus, we found a selective increase in activity while participants were 
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reading part of the moral vignette that provided information about harmfulness of the outcome, 
irrespective of whether someone was harmed (accidental/intentional) or not (neutral/attempted).  
If it is true that these empathy ROIs are tracking subjective unpleasantness or salience of harmful 
outcomes, then they would be expected to exhibit increased activity only for conditions with 
negative outcomes (accidental and intentional, i.e.), but not for other conditions. Instead we 
observed significant activity across all conditions, which would mean that affective encoding of 
victim state happened even in the absence of any information about harm. One possible 
explanation for this peculiar response pattern is that presence of conditions with harmful 
outcome produced a relative contrast effect such that even in conditions where no harm was 
expected, aversive outcome was anticipated nonetheless (Liljeholm, Dunne, & O’Doherty, 
2014). This is in line with prior studies which show that neural responses to events can be 
modulated by the overall contextual setting in which these events take place (e.g., anterior insula 
response to reward and punishment; Elliott, Friston, & Dolan, 2000) and behavioral reactions 
towards a particular stimulus is contingent on affective properties of other stimuli concomitant 
with it (Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997).        
3.3.2 Across-condition differences in PSC 
In order to assess how activity in ROIs varied across different conditions, we carried out analysis 
on averaged PSC values only for the text segments that were of a priori interest to us: mental-
state information, consequence, acceptability, and blame (see Figure 1). For each segment, we 
ran a 2 (belief) × 2 (outcome) repeated measures ANOVA for each ROI. For the sake of brevity, 
we report here only those ANOVAs which revealed significant effects (main and/or interaction) 
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and the post-hoc tests probing these effects were significant. Full details about the rest of the 
analyses have been provided in Appendix Text S14-S15.  
The only empathy ROI in which main effect of outcome was found was in dACC for the 
acceptability segment (F(1,38) = 5.769, p = 0.021). Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showed 
that this was due to greater PSC in response to the intentional as compared to attempted harm 
condition (mean difference = 0.296, 95% CI [0.095, 0.498], p = 0.010).  
Interestingly, in l-AI, a main effect of belief (F(1,35) = 5.120, p = 0.030) and a belief-by-
outcome interaction (F(1,35) = 5.226, p = 0.028) was found for the consequence segment. Post-
hoc tests carried out to investigated these effects further revealed only one significant 
comparison (see Appendix Text S15 for figure): magnitude of PSC was greater while reading 
consequence information about the attempted harm condition as compared to neutral case (mean 
difference = 0.317, 95% CI [0.126, 0.508], p = 0.004). In other words, although no explicit 
information about possible victim suffering was provided, participants still exhibited increased 
neurohemodynamic response in this empathy region while reading about outcomes in the 
attempted harm scenarios, possibly denoting counterfactual reasoning about harm that could 
have befallen the victim while reading the outcome information. This line of reasoning is 
supported by a previous study which showed that, when asked, participants provide downward 
counterfactuals (how things could have been worse) most frequently for attempted harm cases, 
while priming participants with downward counterfactual leads to more severe evaluation of 
attempted harms (Lench et al., 2015). Thus, it is possible that condemnation of attempted harm 
relies not only on intent-based reasoning process, as argued in previous research (Cushman, 
2008; Young et al., 2007), but also on causal-based reasoning process, motivated by 
counterfactual empathic reasoning about possible harmful outcomes. Since this effect was 
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neither predicted nor expected, we do not discuss it further, but  it raises an interesting possibility 
that can be explored further in future studies.  
No other significant differences were found in post-hoc comparison for any of the other ROIs or 
segments.  
3.3.3 Moral luck in PSC: acceptability versus blame judgments 
We carried out a 2 (outcome: neutral, negative) × 2 (judgment: acceptability, blame) repeated 
measures ANOVA separately for neutral (accidental versus no-harm condition) and negative 
(intentional versus attempted condition) belief for each ROI to investigate neural basis of moral 
luck and only the outcome-by-judgment interaction was of interest to us. Note that this analysis 
focused only on the PSCs from the two text segments when participants provided acceptability 
and blame judgments. For the sake of brevity, we report here only those ANOVAs which 
revealed interaction effect and the post-hoc tests probing these effects were significant. Full 
details about the rest of the analyses have been provided in Appendix Text S16. 
The ANOVAs carried out to investigate moral luck found the outcome-by-judgment interaction 
only in r-AI (F(1,37) = 5.750, p = 0.022) and none of the other ROIs. Post-hoc comparisons 
showed (see Figure 3) that the PSC was higher when participants were deciding on blame for 
accidental harms as compared to when they were deciding about acceptability of behavior of 
accidental harm-doers (mean difference = 0.188, 95% CI [0.044, 0.333], p = 0.024), but no such 
differentiation in response was observed for neutral cases (p = 0.967). Thus, blame evaluations 
about accidents relied to a greater degree on the information about victim suffering than 
acceptability judgments but no such asymmetry was observed for neutral cases where there was 
no negative outcome.   
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Figure 3. The PSC in the right anterior insula (r-AI) during the story segments when the 
participants provided moral judgments. The PSC was higher for blame compared to 
acceptability judgments only for accidental harm scenarios, but not for no-harm 
scenarios. The displayed p-values have been corrected for multiple comparisons and error 
bars correspond to 95% confidence intervals. 
This result begs the question as to why the moral luck effect was observed in the PSC data, but 
not in the behavioral data. One explanation can be that there was less amount of variation in 
behavioral data (coefficient of variation for accidental condition: blame = 29.1%, acceptability = 
29.3%) as compared to PSC data (coefficient of variation for accidental condition: blame = 54%, 
acceptability = 58.9%) due to restricted range of ratings that could be recorded in the scanner.  
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3.3.4 Brain-behavior correlations: 
Correlating PSC during various segments for each type of scenario with acceptability and blame 
judgments revealed various significant correlations, but only two of these results  survived 
robustness checks and are reported here (for full details, see Appendix Text S17-18). There was 
a positive correlation between PSC in l-PI while reading consequence segment of accidental 
harm scenarios for both acceptability (ρ = 0.427, p = 0.021; robust correlations: ρskipped = 0.524, 
95%CI [0.215, 0.730]; pi = 0.52, p = 0.010) and blame (ρ = 0.428, p = 0.021; robust correlations: 
ρskipped = 0.523, 95%CI [0.193, 0.734]; pi = 0.52, p = 0.012) judgments for accidental harm (see 
Figure 4). In other words, individual differences in encoding victim’s pain, possibly the sensory 
component of the pain, were predictive of severity of moral condemnation for accidental harm-
doers with more empathic individuals endorsing harsher moral judgments.  
 
Figure 4. Individual differences in average percent signal change (PSC) in the left 
posterior insula (l-PI) while reading information about consequences was positively 
correlated with average acceptability and blame judgments for accidental harm scenarios.  
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3.4 Functional connectivity results:  
In order to investigate the neural regions that exhibited changes in functional connectivity with r-
AI while making acceptability and blame judgments for accidental harm condition, PPI analyses 
were conducted during these segments. This analysis revealed that r-AI exhibited increased 
exchange of information (positive PPI effect, i.e.) with the left middle frontal gyrus or l-dlPFC (x 
= -34, y = 10, z = 36; p(uncorrected) < 0.001, k > 10) while making blame as compared to 
acceptability judgments (see Figure 5). Setting the extent threshold to zero voxels (k = 0) 
revealed a similar cluster also in the right middle frontal gyrus or r-dlPFC (x = 36, y = 10, z = 
50). No brain region showed negative PPI with r-AI. In other words, the r-AI exhibited increased 
functional connectivity with bilateral dlPFC during blame as compared to acceptability 
judgments and did not show decreased functional connectivity with any region across judgment 
contexts.  
3.5 Whole-brain results:  
No effects of interest were observed at the whole-brain level in second-level analysis at the 
corrected thresholds. Details are reported in Appendix Text S19. These results are consistent 
with the higher power of functional ROI analyses to detect subtle but systematic response 
profiles (Saxe et al., 2006). 
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Figure 5. Regions showing increased functional connectivity with r-AI during blame judgments 
for accidental harm (compared with acceptability judgments) and plot of parameter estimate for 
difference in functional connectivity. Error bars represent 90% confidence interval. The z-
coordinate is in MNI-coordinates. Abbreviations - PPI: psycho-physiological interaction; r-AI: 
right anterior insula; l-dlPFC: left dorsolaternal prefrontal cortex.  
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4. Discussion 
Current study investigated the role of empathic reaction to victim suffering in condemning 
agents who accidently produced harmful outcome. The results revealed that greater neural 
activity in posterior insula, a node in the sensory-discriminative part of the pain matrix, was 
predictive of greater severity of moral assessment. In other words, the degree to which people 
rely on causal assessment of accidental harm-doer’s role in bringing about the bad outcome is 
motivated by empathic aversion. Additionally, the current study also found that blame judgments 
relied to a greater degree on empathic assessment of the victim as compared to acceptability 
judgments during evaluations about accidental harms. Thus, the current findings support the 
prior observation that moral luck (greater reliance on outcome information) has greater bearing 
on blame/punishment judgments than on acceptability/wrongness judgments and localizes the 
source of this effect to differential integration of information about victim suffering during these 
two types of evaluations.      
Although a burgeoning body of research demonstrates the complex relationship between 
empathy and morality (for reviews, see Decety & Cowell, 2014; Ugazio, Majdandžić, & Lamm, 
2014), there is consensus that one of the primary moral domains where it exerts its greatest 
influence is harm. Harmful behaviors feature a clearly delineated victim and empathy enables 
people to share their affective state while evaluating moral valence of actions and plenty of prior 
research supports this claim. For example, empathic aversion constitutes strong negative 
emotional response to personally harming others for the greater good in moral dilemmas 
(Gleichgerrcht & Young, 2013; Patil & Silani, 2014b; Wiech et al., 2013), empathic 
computations also undergird other-oriented justice sensitivity for victims of harmful behavior 
(Decety & Yoder, 2015; Yoder & Decety, 2014) and drives altruistic behavior that comes at cost 
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to self (FeldmanHall, Dalgleish, Evans, & Mobbs, 2015), and active intergroup harm involves 
down-regulation of empathic concern for the outgroup members (Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, 
Batson, & Singer, 2010). But this preceding work has primarily focused on harmful acts carried 
out with intent to harm and, thus far, the neural basis of condemnation of unintentional harmful 
acts - where there is no homologous mapping between intended and realized outcome - remains 
sparsely studied. The current study investigated such situations in third-party settings and, 
consistent with prior research, found that increased empathic arousal stemming from sharing 
victim’s pain led to more severe condemnation for accidental harm-doers. Furthermore, 
vicariously shared unpleasantness of this painful experience also motivated individuals to 
increase blame judgments for accidental harm-doers significantly more than the perceived 
acceptability of such behavior.  
4.1 Role of the insular cortex in moral condemnation  
The insular cortex has been known to play a key role in basic emotions and emotional processing 
related to social interactions (for a review, see Lamm & Singer, 2010). Insular cortex is a 
viscerosensory region that underpins neural representations about internal body states (e.g., pain, 
hunger, etc.) and represents subjective affective states (e.g., arousal, feelings, etc.). In particular, 
there is a posterior-to-anterior gradient in the complexity of representations of interoceptive 
signals that map psychophysiological states (Craig, 2002, 2009) such that PI maps only primary 
interoceptive information (e.g., location and intensity of painful stimulation), while AI, 
especially r-AI, re-represents these signals where they become consciously accessible and 
constitutes a subjective emotional experience (“I am feeling pain.”). While empathizing with 
others in pain, these insular representations of bodily states are harnessed in two ways (Singer, 
Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009) - (i) to form predictive representation of physiological response 
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to painful stimuli from self-centered perspective based on nociceptive information (i.e., 
subjective feeling state), and (ii) to simulate self and other-oriented subjective painful experience 
based on these predictions (i.e., empathic feeling state). In other words, our sensitivity to others’ 
painful experience activates the same - primarily affective dimension of - neural representations 
that represent this state during first-hand painful experience.  
In the backdrop of this model for the functional role of insular cortex, it is possible to interpret 
the observed brain-behavior correlation in l-PI during the encoding phase (consequence segment) 
and outcome-by-judgment interaction in r-AI during the integration phase (acceptability and 
blame segments).  
Posterior insula and condemnation of accidental harms: In the current study, we found that the 
higher activity in l-PI while reading about harmful consequences in unintentional harm condition 
was predictive of severity of both acceptability and blame moral judgments endorsed by 
participants (Section 3.3.4). Given that PI is fundamental in representing intensity of nociceptive 
stimulation in the self (Segerdahl, Mezue, Okell, Farrar, & Tracey, 2015), it is possible that 
participants shared the sensory-discriminative component of the protagonist’s pain (e.g., reading 
about outcome where a rabid dog bites an older lady may invoke sensory representation of dog’s 
teeth puncturing the skin). Such bottom-up mapping of sensory-discriminative aspect of others’ 
pain determines intensity of shared pain and this personally aversive experience drives moral 
condemnation for the third-party actors (Miller & Cushman, 2013). We thus take the activity in 
l-PI to denote empathic arousal (also known as emotional sharing), which represents the most 
rudimentary component of empathy involving duplication of another’s affective state in the 
observer in an automatic manner without conscious awareness as to the source of this arousal 
(Decety & Cowell, 2014; Gonzalez-Liencres, Shamay-Tsoory, & Brüne, 2013). Indeed, past 
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research has shown that empathy for pain does not solely rely on affective nodes of the pain 
matrix, but can also automatically recruit fine-grained somatic representations to extract sensory 
aspects of others’ pain (e.g. source and intensity) and map them onto the observer’s sensorimotor 
system (Avenanti, Bueti, Galati, & Aglioti, 2005).  
At first blush, the current finding seems to contradict the earlier evidence showing that only 
affective-motivational and not sensory component of empathy is copied in the observer. But note 
that the l-PI was not significantly activated with respect to baseline while reading about harmful 
consequences and thus, on average, information about harmful outcome did not elicit activity in 
sensory areas of pain matrix, as would be expected based on prior work. What we are arguing is 
that the cross individual variation in the degree to which sensory component is shared seems to 
impact their perception of intensity of harmfulness of the outcome, which, in its turn, is used to 
calibrate the severity of moral condemnation of accidents. Also, note that we are not arguing that 
l-PI tracks the emotional arousal in response to assessed intensity of others’ pain, rather only the 
intensity itself. The emotional arousal stemming from pain perception is likely to be encoded in 
amygdala (Buckholtz et al., 2008; Hesse et al., 2015; Shenhav & Greene, 2014; Treadway et al., 
2014; Yu et al., 2015).  
Although a number of previous studies have shown that trait levels of various dimensional 
aspects of empathy are predictive of severity of moral judgments for accidental harms (Patil & 
Silani, 2014a; Trémolière & Djeriouat, 2016), none thus far have investigated neural correlates 
of this association. We resist the temptation to draw any link between prior self-report measures 
and activity in l-PI (e.g., activity in l-PI represents empathic concern, etc.) because the vast 
majority of previous studies have failed to find any association between self-report measures of 
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dispositional empathy (like IRI) and context-specific neural response in empathy-eliciting 
situations (for a review, see Decety, 2011).  
Thus, based on the current findings, we posit that inter-individual differences in the severity of 
third-party moral evaluations of social agents who accidentally harm others stem from empathic 
arousal originating in vicarious encoding of somatosensory aspect of victim’s pain.    
Anterior insula and moral luck: Activity in r-AI featured the outcome-by-judgment interaction 
during integration phase such that it exhibited greater activity during blame as compared to 
acceptability judgment for unintentional harms, although no such difference was found for 
neutral cases (Section 3.3.3). The r-AI belongs the core empathy network (along with aMCC and 
dACC; Bzdok et al., 2012; Fan et al., 2011; Lamm et al., 2011) and indexes affective-
motivational aspect of other-oriented empathic sensitivity that involves sharing subjective 
unpleasantness of the target’s painful experience. Thus, the current data suggest that presence of 
harmful outcomes has a greater influence on the blame than acceptability judgments for 
accidental harms because the information about victim’s affective state is integrated to a greater 
degree during blame than acceptability judgments.  
From another perspective, the pain matrix has also been reconceptualized more broadly to be a 
part of the salience network which is involved in detecting and orienting attention towards 
sensory stimuli that are crucial for homeostatic balance and pain represents one such salient 
aspect of the internal and external environment (Uddin, 2014). Converging evidence 
demonstrates that activity in r-AI correlated with subjective salience across diverse task domains 
(Uddin, 2014). Additionally, the r-AI forms the central node of the salience network and 
coordinates activity of other large-scale neurocognitive networks by causally influencing activity 
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in central hubs of such networks (Menon & Uddin, 2010). For example, detection of salient 
event like experience of pain leads to r-AI-induced changes in activity of the dlPFC, a central 
hub in the central executive network that orchestrates externally oriented cognition and allocates 
attentional resources to attend to salient event.  
Thus, from the r-AI as salience processing hub perspective, the selectively greater activation in r-
AI during blame versus acceptability judgments for accidental harm cases could be interpreted to 
mean that subjective salience of information about harmfulness of the outcome is greater when 
one needs to decide on how much blame to attribute to the agent as compared to when agent’s 
behavior needs to be evaluated on right-wrong dimension.  
Irrespective of the perspective one subscribes to, we would expect r-AI to change its functional 
connectivity across different judgments domains with the brain region that plays central role in 
integration of different inputs (dlPFC) and, indeed, this is what was observed.  
4.2 Moral luck and differential integration of empathy inputs in dlPFC 
The functional connectivity analysis designed to explore the region that exhibited context-
sensitive changes in exchange of information with r-AI revealed only one region (Section 3.4): 
the bilateral dlPFC showed increased connectivity with r-AI during blame as compared to 
acceptability judgments. This finding sits comfortably with the emerging consensus regarding 
the role of dlPFC as a superordinate, integrative node in decision making system that combines 
representations of inputs from multiple subprocesses to reach a final output that biases response 
selection (Buckholtz & Marois, 2012; Buckholtz et al., 2015; Treadway et al., 2014).  
The dlPFC has been observed across diverse social and non-social decision making contexts: 
moral decision making in dilemmatic contexts (Cushman, Murray, Gordon-McKeon, Wharton, 
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& Greene, 2012; Kuehne, Heimrath, Heinze, & Zaehle, 2015), second-party (Knoch, Pascual-
Leone, Meyer, Treyer, & Fehr, 2006; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003) and 
third-party norm enforcement (Buckholtz et al., 2008), norm compliant behavior (Ruff, Ugazio, 
& Fehr, 2013), goal-directed planning and model-based computations (Gęsiarz & Crockett, 
2015), organizing and integrating working memory content (De Pisapia, Slomski, & Braver, 
2006; Owen, McMillan, Laird, & Bullmore, 2005), analogical reasoning (Bunge, Wendelken, 
Badre, & Wagner, 2005), etc. Although initially it was suggested that the recurrent occurrence of 
dlPFC across such wide variety of social and non-social decision making contexts reflects its 
involvement in cognitive control that inhibits prepotent responses, recent work casts doubt that 
this is its sole function and seems to support the alternative “integration-and-selection” function 
of dlPFC (for a review, see Buckholtz, 2015). In this framework, dlPFC is specifically recruited 
when the task demands involve holding abstract representations synthesized in multiple 
information processing streams in working memory and then integrating them depending on the 
adaptive requirements imposed by the task context. For example, in case of intent-based moral 
judgments, the information processing streams consist of abstract inferential processes that 
evaluate (i) presence of culpable mental states and (ii) assess severity of harm and are later 
integrated to form the final moral judgment. But note that different categories of final moral 
judgments have different adaptive demands: the acceptability judgments are primarily a product 
of mental state evaluations, while blame judgments rely additionally on the empathic evaluation 
of the victim (Cushman, 2008). Thus, the dlPFC would be expected to integrate information 
about the empathic assessment of the victim to a different degree across decision contexts due to 
its sensitivity to adaptive demands inherent to each task domain. Indeed, disrupting activity in 
bilateral dlPFC results in maladaptive performance on punishment but not wrongness judgments 
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because punitive judgments rely to a greater degree on integrative ability of the dlPFC 
(Buckholtz et al., 2015). Thus, we argue that the observed decision-context-dependent change in 
functional connectivity between r-AI and l-dlPFC reflects increased integration of harm 
assessment during blame judgments that biases selection of magnitude of blame for agents 
causally responsible for the harmful outcome.    
4.3 Conclusions 
In summary, the current findings expand the role of empathy in condemning harmful acts from 
intentional to unintentional. It also sheds light on the distinct contributions of different 
components of empathy and their neural correlates. The current study also highlights the 
motivational role of interpersonal sensitivity of third-party judges to enforce widely shared 
sentiments about appropriate behavior. Although the current study assessed attribution of blame 
to moral agents, the same neurocognitive architecture is expected to underpin punishment 
judgments since the punishment arises from the attribution of blame (Cushman, 2008; Fincham 
& Roberts, 1985; Shultz, Schleifer, & Altman, 1981). Thus, conclusions derived from the current 
study also inform current neurobiological models of punishment as well.  
4.4 Future work 
Current study was hypothesis-driven in terms of the proposed role of empathy in condemnation 
of accidental harms and differential influence of moral luck on different categories of moral 
evaluations. As such, we did not explore roles of other processes and activity in regions 
mediating these processes: mental state reasoning in rTPJ, affective arousal encoding in 
amygdala, emotion regulation in dACC, etc. In future connectivity analysis study, we would 
explore complex interactions between these critical nodes during moral judgments.   
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Additionally, we adopted an ultra-conservative approach which could have significantly reduced 
degrees of freedom at the first-level analysis (due to high number of regressors) and reduced 
sample size at the group level (focusing only on participants in which ROIs were localized) both 
of which could have contributed to loss of power that prevented us from detecting more subtle 
effects in both ROI and whole-brain analyses. Future work will focus on re-analysis of this data 
with more liberal methodological approach.  
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Appendix: Chapter 1 
Appendix S1: Descriptions of text dilemmas 
The detailed descriptions (translated into English) of the moral dilemmas used in the text session are provided below. The original 
descriptions used in the experiment were in Italian.  
Burning Car – Experimental 
You are the operator of a bridge in a huge parking complex. The bridge you operate connects two different floors. You see that a car 
out of control is approaching the bridge and is on fire. You don't know what is going on but you still need to operate the bridge.  
 You see that on the top floor there are five people walking and on the bottom floor, there is one person walking. The floors they are 
walking on are so narrow that only one car can pass through at any given time. Right now, the bridge is in the upward position. So if 
you don't do anything, the car would continue its course on the top floor and kill those five people in its way. But if you move the 
bridge in the downward position, the car would go on the bottom floor and would kill the one person walking there.  
 Is it appropriate for you to move the bridge in order to avoid the death of the five people, killing one person? 
 
Burning Car – Control 
You are the operator of a bridge in a huge parking complex. The bridge you operate connects two different floors. You see that a car is 
approaching the bridge and is on fire. You don't know what is going on but you still need to operate the bridge.  
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You see that on the top floor there is one person walking and on the bottom floor, there are five empty boxes. The floor the person is 
walking on is so narrow that only one car can pass through at any given time. Right now, the bridge is in the upward position. So if 
you don't do anything, the car would continue its course on the top floor and kill the one person in its way. But if you move the bridge 
in the downward position, the car would go on the bottom floor and would crush all the boxes there.  
Is it appropriate for you to move the bridge in order to avoid the death of that one person, destroying the boxes? 
 
Lifting Magnet - Experimental  
 You are the controller of a lifting magnet in a junkyard. Lifting magnets lift the heavy magnetic objects at some height and transport 
them to another place and drop them. The magnet, in automatic mode, is moving a car at some height from one place to another on the 
right side of the platform. Suddenly, you realize that if the magnet continues on its course, the magnet would drop the car on five 
people standing below. On the left, there is one person standing.  
 You can take control of the magnet. If you do nothing, the magnet would proceed to the right and drop the car attached to it, causing 
the death of the five people standing below. You can turn the magnet to left side of the platform, causing the death of the single person 
standing there.  
 Is it appropriate for you to turn the magnet in order to avoid the death of the five people, killing one person? 
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Lifting Magnet – Control 
You are controller of a lifting magnet in a junkyard. Lifting magnets lift the heavy magnetic objects at some height and transport them 
to another place and drop them. The magnet, in automatic mode, is moving, a car at some height from one place to another on the right 
side of the platform. Suddenly, you realize that if the magnet continues on its course, the magnet would drop the car on one person 
standing below. On the left, there are five empty boxes.  
 You can take control of the magnet. If you do nothing the magnet would proceed to the right and drop the car attached to it, causing 
the death of the person standing. You can turn the magnet to left side of the platform, causing the destruction of the boxes. 
 Is it appropriate for you to turn the magnet in order to avoid the death of that one person destroying the boxes?  
 
Pier - Experimental 
You are in charge of operating an automatic coast-guard boat. From your operating station, you can see that there are five swimmers 
on your right who are being approached by sharks. But you also see that there is one swimmer on the left who is also being 
approached by sharks.  
 Right now, the boat you are operating is moving towards the person on the left. If you don't do anything, it can reach that 
one swimmer and he can be saved, but then the five swimmers on the right would get killed by sharks. You can save these five 
swimmers, only if you turn the boat to the right, but then the swimmer on the left would be killed. 
 Is it appropriate for you to turn the boat in order to avoid the death of the five swimmers letting one person die?  
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 Pier – Control 
You are in-charge of operating an automatic coast-guard boat. From your operating station, you can see that there is a swimmer on 
your right who is being approached by sharks. But you also see that there are five empty boxes floating on the left.  
 Right now, the boat you are operating is moving towards the boxes on the left. You can save that swimmer, only if you turn the boat 
to the right, but then the boxes on the left would drown. 
 Is it appropriate for you to turn the boat in order to avoid the death of the swimmer, letting the boxes drowning?  
 
Train- Experimental 
You are standing on a railway track where a single track divides into two tracks. There is a switch to control the track of the train. You 
see a train out of control approaching rapidly. On the track extending to the left is a group of five railway workers. On the track 
extending to the right is a single railway worker.  
 If you do nothing, the train will proceed to the left, causing the death of the five workers. The only way to avoid the death of these 
workers is to hit a switch on your dashboard that will cause the train to proceed to the right, causing the death of the single worker. If 
you don't do this, those workers will be killed but one worker on the right track would remain safe.  
 Is it appropriate for you to hit the switch in order to avoid the death of the five workers, killing one person? 
  
Train – Control 
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You are standing on railway track where a single track divides into two tracks. There is a switch to control the track of the train. 
You see a train out of control approaching rapidly. On the track extending to the left is a collection of five empty boxes. On the track 
extending to the right is a single railway worker.  
 If you do nothing the train will proceed on the right track and would kill the worker. You can avoid this by hitting a switch and 
turning the train on left track. But this would destroy the boxes.  
 Is it appropriate for you to hit the switch in order to avoid the death of the worker, destroying the boxes? 
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Appendix S2:  
Here we explain the exact details of how participants kept track of the 10-second response limit in VR scenarios (for both 
experimental and control scenarios). 
 For the burning car dilemma, participants had to respond before the car hit the ramp (shown in red circle): 
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 For the lifting magnet dilemma, participants had to respond before the magnet crossed the yellow-black striped line (shown in 
red circle): 
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 For the pier dilemma, participants had to respond before the coast-guard boat crossed the end of the floating objects (shown in 
red circle): 
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 For the train dilemma, participants had to respond before the train crossed the yellow-black striped line on the track (shown in 
red circle): 
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Appendix: Chapter 2 
Text S1: Questionnaires used and their internal reliability 
Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ-k): Autistic traits were assessed in all participants with the shortened, German-validated, 33-item 
version of the Autism Spectrum Quotient self-report questionnaire (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Freitag et al., 2007) designed for both 
clinical and community samples. This scale is further divided into three subscales: social interaction and spontaneity (SIS, 11 items; 
e.g. “I enjoy meeting new people”), imagination and creativity (IC, 12 items; e.g. “When I’m reading a story, I can easily imagine 
what the characters might look like”), communication and reciprocity (CR, 10 items; e.g. “I frequently find that I don’t know how to 
keep a conversation going”). All questions were rated on a 4-point Likert scale from “Definitely Agree” to “Definitely Disagree” and 
were later recoded to 0 and 1.  
Depression: Depressive symptoms in both groups were measured using Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1996; Hautzinger, 
1991).  
Mehrfachwahl-Wortschatz-Intelligenz-Test (Multiple choice vocabulary test, MWT): MWT-B is the most commonly used version of 
MWT and is considered a measure of verbal intelligence (Lehrl et al., 1995; Lehrl, 1995). It consists of 37 items and each item 
consists of five words (e.g. nesa - naso - nose - neso - nosa), out of which one authentic word needs to be recognized by the 
participants. Familiarity of the words varies widely and each correctly recognized word gives a point (thus possible scores range from 
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0 to 37). MWT-B has been shown to have good test-retest reliability and tends to be highly correlated with the other widely used 
measure of global IQ, viz. WAIS-Full-IQ.  
Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM): SPM is considered a nonverbal estimate of fluid intelligence and the abbreviated 
version consisting of nine items (Form-A) was administered in the current study (Bilker et al., 2012; Raven et al., 1998). SPM items 
involve increasingly difficult pattern matching tasks and rely to a little degree on language abilities. Each correct answer is allotted 
one point and thus possible scores range from 0 to 9. This nine-item version has been shown to have good test-retest reliability and a 
high correlation with the full form SPM (Bilker et al., 2012).  
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS): Interindividual differences in subclinical alexithymia were evaluated using the German-validated 
18-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Bagby et al., 1994; Kupfer et al., 2000) consisting of three subscales: Difficulty Identifying 
Feelings (DIF, 7 items; e.g., “When I am upset, I don't know if I am sad, frightened, or angry”), Difficulty Describing Feelings (DDF, 
5 items; e.g., “It is difficult for me to find the right words for my feelings”), and Externally-Oriented Thinking (EOT, 6 items; e.g., “I 
prefer to analyze problems rather than just describe them”). Each item consisted of statements about emotional awareness and 
participants reported their agreement with these statements using a 5-point-Likert scale (1: strongly disagree, 5: strongly agree). TAS 
has been argued to be the best current measure overall for assessing alexithymia due to its sound reliability, validity, and broad 
generalizability (Timoney & Holder, 2013). 
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Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI): The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983; Paulus, 2009) was used to assess specific 
aspects [fantasizing, empathic concern (EC), perspective-taking (PT), and personal distress (PD)] of dispositional empathy. The scale 
consisted of 16-items (four per subscale) and participants reported agreement with statements on a 5-point Likert scale (1: never true 
for me, 5: always true for me). Based on recent psychometric assessments of the IRI questionnaire (Baldner & McGinley, 2014), we a 
priori decided not to explore the fantasy subscale beyond descriptive statistics, as it does not map well onto the current neuroscientific 
discourse on empathy. Additionally, we focus on individual components of empathy rather than focusing on the entire construct of 
empathy since this approach provides more fine-grained understanding about empathy deficits in clinical populations.  
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ): Frequency of cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression strategies to regulate 
emotions in everyday life was assessed with the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Abler & Kessler, 2009; Gross & John, 2003). 
Participants reported agreement with each statement using a 7-point Likert scale (1: strongly disagree, 7: strongly agree). Cognitive 
reappraisal is a cognitive strategy involving reinterpretation of events to reduce their emotional impact (6 items; e.g., ‘‘I control my 
emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in.’’) and expressive suppression includes response-focused regulation 
involving inhibition of emotion-expressive behavior (4 items; e.g., ‘‘I control my emotions by not expressing them.’’).  
Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET): To compliment the self-report paradigm (i.e., IRI), we also used a more naturalistic and 
ecologically valid performance measure, Multifaceted Empathy Test (Dziobek et al., 2008), to assess both cognitive and affective 
component of empathy for positive and negative emotions. We used the new, improved version MET-CORE-II (condensed and 
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revised; Isabel Dziobek, personal correspondence) which includes 20 negative and 20 positive photographic stimuli (presented in 
blocks of either positive or negative emotional valence which consisted of 10 pictures randomized within each block) that depict 
people in emotionally charged contexts. In cognitive empathy condition (i.e., block 1, 4, 6, and 7: “What is this person feeling?”), 
participants had to choose an appropriate emotion from four available options (e.g., scared, despaired, confused, impatient.) and their 
accuracy and response times were recorded. In emotional empathy condition (i.e., block 2, 3, 5, and 8: “How much do you feel with 
this person?”), the degree of empathic concern participants felt for the person in the picture was assessed on a 9-point Likert scale (1: 
not at all , 9: very much) and response time data was also recorded.  
 Internal reliability 
Group differences in Cronbach's alphas were investigated using cocron package in R (http://comparingcronbachalphas.org/) which 
implements inferential statistics on alphas.  
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Scale HC ASD Item count χ
2
(1) p
SIS 0.592 0.887 11 5.040 0.025
IC 0.635 0.753 12 0.507 0.477
CR 0.423 0.718 10 1.616 0.204
FS 0.490 0.818 4 2.327 0.127
EC 0.765 0.564 4 0.863 0.353
PT 0.715 0.720 4 0.001 0.979
PD 0.545 0.741 4 0.720 0.396
DDF 0.519 0.811 5 2.167 0.141
DIF 0.547 0.694 7 0.449 0.503
EOT 0.509 0.597 6 0.109 0.742
Reappraisal 0.865 0.819 6 0.239 0.625
Suppression 0.569 0.782 4 1.046 0.306
Impersonal -behavior 0.857 0.645 6 1.934 0.164
Personal - behavior 0.566 0.664 6 0.159 0.691
Moral dilemma task (n  = 15)
AQ-k (n  = 17)
SPF-IRI (n  = 17)
TAS (n  = 17)
ERQ  (n  = 17)
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Text S2: Textual description of moral dilemmas 
Impersonal and personal moral dilemmas were chosen from previously published batteries of moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2004; 
Lotto, Manfrinati, & Sarlo, 2014; Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008; Patil et al., 2014) and posed a conflict between actively harming less 
number of individuals for the welfare of many. In both impersonal and personal moral dilemmas, a number of factors that previous 
research has shown to affect moral judgments varied freely in order to increase heterogeneity and thus decrease predictability of 
experimental stimuli, e.g. whether the sacrificial actions benefited self or other (Lotto et al., 2014), whether the victim’s death was 
inevitable (Moore et al., 2008), kill-save ratios (Trémolière & Bonnefon, 2014) (e.g., 1:6, 1:100s, etc.), etc. 
Full descriptions of the scenarios used in the moral dilemma task are provided here. The German translations of the scenarios are 
available from the authors on request. 
Non-moral scenarios 
1. Two trips 
You are bringing home some plants from the store. You have lined the trunk of your car with plastic to catch the mud from the plants, 
but your trunk will not hold all of the plants you have bought.  
You could bring all of the plants home in one trip, but you would need to put some of the plants in the back seat. If you put the plants 
in the back seat, the mud from the plants will ruin your fine leather upholstery, which would cost thousands of dollars to replace.  
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2. Mutual Fund 
You are at home one day when the mail arrives. You receive a letter from a company that provides financial services. You have heard 
of this company, which has a good reputation. They have invited you to invest in a mutual fund.  The minimum investment for this 
fund is €1000.  
You already know a lot about this particular mutual fund. It has performed poorly over the past few years. Based on what you know, 
there is no reason to think that it will perform any better in the future. 
3. Jogging 
You intend to accomplish two things this afternoon: going for a jog and doing some paperwork. In general you prefer to get your work 
done before you exercise. 
The weather is nice at the moment, but the weather forecast says that in a couple of hours it will start to rain. You very much dislike 
jogging in the rain, but you don’t care what the weather is like while you do paperwork. 
4. Pharmacy 
You have a very bad headache. You go to the pharmacy looking for your favorite brand of headache medicine. When you get there, 
you find that the pharmacy is out of the brand that you are looking for.  
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You have known the pharmacist at this store for a long time, and you trust him. He says he has a generic medicine that is “exactly the 
same” as the name-brand medicine that you wanted. In the past, he has always given you good advice. 
5. Meeting 
You need to travel to a nearby city in order to attend a meeting that starts at 2:00 PM. You can either take the train or the bus. The 
train will get you there just in time for your meeting no matter what.  
The bus is scheduled to arrive an hour before your meeting. However, the bus sometimes is several hours late because of traffic. It 
would be nice to have an extra hour before the meeting, but it is very important that you arrive on time. 
6. Scenery 
An old friend invites you to spend the weekend at his summer home. This house is up the coast from where you live. You plan to 
drive, and you can take either the highway or the coastal road.  
The highway will get you there in about three hours, but the scenery along the highway is very boring. The coastal road will get you to 
your friend’s house in about three hours and fifteen minutes, and the scenery along the coastal road is very beautiful. 
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Moral impersonal 
7. Hospital fumes 
You are the late-night watchman in a hospital. Due to an accident in the building next door, there are deadly fumes rising up through 
the hospital’s ventilation system. In a certain room of the hospital are three patients. In another room there is a single patient. If you do 
nothing the fumes will rise up into the room containing the three patients and cause their deaths. 
The only way to avoid the deaths of these patients is to hit a certain switch, which will cause the fumes to bypass the room containing 
the three patients. As a result of doing this the fumes will enter the room containing the single patient, causing his death. 
8. Trolley 
You are the driver of a runaway trolley approaching a fork in the tracks. On the tracks going to the left is a group of five railway 
workers. On the tracks going to the right is a single railway worker.  
If you do nothing, the trolley will go to the left, causing the five workers to die. The only way to avoid the deaths of these five workers 
is to hit a switch on your dashboard that will make the trolley go to the right, leading to the death of the single worker. 
9. Motor boat 
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You are driving your motor boat in a small bay when your attention is drawn to cries of help from five people who are drowning at the 
end of a very narrow channel which is right in front of you. Between you and the people who are drowning, to one side of the channel, 
is another person who is calmly swimming. 
If you do nothing, these five people would drown soon. You can steer towards the end of the channel at high speed. But you know that 
the person who is swimming in between will be hit by the motorboat and die, but the other five people will be saved. 
10. Burning Car 
You are the operator of a bridge in a huge parking complex. The bridge you operate connects two different floors. You see that an out 
of control car is approaching the bridge and is on fire. You see that on the top floor there are five people walking and on the bottom 
floor, there is one person walking. The floors they are walking on are so narrow that only one car can pass through at any given time. 
Right now, the bridge is in the upward position. 
If you don't do anything, the car would continue its course on the top floor and kill those five people in its way. But if you move the 
bridge in the downward position, the car would go on the bottom floor and would kill the one person walking there.  
11. Lifting magnet 
You are the controller of a lifting magnet in a junkyard. Lifting magnets lift the heavy magnetic objects at some height and transport 
them to another place and drop them. The magnet, in automatic mode, is moving a car at some height from one place to another on the 
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right side of the platform. Suddenly, you realize that if the magnet continues on its course, the magnet would drop the car on five 
people standing below. On the left, there is one person standing.  
You can take control of the magnet. If you do nothing, the magnet would proceed to the right and drop the car attached to it, causing 
the death of the five people standing below. You can turn the magnet to left side of the platform, causing the death of the single person 
standing there.  
12. Nurse 
You are a nurse who is in charge of a machine which controls drug dosage levels in patients’ blood. Because of a technical failure, the 
machine is supplying a lethal dose of the drug to four patients. Another patient, in a single room, is hooked up to the same machine 
and has not undergone any variation in dosage. 
If nothing is done, these four patients would die due to lethal poisoning caused by drug overdose. You can press the button to block 
the drug supply to the four patients. You know that the overdose of drug will be redirected to the patient in the single room, who will 
die, but the other four will be saved. 
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Moral personal 
13. Footbridge 
A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workers, and will kill them if it keeps going. You are on a footbridge over 
the tracks, in between the approaching trolley and the five workers. Next to you on this footbridge is a stranger who is very large.  
The only way to save the lives of the five workers is to push this stranger off the bridge and onto the tracks below where his large 
body will stop the trolley. The stranger will die if you do this, but the five workers will be saved. 
14. Miners 
You are leading a rescue team for seven miners that are stuck in an underground mine, which is flooding. Six miners are trapped at the 
bottom and will drown if not rescued soon. One miner is trapped higher in the elevator shaft and will not drown.  
The only way to rescue the six at the bottom is to quickly send down the mine elevator. If you do this, the one miner in the shaft will 
be crushed to death. If you do not send down the elevator, you will have enough time to rescue the one miner in the shaft.  
15. Vitamins 
You are leading a group that is lost in the wilderness. Your group includes a family of six with a genetic vitamin deficiency. A few 
people’s kidneys contain large amounts of this vitamin. There is one such person in your group.  
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The only way to save the lives of the six family members is to remove one of this man’s kidneys and take the necessary vitamins from 
it. He will not die if you do this, but his health will get worse. He does not want to give his kidney, but you have the power to do what 
you choose.  
16. Epidemic 
An epidemic has spread worldwide killing millions of people. You have developed two substances in your underground shelter. One 
of them is a cure but the other one is deadly. You don’t know which is which.  
Two people have run downstairs to your shelter trying to avoid the epidemic. The only way to identify the cure is to inject each of 
these people with one of the two substances. One person will live but the other will die. Then you will be able to start saving lives with 
the cure. 
17. Savannah 
You are carrying out research into the behaviour of lions in the Savannah of Central Africa. From an observation tower, you can see 
four people hiding behind a bush. They are being followed by a lion and are trying to get away from it. The lion has seen them and is 
heading for the bush. Meanwhile, another person has been able to climb the observation tower and is standing near you. 
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If you do nothing, the lion is going to find the four people hiding in the bush and kill them. You can push off the person standing near 
you so that the lion is drawn towards him. You know that this person will be mauled to death, but the other four will have time to 
escape. 
18. Transplant 
You are a young doctor working in the emergency surgery ward of your local hospital. Four of the patients under your care in your 
ward are dying from grave injury to vital organs as a result of a serious car accident. You have another patient in the ward who is now 
in good health and ready to be sent home.  
If nothing is done, these four patients are going to die. You can anaesthetize the patient in good health and remove his vital organs to 
transplant them in the patients who are dying. You know that this patient will die, but the other four can be saved. 
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Text S3: Descriptive statistics for behavioral ratings for moral judgment tasks 
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
non-moral 0.55 0.17 0.33 1.00 0.56 0.12 0.33 0.83
impersonal 0.55 0.34 0 0.83 0.58 0.26 0.17 1.00
personal 0.25 0.20 0 0.50 0.13 0.21 0 0.67
non-moral 0.93 1.58 0 6.16 4.66 3.61 0.72 12.80
impersonal 11.35 4.05 4.16 20.00 16.16 3.49 7.09 20.00
personal 9.40 4.64 0.05 19.71 14.00 5.32 2.61 20.00
behaviour
emotional arousal
Moral dilemma task
Question Condition
HC (n  = 16) ASD (n  = 15)
 
 
 
Text S4: Details for response time data 
Descriptive statistics and group differences for response time data from the moral dilemma task. No response time data was available 
for the arousal ratings. Note that although we had response time data for the moral dilemma task, we do not carry out any analysis on 
this data to make an inference about underlying psychological processes, as this practice of reverse inference has been recently 
demonstrated to be problematic (Krajbich et al., 2015).  
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n Min Max Mean SD n Min Max Mean SD
non-moral 16 3.80 11.25 6.11 2.07 15 4.38 21.65 7.95 4.36 -1.485 19.71 0.153
impersonal 16 3.12 32.02 7.01 7.14 15 3.78 24.04 7.26 5.01 -0.114 26.94 0.91
personal 16 3.06 24.30 6.81 5.20 15 3.46 12.84 6.35 2.64 0.315 22.56 0.756
utilitarian 16 0 12.02 4.23 3.19 15 3.12 30.59 8.20 6.89 -2.037 19.45 0.055
non-utilitarian 17 0 32.02 6.90 7.72 14 3.18 20.77 7.39 4.81 -0.213 27.21 0.833
utilitarian 16 3.34 9.34 5.55 2.12 11 2.87 11.06 6.68 2.76 -1.141 17.79 0.269
non-utilitarian 17 0 12.20 5.70 3.02 15 2.93 18.21 7.91 4.00 -1.747 25.9 0.092
utilitarian 12 3.27 44.85 11.05 13.13 10 3.33 7.93 5.78 1.58 1.378 11.38 0.195
non-utilitarian 16 2.50 16.91 5.99 3.75 15 3.82 36.70 8.41 8.12 -1.051 19.43 0.306
average
scenario
Type of 
response
HC ASD
t
impersonal
personal
non-moral
df p
 
Note: The reported p-values are uncorrected for multiple comparisons and would have to be adjusted for factorial design of the study.  
 
 
 
Text S5 
Correlation (Spearman’s rho) between arousal ratings and moral judgments on moral dilemma task. *p < 0.05 (two-tailed) 
ρ p ρ p
Non-moral behaviour-arousal -0.261 0.330 -0.397 0.142 0.382
Impersonal behaviour-arousal 0.219 0.414 -0.583 0.023 2.222*
Personal behaviour-arousal 0.384 0.142 -0.150 0.594 1.389
Correlation pair
Control (n  = 16) ASD (n  = 15) Fisher's Z-
test
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Text S6 
Correlation (Spearman’s rho) between moral judgments on the moral dilemma task and arousal ratings and ERQ. *p < 0.05 (two-
tailed) 
ERQ - 
reapprai
sal
ERQ - 
suppress
ion
ERQ - 
reapprai
sal
ERQ - 
suppress
ion
ERQ - 
reapprai
sal
ERQ - 
suppress
ion
ρ .441 -.449 -.055 .214
p .087 .081 .845 .443
ρ .068 .454 .382 .100
p .802 .077 .160 .724
ρ .088 .278 .302 .450
p .745 .296 .274 .092
ρ -.449 -.308 .070 -.250
p .081 .246 .805 .368
ρ .386 -.320 .132 -.001
p .139 .228 .640 .997
ρ .276 -.309 .317 .107
p .301 .244 .250 .703
Threshold of significance = 0.0167
Fisher's Z -test
variable statistic
HC (n = 16) ASD  (n  = 15)
personal utilitarian behaviour 0.558 0.498
non-moral affirmative behaviour 1.32 1.751
impersonal utilitarian behaviour 0.835 0.973
personal emotional arousal 0.112 1.066
non-moral emotional arousal 1.383 0.157
impersonal emotional arousal 0.685 0.826
 
 
 
 
 
 
 202 
 
Text S7 
Correlation (Spearman’s rho) between moral judgments on the moral dilemma task and arousal ratings and alexithymia. *p < 0.05 
(two-tailed) 
ρ -.008 -.283
p .977 .307
ρ -.159 .030
p .556 .917
ρ -.088 .246
p .746 .378
ρ .164 0.765
p .543 .001
ρ -.181 .022
p .502 .937
ρ -.059 -.165
p .827 .557
personal emotional arousal 0.268
non-moral emotional arousal 2.105*
impersonal emotional arousal 0.512
Threshold of significance = 0.0167
variable statistic
personal utilitarian behaviour 0.848
non-moral affirmative behaviour 0.707
impersonal utilitarian behaviour 0.476
HC (n  = 
16)
ASD (n = 
15)
Fisher's 
Z -test
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Text S8  
Correlation (Spearman’s rho) between moral judgments on the moral dilemma task and arousal ratings and SPF-IRI. *p < 0.05 (two-
tailed) 
EC PT PD EC PT PD EC PT PD
ρ .483 .258 .382 -.377 -.062 -.014
p .058 .334 .144 .166 .827 .959
ρ -.173 .121 -.331 -.331 -.093 .212
p .522 .655 .210 .229 .742 .447
ρ .035 .212 -.193 -0.573 -.329 -.315
p .896 .431 .474 .026 .232 .253
ρ -.313 -.388 -.088 -.018 -.018 .341
p .238 .138 .746 .949 .949 .213
ρ .381 .322 .263 0.641 -.042 .227
p .146 .224 .325 .010 .881 .416
ρ .151 .364 .070 0.523 -.178 .251
p .576 .166 .796 .045 .525 .367
personal utilitarian behaviour 1.716 1.391 0.326
personal emotional arousal 1.07 1.402 0.466
non-moral emotional arousal 0.764 0.978 1.108
impersonal emotional arousal 0.896 0.939 0.096
non-moral affirmative behaviour 2.307* 0.814 1.04
impersonal utilitarian behaviour 0.423 0.537 1.397
Threshold of significance = 0.0167
Fisher's Z -test
variable statistic
HC (n  = 16) ASD (n  = 15)
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Text S9 
Correlation (Spearman’s rho) between moral judgments on dilemma task and arousal ratings and MET performance. *p < 0.05 (two-tailed) 
Cognitiv
e 
empathy 
positive 
correct 
answers
Cognitiv
e 
empathy 
negative 
correct 
answers
Emotion
al 
empathy 
positive 
average
Emotion
al 
empathy 
negative 
average
Cognitiv
e 
empathy 
positive 
correct 
answers
Cognitiv
e 
empathy 
negative 
correct 
answers
Emotion
al 
empathy 
positive 
average
Emotion
al 
empathy 
negative 
average
Cognitiv
e 
empathy 
positive 
correct 
answers
Cognitiv
e 
empathy 
negative 
correct 
answers
Emotion
al 
empathy 
positive 
average
Emotion
al 
empathy 
negative 
average
ρ -.178 -.232 -.175 -.129 -.260 -.159 .270 -.008
p .509 .386 .516 .635 .350 .572 .330 .977
ρ .332 .381 -.275 0.000 -.152 -.272 .487 .225
p .209 .146 .303 1.000 .588 .326 .066 .421
ρ .361 .158 .040 -.015 -.025 -.147 .008 -.227
p .170 .560 .884 .957 .930 .600 .977 .417
ρ -.286 -.309 0.573 -.195 .375 -.289 -.100 .150
p .283 .244 .020 .470 .168 .296 .723 .594
ρ .261 .141 -.109 .237 .167 .423 -.148 .304
p .329 .603 .688 .376 .552 .116 .597 .271
ρ -.028 -.012 .012 .071 -.226 .107 -.011 .236
p .918 .964 .966 .794 .418 .705 .970 .398
Threshold of significance = 0.0167
Fisher's  Z -test
variable statistic
HC (n  = 16) ASD (n  = 15)
impersonal utilitarian 
behaviour
1.245 1.699 2.034* 0.572
non-moral affirmative 
behaviour
0.215 0.19 1.133 0.304
personal utilitarian behaviour 1.007 0.768 0.08 0.54
impersonal emotional arousal 0.246 0.773 0.099 0.181
non-moral emotional arousal 1.72 0.055 1.879 0.871
personal emotional arousal 0.505 0.298 0.057 0.423
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Text S10 
Correlation (Spearman’s rho) between moral judgments on dilemma task and arousal ratings and personality traits. *p < 0.05 (two-tailed) 
AQ-k SPM MWT-B BDI AQ-k SPM MWT-B BDI AQ-k SPM MWT-B BDI
ρ -.060 -.042 .102 -.418 -0.595 -.122 -.176 .129
p .825 .876 .707 .107 .019 .665 .531 .646
ρ -.358 0.718 -.047 .306 -.423 -.493 -.358 .041
p .173 .002 .862 .249 .116 .062 .190 .885
ρ -.281 .392 -0.521 .358 -.352 -.459 -0.739 -.096
p .293 .134 .039 .174 .198 .085 .002 .734
ρ .057 -.135 -.325 .364 0.715 -.006 -.059 .212
p .833 .618 .219 .166 .003 .984 .834 .448
ρ .163 .406 -.368 -.046 .497 -.052 .408 .161
p .546 .118 .160 .865 .060 .854 .131 .567
ρ -.111 .248 -.440 .058 .123 -.111 .292 .239
p .682 .355 .088 .831 .663 .693 .291 .391
Threshold of significance = 0.0167
Fisher's Z -test
variable statistic
HC (n  = 16) ASD (n  = 15)
impersonal utilitarian 
behaviour
0.192 3.606* 0.818 0.687
non-moral affirmative 
behaviour
1.562 0.201 0.7 1.436
personal utilitarian 
behaviour
0.197 2.274* 0.926 1.176
impersonal emotional 
arousal
0.951 1.206 2.047* 0.521
non-moral emotional 
arousal
2.099* 0.324 0.695 0.415
personal emotional 
arousal
0.587 0.911 1.931 0.464
 
 
Text S11 
Verbal reasoning skills and moral judgments: The relation observed between global/verbal intelligence scores (as assessed by MWT-B) and 
utilitarian moral judgment on personal moral dilemmas was similar for the two groups (Z = 0.926, p = 0.354). In both controls and ASD 
group, higher MWT-B scores were associated with a reduced tendency to make utilitarian judgments. Note that the number of data-points in 
the scatterplot seems to be less than the sample sizes due to overlap between data-points (denoted by circles with thicker circumference). 
Reported p-values are two-tailed.  
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Text S12: Details for the standardized regression coefficients for each path from the path analysis model  
Since we had directional hypotheses for most paths, one-tailed p-values have been provided. Note: S.E. – Standard Error, C.R. – Critical 
Ratio, MJ – moral judgment for the behavior question on the personal moral dilemma 
β p (1-tailed) S.E. C.R.
EC <--- TAS -0.313 0.100 0.254 -1.234
PD <--- AQ 0.396 0.030 0.214 1.881
PD <--- SPM -0.461 0.015 0.214 -2.186
PD <--- Medication status 0.091 0.334 0.422 0.429
EC <--- Medication status -0.047 0.426 0.501 -0.186
MJ <--- AQ -0.338 0.049 0.175 -1.651
MJ <--- TAS 0.535 0.004 0.168 2.712
MJ <--- EC -0.491 0.001 0.132 -3.157
MJ <--- PD -0.418 0.013 0.157 -2.234
MJ <--- SPM -0.452 0.004 0.146 -2.646
MJ <--- Medication status 0.142 0.171 0.250 0.952  
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Text S13 
Hierarchical regression analyses (conducted separately in the control and ASD groups) determined whether alexithymia or ASD symptom 
severity predicted utilitarian responses on the behavior question for personal moral dilemmas once age, gender, and depression were 
controlled for, and whether each could predict the dependent variables after the other was controlled for. As noted in a previous study (Brewer 
et al., 2015), it is necessary to perform hierarchical regressions with alexithymia and ASD symptom severity entered in both possible orders to 
independently investigate the effect of each, after controlling for the other, because of collinearity. We acknowledge that limitation of the 
following analysis is again that the sample size is smaller than recommended (Maxwell, 2000).  Note: All reported p-values are from two-
tailed tests.  
As mentioned in the main text, there was less amount of variation in trait alexithymia in control sample as compared to ASD sample (SDASD = 
8.091, SDHC = 3.890; Levene’s test: F(1,32) = 5.359, p = 0.027), but not for AQ-k scores (SDASD = 3.238, SDHC = 3.182; Levene’s test: 
F(1,32) = 0.046, p = 0.831). This was a result of our methodological choice to not match the two groups for alexithymia scores (in contrast to 
prior recommendations (Bird & Cook, 2013)), since this requires oversampling the control group and consequently is unrepresentative with 
respect to distribution of alexithymic traits in this population. Given that there was not enough variation in TAS scores in control group with 
respect to the ASD group, but equivalent variation in AQ scores, we expected analogous result in the HC group only for the AQ but not TAS 
traits. We did not carry out moderation analysis to see if factor group moderated relationship between alexithymia severity and utilitarian 
judgments (like in a previous study (Brewer et al., 2015)), because the two groups were not matched for alexithymia scores. 
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 For ASD group (n = 15) with order ASD severity first, alexithymia second 
β t p R
2
ΔR
2 
(p )
(Constant) 2.704 0.021
Gender -0.193 -0.751 0.468
Age -0.498 -1.915 0.082
Depression -0.186 -0.725 0.483
(Constant) 1.621 0.136
Gender -0.164 -0.599 0.563
Age -0.472 -1.712 0.118
Depression -0.166 -0.614 0.553
ASD severity -0.126 -0.457 0.657
(Constant) 1.120 0.292
Gender -0.170 -0.919 0.382
Age -0.319 -1.664 0.130
Depression -0.073 -0.394 0.703
ASD severity -0.701 -2.846 0.019
Alexithymia 0.840 3.583 0.006
2 32.6% 1.4% (0.657)
3 72.2% 39.6% (0.006)
Step Predictor
ASD group : behavior ratings for personal dilemma
1 31.2% 31.2% (0.232)
 
 For ASD group (n = 15) with order alexithymia first, ASD severity second 
β t p R
2
ΔR
2 
(p )
(Constant) 2.704 0.021
Gender -0.193 -0.751 0.468
Age -0.498 -1.915 0.082
Depression -0.186 -0.725 0.483
(Constant) -0.080 0.938
Gender -0.259 -1.087 0.303
Age -0.481 -2.011 0.072
Depression -0.186 -0.788 0.449
Alexithymia 0.406 1.743 0.112
(Constant) 1.120 0.292
Gender -0.170 -0.919 0.382
Age -0.319 -1.664 0.130
Depression -0.073 -0.394 0.703
Alexithymia 0.840 3.583 0.006
ASD severity -0.701 -2.846 0.019
2 47.2% 16% (0.112)
3 72.2% 25% (0.019)
Step Predictor
ASD group : behavior ratings for personal dilemma
1 31.2% 31.2% (0.232)
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As can be noted from the regression coefficients, both autistic and alexithymic traits were significant predictors of the utilitarian moral 
behavior on personal dilemmas, but with opposite signs. That is, greater severity of autistic traits was associated with increased endorsement 
of the option of inaction, while higher scores on alexithymia were characterized by greater endorsement of the utilitarian choice. Thus, the 
pattern revealed by complex path analysis was also observed in this simpler regression analysis.  
Next, we investigated if the same pattern was also observed in the control sample.    
 For HC group (n = 16) with order ASD severity first, alexithymia second 
β t p R
2
ΔR
2 
(p )
(Constant) 5.369 < 0.001
Gender -0.217 -1.285 0.223
Age -0.788 -4.728 < 0.001
Depression 0.234 1.422 0.180
(Constant) 8.511 < 0.001
Gender -0.299 -2.493 0.030
Age -0.848 -7.216 < 0.001
Depression 0.254 2.204 0.050
ASD severity -0.423 -3.693 0.004
(Constant) 4.405 0.001
Gender -0.300 -2.383 0.038
Age -0.844 -6.709 < 0.001
Depression 0.254 2.108 0.061
ASD severity -0.418 -3.378 0.007
Alexithymia -0.017 -0.142 0.890
2 86.3% 16.9% (0.004)
3 86.4% 0.1% (0.890)
Step Predictor
HCgroup : behavior ratings for personal dilemma
1 69.4% 69.4% (0.002)
 
As can be seen from the final model, gender emerged as a significant negative predictor of utilitarian judgment, i.e. women were less likely to 
judge harming the few for the greater good than men, which agrees with a recent large-scale meta-analysis (Friesdorf, Conway, & Gawronski, 
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2015). Additionally, it was also observed that older people were less likely to endorse utilitarian judgment, but this result might be an artifact 
of small sample size as prior surveys with study sample large enough to investigate age-related variation on moral judgments revealed null 
results (Hauser et al., 2007).   
 For HC group (n = 16) with order alexithymia first, ASD severity second 
β t p R
2
ΔR
2 
(p )
(Constant) 5.369 < 0.001
Gender -0.217 -1.285 0.223
Age -0.788 -4.728 < 0.001
Depression 0.234 1.422 0.180
(Constant) 3.060 0.011
Gender -0.227 -1.313 0.216
Age -0.767 -4.444 0.001
Depression 0.241 1.434 0.179
Alexithymia -0.122 -0.729 0.481
(Constant) 4.405 0.001
Gender -0.300 -2.383 0.038
Age -0.844 -6.709 < 0.001
Depression 0.254 2.108 0.061
Alexithymia -0.017 -0.142 0.890
ASD severity -0.418 -3.378 0.007
Step Predictor
HC group : behavior ratings for personal dilemma
1 69.4% 69.4% (0.002)
2 70.8% 1.4% (0.481)
3 86.4% 15.6% (0.007)
 
As expected, we found evidence for decreased non-utilitarian tendency with autistic traits also in the control sample, but no evidence for 
alexithymic traits due to lack of enough variation in these traits. A prior study done with healthy sample did reveal utilitarian bias in trait 
alexithymia (Patil & Silani, 2014a), but this study did not investigate the role of autistic traits. Future studies should investigate divergent 
contributions of these two traits in a large sample consisting of healthy adults.  
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Appendix: Chapter 3 
 Text S1: Scenario details 
Scenario type by version breakdown. Red and green cells denote scenarios taken from Cushman (2008) and Young, Camprodon, 
Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe (2010), respectively.  
Note: The exact wording of the details can be found in the original papers or can be requested from the corresponding author. Italian 
translations are also available on request. 
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No. scenario v1 v2 v3 v4
1 Popcorn neu att int acc
2 Malaria Pond/African pond att int acc neu
3 Spinach int acc neu att
4 Peanut allergy acc neu att int
5 Rabies/Rabid dog neu att int acc
6 Meatloaf att int acc neu
7 Seatbelt/Amusement park int acc neu att
8 Teenagers/Skiing acc neu att int
9 Ham sandwich neu att int acc
10 Safety Cord/Rock climbing att int acc neu
11 Sesame seeds int acc neu att
12 Coffee/Chemical Plant acc neu att int
13 Bridge neu att int acc
14 Pool att int acc neu
15 Mushrooms int acc neu att
16 Latex acc neu att int
17 Motorboat neu att int acc
18 Asthma att int acc neu
19 Veterinarian/Dog poison int acc neu att
20 Zoo acc neu att int
21 Sushi neu att int acc
22 Cayo/Monkeys att int acc neu
23 Wet floor int acc neu att
24 Lab acc neu att int
25 Vitamin neu att int acc
26 Airport att int acc neu
27 Chairlift int acc neu att
28 Bike acc neu att int
29 Safety Town/Fire drill neu att int acc
30 Parachute att int acc neu
31 Sculpture int acc neu att
32 Dentist acc neu att int
33 Iron neu att int acc
34 Tree House att int acc neu
35 Jellyfish/Ocean int acc neu att
36 Laptop acc neu att int  
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Text S2: Additional details on nature of stimuli used 
When faced with possible harmful situations, human judges tend to perceive them in terms of a moral dyad consisting of (a) a moral 
agent with capacity for purposeful action and goal-directed behavior who is attributed moral responsibility for intending to cause or 
causing harm and (b) a moral patient/victim with capacity for sensations and feelings and is attributed moral rights that need to be 
defended (Gray & Schein, 2012; Theriault & Young, 2014). In other words, while assessing behavior of a perpetrator, judges need to 
simulate both epistemic (beliefs, knowledge, desires, etc.) and feeling (pain, suffering, etc.) states in others. 
But we note that intent and harmfulness inputs represent sufficient but not necessary inputs to moral judgment (Inbar, Pizarro, & 
Cushman, 2012). Additionally, a number of other factors that have been shown to influence moral judgments about third-party 
violations were held constant across scenarios. In none of the scenarios, victims were responsible for their own fate since such 
scenarios tend to elicit reduced empathic reasoning about victims (Fehse, Silveira, Elvers, & Blautzik, 2014). Also, none of the 
scenarios systematically manipulated information about how reasonable the agent’s belief was (Young, Nichols, et al., 2010) or the 
nature of agent’s desires (Cushman, 2008; Laurent, Nuñez, & Schweitzer, 2015). Additionally, all scenarios were formulated in such a 
way that the agent was in control of his/her own behavior (Martin & Cushman, 2016). The agent was causally responsible for the 
outcome and no information that would diminish agent’s perceived responsibility for the outcome was presented (apart from belief 
information), e.g. mitigating circumstances (Buckholtz et al., 2008; Yamada et al., 2012) or external constraints on the agent by third-
parties (Phillips & Shaw, 2015; Woolfolk, Doris, & Darley, 2006). Moreover, when present, the nature of harmful outcome was 
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described in a plain rather than graphic language (Treadway et al., 2014). Importantly, all protagonists in scenarios had an obligation 
towards victims (due to their role in relational context) and possessed the capacity to foresee and prevent the event (Malle et al., 
2014).    
 Text S3: Experimental protocol 
The study was approved by the ethics committee of the hospital “Santa Maria della Misericordia” (Udine, Italy) and the data were 
collected at the same hospital. There was no restriction on handedness of participants (8 left-handed, as assessed using self-report) and 
all participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Rule-out criteria for participation included Italian as a secondary language, 
presence of a diagnosed psychiatric illness and/or history of psychiatric treatment, history of significant neurological illness or brain 
injury, and current usage of psychoactive drugs. 
Subjects were completely agnostic to the purpose of the experiment and did not receive any information about the nature of the 
experiment apart from the fact that it involved decision-making in social context. There were no practice trials before the actual 
experiment as the experimental protocol employed was easily comprehensible and participants were given general instructions about 
the nature of stimuli and handling the response pad before they entered the scanner. For all tasks, the stimuli were presented in a rapid 
event-related design.  
Scenarios were presented in the scanner using a visual display presented on an LCD panel and back-projected onto a screen positioned 
at the front of the magnet bore. Subjects were positioned supine in the scanner so as to be able to view the projector display using a 
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mirror above their eyes. The behavioral data were collected using a Lumina response box (LP-400, Cedrus Corporation, San Pedro, 
USA). The stimuli were presented using Cogent 2000 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent2000.html) running on MATLAB platform. The text of the stories was presented in a black 21-
point Arial font on a white background with a resolution of 800 × 600. 
In the same session, participants completed both the moral judgment task and the empathy localizer task. The order in which 
participants performed moral judgment task and empathy localizer task was counterbalanced across participants.   
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 Text S4: Task designs for localizer tasks 
Task schematics for the empathy localizer task (Lamm et al., 2007). For more details, see the main text.  
 
 
 
 219 
 
 Text S5: Additional details about fMRI preprocessing and data visualization 
Given the huge variation in possible preprocessing pipelines and flexibility in methodological choices (Carp, 2012), we provide 
extensive details about our choices and rationale for the same here. To report acquisition and preprocessing details, we have followed 
a prior set of guidelines (Inglis, 2015; Poldrack et al., 2008). 
Preprocessing:  
Data were analyzed with SPM12 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm12; Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, 
London, UK). First three scans were discarded to avoid T1-equilibration effects. The scans were not slice timing corrected because for 
relatively short TR (2 seconds or less), it can lead to artifacts (Poldrack, Mumford, & Nichols, 2011, p.42, 48). All functional volumes 
were realigned in two steps: initially to the first volume and then to the mean realigned image. The estimation of realignment 
parameters was carried out using a 6-parameter affine (rigid body) transformation such that the cost function comprising of difference 
in voxel intensities between images was minimized. The voxel intensities from old images were then resampled using higher-order 
interpolation (B-spline basis functions) to create new motion-corrected voxel intensities in resliced images. The average of the motion-
corrected images was co-registered to each individual’s structural MRI scan using a 9-parameter affine transformation such that a 
suitable between-modality cost function (normalized mutual information) was minimized. The realigned functional images were then 
normalized to the ICBM-space template (2 mm × 2 mm × 2 mm voxels) for European brains by applying nonlinear deformation field 
estimated from the best overlay of the atlas image on the individual subjects' co-registered structural image. The normalized images 
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were then smoothed by convolving an isotropic Gaussian kernel with full width at half maximum (FWHM) of 10 mm (= √62 +  82, 6 
mm at first and 8 mm at second level) in order (i) boost signal-to-noise ratio to ease the detection of large clusters, (ii) overcome 
imperfections remaining from inter-subject registration, and (iii) validate assumptions of Gaussian random field theory (RFT) applied 
later to correct for multiple comparisons during statistical analysis (Poldrack et al., 2011, pp.50-52).  
Motion and artefact analysis: 
In order to avoid false positive activations owing to head movement, the following data quality checks were employed for each 
participant and for each task. Data from a participant for a particular task was removed without further analysis if TR-to-TR head 
movement exceeded 5 mm at any point during the task (none removed).  
After this check, the artefact detection analysis was carried out using the Art toolbox (www.nitrc.org/projects/artifact_detect). For 
each task, outlier scans were identified based on two measures (cf. Koster-Hale, Bedny, & Saxe, 2014): (a) if the TR-to-TR composite 
motion was more than 2mm and/or (b) if the scan-to-scan global BOLD signal normalized to z-scores deviated from mean more than z 
= 3. Each time-point identified as an outlier was regressed out as a separate nuisance covariate in the first-level design matrix. Note 
that the motion outliers were identified based on composite motion parameter as this is a more comprehensive measure that 
outperforms individual motion parameters (Wilke, 2014). Any participant with more than 20% outliers scans were excluded from the 
analysis. Scanning data for the moral judgment task was discarded for two participants due to excessive head motion (outlier scans > 
20%), but their behavioral data was retained.  
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Using the Art toolbox, we also ensured that there were no systematic correlations between any of the task-related parameters, 
realignment parameters, and global BOLD-signal, which can lead to artifactual activation or loss of task-related signal after removing 
motion-related signal (Poldrack et al., 2011, p.44). Since we regressed out scans with excessive movement and the task regressors 
were not correlated with BOLD activity, we did not unwarp the realigned images to remove variance associated with susceptibility-
by-movement interactions (B0 distortions).  
In the table below, we tabulate percentage of outlier scans from motion and artifact analysis:  
Note: Green cells represent missing data. Yellow cells represent discarded data - ID14 was on medication (for more, see Methods and 
Materials section in the main text). Red cells denote outlier data. 
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Empathy Intent
1 0.90% 3%
2 0% 1.90%
3 0% 2.40%
4 3.70% 6.60%
5 0% 0.20%
6 0% 3.50%
7 5.00%
8 1.20% 3.40%
9 1.20% 0.50%
10 1.20% 1.20%
11 0% 0.70%
12 1.20% 0.90%
13 6.80% 3.90%
14 2.50% 5.40%
15 0% 2.30%
16 0% 7.50%
17 2.50% 21.30%
18 0% 4.20%
19 3.70% 5.00%
20 1.90% 7.10%
21 10.50% 25%
22 4.30% 2%
23 5.60% 15.10%
24 6.80% 8.30%
25 0% 0.80%
26 5.60% 5.50%
27 1.20% 0.60%
28 3.70% 0.50%
29 6.80% 7.80%
30 8.60% 9.90%
31 0% 1.30%
32 6.90% 4.40%
33 8.00% 4.70%
34 8.60% 6.70%
35 4.30% 3.30%
36 9.90% 15.70%
37 11.10% 2.90%
38 0% 3.00%
39 11.10% 10.90%
40 3.70% 0.80%
41 1.20% 8.30%
42 3.70% 0.80%
43 2.50% 1.80%
44 0% 0.90%
45 5.60% 4.20%
46 0% 3.20%
47 11.70% 12.50%
48 1.20% 2.20%
49 3.70% 0.90%
50 6.80% 5.08%
ID
Percent of outlier scans (glabal 
intensity: z  > 3 and motion: > 
2mm)
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Data reporting and visualization: 
Combination of the Anatomy Toolbox v2.1 (Eickhoff et al., 2005) and Neuromorphometrics atlas was used for anatomical 
interpretation. All peaks of activations reported are in MNI-coordinates but no Brodmann Area (BA) labels have been reported as 
assigning functional activations to cytoarchitectotonically defined BAs can be inaccurate in the absence of probabilistic maps of 
underlying cytoarchitectotonic variability (Devlin & Poldrack, 2007). All statistical parametric maps are displayed on smoothed, 
representative scans (average of 305 T1 images, provided in SPM12) and not on a single brain as this can deceive the reader into 
thinking that anatomical localization is more precise than is actually possible (Ridgway et al., 2008). 
 Text S6: Additional details for fMRI data analysis 
First-level analysis: 
For each participant and for each task, the design matrices for a fixed-effects General Linear Model were constructed by convolving a 
canonical hemodynamic response function or HRF (double gamma, including a positive γ function and a smaller, negative γ function 
to reflect the BOLD undershoot) with the stimulus function for events (boxcar function) to create regressors of interest. Even a minor 
misspecification in hemodynamic model can lead to biased estimators and loss of power, possibly inflating the type I error rate 
(Lindquist, Meng Loh, Atlas, & Wager, 2009). Thus, in order to account for subject-to-subject and voxel-to-voxel variation in evoked 
BOLD response, the stimulus function was also convolved with partial derivative of canonical HRF with respect to onset latency 
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(which allows for delay in peak response) and dispersion (which relaxes assumption about width of the response) to form the informed 
basis set (Henson, Rugg, & Friston, 2001). 
Note that the inclusion of temporal derivative of HRF also reduces impact of slice timing differences by allowing some degree of 
timing misspecification, which is crucial for our study since we did not do slice timing correction (Ashby, 2011, pp.47-51). The 
convolution was performed in a higher resolution time-domain than TR (16 time-bins per TR). As a default, SPM orthogonalizes HRF 
derivatives on canonical HRF and not on the rest of the design matrix (Pernet, 2014). The orthogonality of other regressors of interest 
was also visually inspected in design matrices since collinearity between regressors can lead to highly unstable parameter estimates 
and loss of statistical power (Mumford, Poline, & Poldrack, 2015).  High-pass temporal filtering with a cut-off of 128s was used to 
remove low-frequency drifts and power spectra were visually inspected to ascertain that signals of interest were not being filtered out. 
Temporal autocorrelations in fMRI time series data were modelled using an autoregressive AR(1) model. Since in the current study 
neither the ITI was less than 1 second nor was the stimulus exposure duration less than 3 seconds, we were confident that the BOLD-
response did not exhibit significant nonlinearities and thus a second-order Volterra series was not modelled in the design matrix for 
any of the tasks (Ashby, 2011, pp.33-34).    
Second-level analysis:  
Heterogeneity of variance between different levels of factors and non-sphericity in the data was accounted for by estimating 
parameters using Weighted Least Squares (pre-whitening the data using estimated non-sphericity and then applying Ordinary Least 
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Squares; SPM12 Manual, pp.277-78). Not assuming sphericity was especially important for our design since we included informed 
basis set at first-level that leads to stronger assumption about sphericity (Glaser & Friston, 2004), although only canonical HRF 
contrasts were retained for the whole-brain analysis for the moral judgment task because of the complexity of design (cf. 
http://imaging.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk/imaging/DealingWithDifference). 
Whole-brain analyses were thresholded at p < 0.05, Family-wise Error (FWE) corrected at the threshold level (primary threshold: p < 
0.001, extent threshold: k > 10). The cluster-level inference has greater overall sensitivity over more stringent voxel-level inference, 
but the primary limitation of the former approach is that one can only claim that there is true signal somewhere in the large clusters 
(which can span many anatomical regions) that are found and thus is ill-suited to investigate question about overlapping or distinct 
activations across conditions and this limitation should be kept in mind while interpreting the results (Woo, Krishnan, & Wager, 
2014).  
Overall grand mean scaling was applied to the data, but no global normalization was used as this procedure has been known to 
introduce bias in the results (Ashby, 2011, p.97). Also, no implicit threshold masking was applied. Activations lying outside of the 
brain (due to low variance problem) (Ridgway, Litvak, Flandin, Friston, & Penny, 2012) were weeded out using explicit threshold 
mask formed by averaging first-level masks for respective task from each participant.  
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Text S6: Additional details for ROI analysis 
To carry out ROI analysis, we investigated functional specificity (and not specialization) (Friston, Rotshtein, Geng, Sterzer, & 
Henson, 2006) of empathy network for each individual participant using functional localizer task. We note that the ROIs were not 
tailored to be the same for all participants and were determined on an individual basis for both tasks following individual-subjects 
functional localization approach (Fedorenko & Kanwisher, 2011). 
The data from spherical ROIs with a radius of 8mm was extracted and analyzed using the MarsBar toolbox (v0.44) for SPM 
(http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/) (Brett et al., 2002). The GLM model set to time-series of summary statistic (mean signal) from each 
ROI was similar to that in the whole-brain analysis except that autocorrelations in the time-series were modelled using fmristat AR(2) 
(http://www.math.mcgill.ca/keith/fmristat/) processes instead of AR(1) processes, since second order autoregressive model is the most 
parsimonious way to model signal due to aliased physiological artefacts (Lindquist, 2008). Note that since ROI analysis was carried 
out at the first-level, the smoothing kernel applied to data was 6 mm and not 10 mm. 
Within the ROI, the average percent signal change (PSC) was computed relative to the adjusted mean of the time series. Quality check 
was performed by reviewing if any of the PSC values were extreme (> 5%) as these can be indicative of artefacts in the data (Mazaika, 
2009: http://cibsr.stanford.edu/documents/FMRIPercentSignalChange.pdf; Raichle & Mintun, 2006) and, when found, data from that 
particular ROI was excluded.  
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The computation of PSC was based on GLM parameter estimates for canonical HRF and its derivatives, which provides a better 
estimate of the true PSC (Pernet, 2014). As recommended (Poldrack, 2007), data defining ROIs was independent from the data used in 
the repeated measures statistics. Restricting analysis to a few ROIs thus reduced Type-I error by drastically limiting the number of 
statistical tests performed (Saxe et al., 2006).  
Note that although ToM can also be expected to be recruited while thinking about others’ emotional experiences as well, a prior study 
shows that physical pain recruits primarily the empathy network (AI-aMCC) while processing of emotional suffering (without 
physical pain) recruits regions overlapping with ToM network (Bruneau, Dufour, & Saxe, 2013). As such, none of the ToM regions 
were included in our list of ROIs for empathy for pain. 
 
Text S7: Empathy ROIs localized using functional localizer task at whole brain level 
Brain regions where the BOLD signal was higher while watching painful videos as compared to baseline (n = 49, random effects 
analysis, p < 0.05, FEW-corrected, k > 10), masked with Neuromorphometrics anatomical atlas in random effects analysis carried out 
at the second-level. The coordinates for peak activations are reported in Table 1 in the main text. 
Note: The slice numbers represent z-coordinate in MNI stereotactic space and the color bar denotes the F-statistic.  
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Text S8: ROI coordinates at individual level from empathy localizer 
Note: “-” not localized 
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ID dACC aMCC L-AI R-AI L-PI R-PI
1 [-2;42;-6] [-6;10;34] [-30;18;4] [34;10;8] [-38;-18;14] [38;-6;2]
2 [-4;40;24] [4;20;36] [-36;22;0] [44;12;-6] [-42;-8;-8] [42;-6;-10]
3 [4;30;30] [6;8;44] [-36;16;2] [40;14;-4] - -
4 [12;30;24] [10;24;30] [-34;20;4] [38;22;2] [-32;-26;14] [38;-20;14]
5 [4;26;34] [-2;6;46] [-32;14;8] [42;14;-2] [-38;-14;8] [38;-6;0]
6 [-2;24;28] [12;-26;38] [-32;16;6] [34;26;-4] [-40;-10;10] [42;-14;2]
7 [-8;36;22] [-8;14;38] [-30;20;4] [40;16;0] [-36;-16;14] [40;0;-16]
8 [2;32;22] [10;22;32] [-34;18;-2] [34;16;-4] [-36;-20;10] -
9 [-2;34;28] [10;16;34] [-32;18;8] [32;28;-2] - [40;-16;12]
10 [6;42;-4] [4;-2;48] - - - -
11 [4;36;26] [12;22;28] [-32;26;2] [34;24;-8] [-34;-20;2] -
12 [-4;48;8] [6;6;38] [-32;14;4] [36;26;-2] [-38;-16;16] [36;-14;16]
13 [2;46;0] [10;6;38] - [32;28;4] [-36;-16;10] [36;-18;14]
14 [8;26;26] [-2;6;46] [-34;24;-2] [44;14;-4] [-36;-12;14] -
15 [0;40;0] [8;22;32] - [40;2;8] - -
16 [2;26;32] [2;16;38] [-40;10;-4] [44;16;-6] - [42;-10;8]
17 [10;32;24] [8;16;34] [-44;14;-4] [34;22;0] [-38;-10;8] [36;-10;16]
18 [4;26;34] [2;18;38] [-32;16;2] [40;14;-2] [-34;-18;12] [44;-10;6]
19 [12;40;8] [8;-26;44] - [32;18;6] [-38;-20;12] [36;-12;12]
20 [-4;34;20] [4;2;42] [-42;16;-4] [40;10;2] [-42;-16;10] -
21 - - [-36;-2;10] - - -
22 [4;36;26] [8;20;32] [-38;6;4] [38;16;-4] [-38;-14;16] [34;-22;12]
23 [0;32;26] [-6;20;34] [-42;16;-4] [32;28;-2] - -
24 - [10;-10;40] - - - -
25 [4;26;34] [-2;18;38] [-36;14;2] - - -
26 - - - [42;8;0] - [38;-16;12]
27 [-10;30;24] [8;10;40] [-32;20;8] [32;20;8] [-36;-16;14] [38;-16;16]
28 [6;32;26] [4;10;42] - [42;16;-2] - -
29 [2;38;22] [-2;-6;40] [-30;24;6] [32;18;6] [-36;-18;14] -
30 [2;28;30] [-10;0;40] [-32;16;4] [34;18;6] [-40;-14;8] [36;-12;12]
31 - - - - - -
32 [10;26;28] [6;-2;48] [-40;8;2] [34;22;6] [-38;-14;16] [36;6;-20]
33 [-2;28;32] [-8;16;32] [-42;6;0] [44;2;-2] [-34;-18;12] [44;-6;-6]
34 [2;24;28] [2;22;28] [-42;0;6] [32;16;6] [-42;-14;10] [40;-6;-4]
35 [2;34;26] [-2;0;46] [-44;12;-4] [34;22;6] [-36;-22;14] -
36 [-2;30;20] - [-38;10;0] [34;16;6] - -
37 [4;24;32] [2;22;34] [-34;10;6] - - -
38 [2;26;22] [-6;20;30] [-34;16;4] [34;14;8] [-42;-12;-2] -
39 - [2;-2;48] - [40;14;0] [-42;-16;10] -
40 - [4;-2;44] - [32;20;8] - [36;6;-20]
41 - - [-40;-8;8] [40;-2;0] [-40;-10;6] [40;-4;0]
42 [-2;12;42] [0;-22;42] [-30;18;2] [42;4;2] [-34;-20;2] [36;-18;-2]
43 [4;28;32] [2;-24;38] [-40;12;-2] [32;26;8] - [42;-10;8]
44 [-6;24;32] [0;-18;38] [-44;12;-8] [36;18;4] - [36;-18;12]
45 [-6;38;26] [0;-24;38] [-38;18;-10] [44;18;-8] [-34;-16;18] -
46 [2;46;8] [6;-16;42] [-42;2;0] [44;8;-2] [-32;-24;8] [40;-12;4]
47 [12;36;20] [8;-14;44] [-38;8;2] [36;10;8] [-44;-10;6] -
48 - [-6;20;30] [-42;10;-2] [42;2;8] - [38;-12;12]
49 [-4;44;10] [4;18;36] [-32;12;8] [32;18;4] [-38;-14;14] -
50 [12;32;22] [4;-18;36] [-32;12;10] [36;10;6] [-34;-16;12] [36;-12;12]
Avg. [2;32;23] [3;5;38] [-36;13;2] [37;16;1] [-37;-16;-10] [38;-10;4]  
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 Text S9: Additional details for brain-behavior correlation analysis 
To avoid false positive brain-behavior correlations, we followed recommended steps (Rousselet & Pernet, 2012; Schwarzkopf et al., 
2012): (i) In order to avoid undue influence of univariate outliers on the overall results (false positive correlation or masking), 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient was preferred over Pearson’s r. (ii) Significant correlations (p < 0.05) found from this analysis 
were further investigated using Robust correlation toolbox (Pernet et al., 2013), since Spearman’s rho is not robust to multivariate 
normality violation or bivariate outliers or heteroscedasticity. Skipped Spearman (ρskipped) correlations were used as robust correlations 
(standard Spearman correlation on data cleaned up for bivariate outliers). (iii) All significant Skipped correlations (p < 0.05) were 
reported with robust confidence intervals computed by bootstrapping (1000 resamples) the cleaned data to emphasize their likely 
unreliability. (iv) If the nominal confidence interval differed from the bootstrapped confidence interval for significant correlations, 
Shepherd’s pi correlation (Spearman’s rho after removing potential bivariate outliers identified through the bootstrapped Mahalanobis 
distance (10,000 resamples) and adjusting the p-value; Schwarzkopf et al., 2012) was used as an additional robust test. As 24 
correlation tests were run for every ROI, the Bonferroni-corrected threshold for statistical significance would have resulted in a very 
stringent threshold (0.05/24 = 0.0020) increasing the risk of false negatives (Lieberman & Cunningham, 2009) and thus we did not use 
such stringent threshold (as recommended by Rousselet & Pernet, 2012). 
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Text S10: Psychophysiological Interaction analysis details 
Given our a priori hypothesis on the role of empathy on blame judgment, time series were extracted from a seed voxel in the r-AI (at 
coordinates given by the localizer task) that showed an increase in BOLD signal during blame (versus acceptability) judgments for 
accidental harm cases at an uncorrected threshold of p < 0.99 within 8 mm of this voxel, for each subject individually. Note that such 
liberal threshold was chosen to ensure all voxels in the ROI are used to compute the connectivity (McLaren, Ries, Xu, & Johnson, 
2012). The time series from seed region was summarized by the first eigenvariate across all suprathreshold voxels. The resulting time 
series were adjusted for effects of no interest by demeaning the eigenvector by all effects not included in that contrast. This BOLD 
time series was deconvolved to estimate a neuronal time series for this region using the PPI-deconvolution parameter defaults in 
SPM12 (Gitelman, Penny, Ashburner, & Friston, 2003). The PPI regressor was calculated as the element-by-element product of the 
ROI neuronal time series and a vector coding for the main effect of task (contrast vectors: blame = 1, acceptability = -1).  This product 
was then re-convolved with the canonical HRF.  
At first-level analysis, we included the PPI as a regressor of interest in a GLM. The task vectors and the extracted time series were 
modelled as additional regressors, in order to assess the PPI estimates over and above shared functional activation and task-
independent correlations in BOLD signal between the seed and other regions (O’Reilly et al., 2012). These regressors were convolved 
with a canonical HRF and high-pass filtered (128 s). Since functional connectivity results have been shown to be severely affected by 
movement artifacts (Power, Barnes, Snyder, Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2012), we also included realignment parameters and regressors for 
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outlier in the first-level PPI models. Subject-wise PPI models were run, and contrast images were generated. Regions with positive or 
negative PPI denote region with greater or lesser context-dependent change in connectivity with the seed region. These subject-wise 
contrast images were then entered into second-level GLM analyses to generate t-maps on which statistical inference was carried out 
using uncorrected threshold of p < 0.001, k > 10. We did not choose FWE-correction for this analysis because PPI analyses tend to 
lack power (O’Reilly et al., 2012) and thus wanted to avoid greater risk of false negatives (Lieberman & Cunningham, 2009). 
 Text S11: Descriptive statistics for moral judgments 
Type of 
judgment
Condition Mean SD Min Max
neutral 2.18 0.98 1.00 5.57
accidental 4.14 1.21 2.00 6.50
attempted 5.25 1.03 1.67 7.00
intentional 6.35 0.62 4.44 7.00
neutral 2.05 0.88 1.00 4.67
accidental 4.09 1.19 1.22 6.44
attempted 5.13 1.10 1.67 6.78
intentional 6.33 0.75 3.40 7.00
acceptability
blame
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 Text S12: Correlations between empathy (performance measures scores) and behavioral ratings with robustness check 
(significant results denoted by yellows cells) 
Correlating the average of ratings provided by participants for the other- and self-oriented empathy questions of the localizer task 
revealed that only the self-oriented unpleasantness while watching videos of others receiving painful stimuli were predictive of intent-
based moral judgments. In particular, the more unpleasant was the subjective experience, the more severe was the condemnation (less 
acceptable, more blame) for attempted and intentional harms (scatterplots are provided below). This raises the question as to why the 
self-oriented distress was not predictive of condemnation for accidental harm scenarios, similar to the pattern detected in brain-
behavior correlations (see Results in the main text). One possibility is that the differences between the experimental contexts may 
result in divergent results (cf. Decety, 2011). We would like to note that it is not unusual to find such inconsistent results between state 
and trait measures and neural activity (for a review of such discrepancies, see Supplementary Information in Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 
2011).  
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Type of 
judgment
condition statistic
Other-
oriented 
estimation 
(n  = 49)
Self-
oriented 
unpleasa
ntnenss 
(n = 49)
Robustness check (Spearman's 
skipped correlation)
ρ 0.128 0.119
p 0.380 0.416
ρ 0.238 0.038
p 0.099 0.795
ρ 0.042 0.300
p 0.773 0.036
ρ 0.165 0.379
p 0.257 0.007
ρ 0.255 0.319
p 0.077 0.025
ρ 0.259 0.189
p 0.072 0.194
ρ 0.026 0.302
p 0.859 0.035
ρ 0.293 0.293
p 0.041 0.041
blame
neutral case r  = 0.281, 95% CI [-0.013, 0.526] 
accidental harm -
attempted harm r  = 0.351, 95% CI [0.043, 0.613] 
intentional harm r = 0.333, 95% CI [0.0793, 0.576] 
acceptability
neutral case -
accidental harm -
attempted harm r  = 0.375, 95% CI [0.104, 0.645] 
intentional harm r  = 0.431, 95% CI [0.157, 0.632] 
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 Scatterplot with acceptability judgments for attempted and intentional harm cases and self-oriented unpleasantness ratings 
 
 
 Scatterplot with blame judgments for attempted and intentional harm cases and self-oriented unpleasantness ratings 
 
 236 
 
 Text S13: One-sample t-tests on ROI data for each segment and for each condition 
For all figures in this section, the error bars represent 95% confidence interval.  
 dACC: 
Segment Condition M SD t (38) p
neutral -0.008 0.882 -0.055 0.957
accidental 0.072 0.945 0.479 0.635
attempted 0.032 0.886 0.227 0.822
intentional 0.001 0.929 0.007 0.994
neutral 0.555 0.809 4.284 < 0.001
accidental 0.444 0.957 2.899 0.006
attempted 0.428 0.913 2.923 0.006
intentional 0.399 0.950 2.622 0.012
neutral 0.186 0.698 1.664 0.104
accidental 0.192 0.835 1.437 0.159
attempted 0.153 0.761 1.255 0.217
intentional 0.449 0.781 3.591 0.001
neutral 0.342 0.715 2.982 0.005
accidental 0.352 0.804 2.736 0.009
attempted 0.391 0.712 3.429 0.001
intentional 0.346 0.680 3.178 0.003
mental-state 
information
consequence
acceptability
blame
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 l-AI 
Segment Condition M SD t (35) p
neutral 0.130 1.018 0.768 0.448
accidental 0.215 0.900 1.431 0.161
attempted 0.176 0.975 1.084 0.286
intentional 0.301 0.872 2.071 0.046
neutral 0.156 0.956 0.979 0.334
accidental 0.317 0.893 2.132 0.040
attempted 0.473 0.979 2.897 0.006
intentional 0.317 0.826 2.301 0.027
neutral 0.367 0.730 3.013 0.005
accidental 0.433 0.615 4.222 < 0.001
attempted 0.495 0.702 4.237 < 0.001
intentional 0.571 0.633 5.415 < 0.001
neutral 0.446 0.665 4.023 < 0.001
accidental 0.553 0.659 5.040 < 0.001
attempted 0.461 0.654 4.234 < 0.001
intentional 0.500 0.668 4.489 < 0.001
mental-state 
information
consequence
acceptability
blame
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 r-AI 
Segment Condition M SD t (37) p
neutral 0.157 1.117 0.868 0.391
accidental 0.495 1.016 3.002 0.005
attempted 0.330 0.776 2.622 0.013
intentional 0.459 0.810 3.487 0.001
neutral 0.535 1.062 3.101 0.004
accidental 0.580 0.789 4.532 < 0.001
attempted 0.526 0.816 3.978 < 0.001
intentional 0.554 0.748 4.565 < 0.001
neutral 0.575 0.582 6.100 < 0.001
accidental 0.479 0.564 5.236 < 0.001
attempted 0.555 0.565 6.055 < 0.001
intentional 0.561 0.559 6.192 < 0.001
neutral 0.574 0.594 5.966 < 0.001
accidental 0.668 0.502 8.197 < 0.001
attempted 0.632 0.562 6.929 < 0.001
intentional 0.560 0.498 6.925 < 0.001
mental-state 
information
consequence
acceptability
blame
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 l-PI 
Segment Condition M SD t (28) p
neutral 0.207 0.808 1.378 0.179
accidental 0.169 0.704 1.293 0.207
attempted 0.064 0.714 0.479 0.635
intentional 0.323 0.707 2.462 0.020
neutral 0.157 0.707 1.197 0.242
accidental 0.262 0.765 1.845 0.076
attempted 0.188 0.792 1.278 0.212
intentional 0.185 0.767 1.297 0.205
neutral 0.244 0.603 2.175 0.038
accidental 0.036 0.605 0.321 0.751
attempted 0.225 0.602 2.012 0.054
intentional 0.219 0.626 1.887 0.070
neutral 0.245 0.522 2.528 0.017
accidental 0.189 0.590 1.727 0.095
attempted 0.254 0.597 2.291 0.030
intentional 0.356 0.540 3.551 0.001
mental-state 
information
consequence
acceptability
blame
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 r-PI 
Segment Condition M SD t (25) p
neutral -0.019 1.068 -0.091 0.928
accidental 0.148 0.888 0.849 0.404
attempted 0.010 0.972 0.052 0.959
intentional 0.371 0.909 2.083 0.048
neutral 0.290 0.918 1.613 0.119
accidental 0.277 0.850 1.663 0.109
attempted 0.243 0.964 1.283 0.211
intentional 0.169 0.897 0.961 0.346
neutral 0.209 0.694 1.538 0.137
accidental -0.228 0.665 -1.746 0.093
attempted 0.051 0.760 0.341 0.736
intentional 0.225 0.672 1.706 0.100
neutral 0.144 0.803 0.916 0.368
accidental 0.040 0.762 0.269 0.790
attempted 0.086 0.868 0.504 0.618
intentional 0.151 0.740 1.043 0.307
mental-state 
information
consequence
acceptability
blame
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 aMCC 
Segment Condition M SD t (41) p
neutral -0.065 1.033 -0.408 0.685
accidental -0.078 1.000 -0.507 0.615
attempted -0.026 0.999 -0.166 0.869
intentional 0.051 1.017 0.325 0.747
neutral 0.433 1.008 2.781 0.008
accidental 0.360 0.998 2.339 0.024
attempted 0.433 1.085 2.588 0.013
intentional 0.428 0.939 2.957 0.005
neutral 0.281 0.705 2.580 0.014
accidental 0.227 0.760 1.932 0.060
attempted 0.338 0.754 2.900 0.006
intentional 0.436 0.715 3.957 0.001
neutral 0.232 0.772 1.950 0.058
accidental 0.309 0.767 2.607 0.013
attempted 0.304 0.778 2.536 0.015
intentional 0.249 0.686 2.358 0.023
mental-state 
information
consequence
acceptability
blame
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Past studies have revealed activity in the shared empathy network (consisting primarily of AI and aMCC) using pictures of body parts 
sustaining injuries (Gu & Han, 2007) or visual stimuli of facial expressions in response to such injuries (Lamm et al., 2007) or abstract 
cues representing administration of pain to another person physically present in the room (Singer et al., 2004), but very few studies 
have utilized verbal narratives to convey information about physical pain (e.g., Bruneau, Dufour, & Saxe, 2013) and the results 
presented above additionally demonstrates validity of this modality.  
 
 
Text S14: ROI analysis across-conditions with empathy ROIs 
Results from a 2(belief: neutral, negative) × 2(outcome: neutral, negative) repeated measures ANOVA in each ROI for average percent 
signal change (PSC) extracted for each text segment in each condition. Yellow cells represent significant (p < 0.05) values. 
 dACC (n = 39) 
 
Text segment main effect of belief main effect of outcome interaction
mental-state (8s) F  (1,38) = 0.022, p  = 0.883 F  (1,38) = 0.081, p  = 0.778 F  (1,38) = 0.377, p  = 0.543
consequence (8s) F  (1,38) = 1.172, p  = 0.286 F  (1,38) = 0.507, p  = 0.481 F  (1,38) = 0.182, p  = 0.672
acceptability (6s) F  (1,38) = 2.670, p  = 0.110 F  (1,38) = 5.769, p  = 0.021 F  (1,38) = 2.781, p  = 0.104
blame (6s) F  (1,38) = 0.102, p  = 0.752 F  (1,38) = 0.039, p  = 0.845 F  (1,38) = 0.171, p  = 0.681
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 l-AI (n = 36) 
Text segment main effect of belief main effect of outcome interaction
mental-state (8s) F  (1,35) = 0.551, p  = 0.463 F  (1,35) = 1.642, p  = 0.209 F  (1,35) = 0.055, p  = 0.816
consequence (8s) F  (1,35) = 5.120, p  = 0.030 F  (1,35) = 0.001, p  = 0.975 F  (1,35) = 5.226, p  = 0.028
acceptability (6s) F  (1,35) = 3.464, p  = 0.071 F  (1,35) = 1.449, p  = 0.237 F  (1,35) = 0.015, p  = 0.905
blame (6s) F  (1,35) = 0.103, p  = 0.750 F  (1,35) = 3.344, p  = 0.076 F  (1,35) = 0.470, p  = 0.497
 
 l-PI (n = 29) 
Text segment main effect of belief main effect of outcome interaction
mental-state (8s) F  (1,28) = 0.003, p  = 0.959 F  (1,28) = 2.082, p  = 0.160 F  (1,28) = 1.934, p  = 0.175
consequence (8s) F  (1,28) = 0.077, p  = 0.784 F  (1,28) = 0.383, p  = 0.541 F  (1,28) = 0.259, p  = 0.615
acceptability (6s) F  (1,28) = 1.784, p  = 0.192 F  (1,28) = 2.329, p  = 0.138 F  (1,28) = 2.053, p  = 0.163
blame (6s) F  (1,28) = 1.248, p  = 0.273 F  (1,28) = 0.145, p  = 0.706 F  (1,28) = 1.648, p  = 0.210
 
 r-AI (n = 38) 
Text segment main effect of belief main effect of outcome interaction
mental-state (8s) F  (1,37) = 0.448, p  = 0.508 F  (1,37) = 2.538, p  = 0.120 F  (1,37) = 0.394, p  = 0.534
consequence (8s) F  (1,37) = 0.029, p  = 0.866 F  (1,37) = 0.265, p  = 0.610 F  (1,37) = 0.011, p  = 0.917
acceptability (6s) F  (1,37) = 0.311, p  = 0.580 F  (1,37) = 0.759, p  = 0.389 F  (1,37) = 0.641, p  = 0.429
blame (6s) F  (1,37) = 0.252, p  = 0.619 F  (1,37) = 0.081, p  = 0.778 F  (1,37) = 2.178, p  = 0.148
 
 r-PI (n = 26) 
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Text segment main effect of belief main effect of outcome interaction
mental-state (8s) F  (1,25) = 0.793, p  = 0.382 F  (1,25) = 3.782, p  = 0.063 F  (1,25) = 0.256, p  = 0.618
consequence (8s) F  (1,25) = 0.858, p  = 0.363 F  (1,25) = 0.214, p  = 0.648 F  (1,25) = 0.112, p  = 0.741
acceptability (6s) F  (1,25) = 3.103, p  = 0.090 F  (1,25) = 4.256, p  = 0.050 F  (1,25) = 24.820, p  < 0.001
blame (6s) F  (1,25) = 0.138, p  = 0.714 F  (1,25) = 0.129, p  = 0.723 F  (1,25) = 1.430, p  = 0.243
 
 aMCC (n = 42) 
Text segment main effect of belief main effect of outcome interaction
mental-state (8s) F  (1,41) = 0.726, p  = 0.399 F  (1,41) = 0.154, p  = 0.697 F  (1,41) = 0.294, p  = 0.591
consequence (8s) F  (1,41) = 0.211, p  = 0.648 F  (1,41) = 0.188, p  = 0.667 F  (1,41) = 0.152, p  = 0.699
acceptability (6s) F  (1,41) = 5.407, p  = 0.025 F  (1,41) = 0.108, p  = 0.744 F  (1,41) = 1.187, p  = 0.282
blame (6s) F  (1,41) = 0.007, p  = 0.933 F  (1,41) = 0.026, p  = 0.873 F  (1,41) = 1.407, p  = 0.242
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 Text S15: Belief-by-interaction effect in l-AI for consequence segment 
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Text S16: ROI analysis with empathy ROIs for moral luck 
Results from a 2(outcome: neutral, negative) × 2(type of judgment: acceptability, blame) repeated measures ANOVA, carried out 
separately for neutral and negative belief, in each ROI for average percent signal change (PSC) extracted for moral judgment 
segments. Only interaction effects were of interest. Yellow cells represent significant (p < 0.05) values for the interaction term and 
green cells represent interaction terms with significant post-hoc comparisons for the judgment factor. 
ROI Comparison main effect of consequence main effect of judgment interaction
Acc vs. Neu F  (1,38) = 0.009, p  = 0.925 F  (1,38) = 8.019, p  = 0.007 F  (1,38) = 0.001, p  = 0.974
Int vs. Att F  (1,38) = 3.659, p  = 0.063 F  (1,38) = 1.024, p  = 0.318 F  (1,38) = 4.508, p  = 0.040
Acc vs. Neu F  (1,35) = 2.950, p  = 0.095 F  (1,35) = 3.067, p  = 0.089 F  (1,35) = 0.173, p  = 0.680
Int vs. Att F  (1,35) = 1.623, p  = 0.211 F  (1,35) = 0.771, p  = 0.386 F  (1,35) = 0.159, p  = 0.692
Acc vs. Neu F  (1,28) = 3.503, p  = 0.072 F  (1,28) = 2.286, p  = 0.142 F  (1,28) = 1.131, p  = 0.297 
Int vs. Att F  (1,28) = 0.615, p  = 0.440 F  (1,28) = 1.033, p  = 0.318 F  (1,28) = 0.834, p  = 0.369
Acc vs. Neu F  (1,37) = 0.001, p  = 0.977 F  (1,37) = 5.365, p  = 0.026 F  (1,37) = 5.750, p  = 0.022
Int vs. Att F  (1,37) = 0.452, p  = 0.506 F  (1,37) = 0.501, p  = 0.484 F  (1,37) = 0.349, p  = 0.558
Acc vs. Neu F  (1,25) = 23.975, p  < 0.001 F  (1,25) = 1.418, p  = 0.245 F  (1,25) = 1.315, p  = 0.258
Int vs. Att F  (1,25) = 3.036, p  = 0.094 F  (1,25) = 0.077, p  = 0.784 F  (1,25) = 1.139, p  = 0.296
Acc vs. Neu F  (1,41) = 0.030, p  = 0.862 F  (1,41) = 0.112, p  = 0.740 F  (1,41) = 1.315, p  = 0.258
Int vs. Att F  (1,41) = 0.141, p  = 0.709 F  (1,41) = 3.052, p  = 0.088 F  (1,41) = 0.938, p  = 0.338
aMCC 
(n  = 42)
dACC 
(n  = 39)
l-AI (n 
= 36)
l-PI (n 
= 29)
r-AI (n 
= 38)
r-PI (n 
= 26)
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 Text S17: Brain-behavior correlations for empathy ROIs 
Spearman’s correlations between average percent signal change (PSC) in each ROI in each condition. The four text segments 
investigated were: mental-state information, consequence, acceptability, blame. Yellow cells represent significant (p < 0.05) values. 
 dACC (n = 39) 
Accidental harm mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = -0.195, p  = 0.235 ρ = -0.135, p  = 0.412 ρ = -0.210, p  = 0.200 -
blame ρ = -0.130, p  = 0.429 ρ = -0.135, p  = 0.411 - ρ = 0.005, p  = 0.974
Attempted harm mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = -0.178, p  = 0.279 ρ = 0.055, p  = 0.739 ρ = 0.082, p  = 0.620 -
blame ρ = -0.155, p  = 0.345 ρ = 0.101, p  = 0.542 - ρ = 0.156, p  = 0.344
Intentional harm mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = -0.047, p  = 0.777 ρ = -0.081, p  = 0.623 ρ = 0.006, p  = 0.872 -
blame ρ = 0.027, p  = 0.869 ρ = 0.127, p  = 0.440 - ρ = 0.163, p  = 0.323
Neutral harm mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = -0.020, p  = 0.902 ρ = -0.014, p  = 0.930 ρ = -0.070, p  = 0.671 -
blame ρ = -0.078, p  = 0.636 ρ = -0.217, p  = 0.185 - ρ = -0.295, p  = 0.068  
 l-AI (n = 36) 
Accidental harm mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = 0.281, p  = 0.097 ρ = 0.028, p  = 0.871 ρ = 0.351, p  = 0.036 -
blame ρ = 0.235, p  = 0.167 ρ = 0.002, p  = 0.990 - ρ = 0.214, p  = 0.209
Attempted harm mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = 0.104, p  = 0.547 ρ = -0.001, p  = 0.997 ρ = 0.097, p  = 0.575 -
blame ρ = 0.111, p  = 0.518 ρ = -0.080, p  = 0.644 - ρ = -0.018, p  = 0.916
Intentional harm mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = -0.124, p  = 0.472 ρ = 0.003, p  = 0.986 ρ = -0.175, p  = 0.308 -
blame ρ = 0.134, p  = 0.436 ρ = 0.021, p  = 0.905 - ρ = 0.189, p  = 0.269
Neutral case mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = -0.020, p  = 0.906 ρ = -0.024, p  = 0.888 ρ = 0.034, p  = 0.845 -
blame ρ = -0.020, p  = 0.908 ρ = -0.060, p  = 0.729 - ρ = -0.138, p  = 0.421  
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 l-PI (n = 29) 
Accidental harm mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = 0.319, p  = 0.092 ρ = 0.427, p  = 0.021 ρ = 0.153, p  = 0.428 -
blame ρ = 0.352, p  = 0.061 ρ = 0.428, p  = 0.021 - ρ = 0.289, p  = 0.128
Attempted harm mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = 0.015, p  = 0.938 ρ = -0.078, p  = 0.687 ρ = -0.076, p  = 0.694 -
blame ρ = -0.065, p  = 0.739 ρ = -0.260, p  = 0.173 - ρ = -0.076, p  = 0.694
Intentional harm mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = 0.025, p  = 0.896 ρ = 0.081, p  = 0.674 ρ = 0.022, p  = 0.909 -
blame ρ = 0.335, p  = 0.101 ρ = 0.042, p  = 0.844 - ρ = 0.074, p  = 0.727
Neutral case mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = 0.209, p  = 0.317 ρ = 0.385, p  = 0.058 ρ = 0.245, p  = 0.238 -
blame ρ = 0.347, p  = 0.090 ρ = 0.229, p  = 0.271 - ρ = 0.055, p  = 0.795  
 r-AI (n = 38) 
Accidental harm mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = 0.310, p  = 0.058 ρ = 0.196, p  = 0.237 ρ = 0.174, p  = 0.296 -
blame ρ = 0.322, p  = 0.049 ρ = 0.108, p  = 0.517 - ρ = 0.153, p  = 0.358
Attempted harm mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = -0.007, p  = 0.965 ρ = 0.034, p  = 0.842 ρ = -0.173, p  = 0.299 -
blame ρ = -0.101, p  = 0.548 ρ = -0.128, p  = 0.445 - ρ = -0.037, p  = 0.827
Intentional harm mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = -0.483, p  = 0.200 ρ = -0.302, p  = 0.065 ρ = -0.379, p  = 0.19 -
blame ρ = -0.172, p  = 0.302 ρ = -0.050, p  = 0.766 - ρ = -0.015, p  = 0.931
Neutral case mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = 0.002, p  = 0.989 ρ = 0.102, p  = 0.543 ρ = 0.082, p  = 0.625 -
blame ρ = -0.127, p  = 0.446 ρ = -0.118, p  = 0.479 - ρ = -0.114, p  = 0.495  
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 r-PI (n = 26) 
Accidental harm mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = 0.179, p  = 0.381 ρ = -0.297, p  = 0.141 ρ = -0.262, p  = 0.196 -
blame ρ = 0.068, p  = 0.742 ρ = -0.181, p  = 0.377 - ρ = -0.130, p  = 0.527
Attempted harm mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = 0.189, p  = 0.355 ρ = 0.019, p  = 0.927 ρ = 0.111, p  = 0.589 -
blame ρ = 0.154, p  = 0.453 ρ = -0.034, p  = 0.868 - ρ = 0.033, p  = 0.875
Intentional harm mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = 0.074, p  = 0.719 ρ = 0.021, p  = 0.920 ρ = -0.038, p  = 0.854 -
blame ρ = 0.086, p  = 0.677 ρ = -0.042, p  = 0.840 - ρ = -0.042, p  = 0.838
Neutral case mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = -0.232, p  = 0.254 ρ = -0.102, p  = 0.620 ρ = -0.166, p  = 0.419 -
blame ρ = -0.127, p  = 0.537 ρ = -0.297, p  = 0.140 - ρ = -0.277, p  = 0.170  
 aMCC (n = 42) 
Accidental harm mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = 0.207, p  = 0.189 ρ = 0.119, p  = 0.454 ρ = 0.132, p  = 0.406 -
blame ρ = 0.286, p  = 0.067 ρ = 0.261, p  = 0.095 - ρ = 0.126, p  = 0.428
Attempted harm mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = 0.002, p  = 0.989 ρ = 0.077, p  = 0.629 ρ = 0.003, p  = 0.985 -
blame ρ = -0.091, p  = 0.566 ρ = 0.023, p  = 0.884 - ρ = -0.068, p  = 0.670
Intentional harm mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = -0.239, p  = 0.128 ρ = -0.078, p  = 0.622 ρ = 0.058, p  = 0.715 -
blame ρ = -0.107, p  = 0.498 ρ = 0.085, p  = 0.594 - ρ = 0.119, p  = 0.454
Neutral case mental-state consequence acceptability blame
acceptability ρ = 0.141, p  = 0.372 ρ = 0.057, p  = 0.718 ρ = 0.059, p  = 0.710 -
blame ρ = 0.094, p  = 0.554 ρ = 0.041, p  = 0.798 - ρ = 0.116, p  = 0.464  
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 Text S18: Brain-behavior correlations for empathy ROIs – robustness check 
Robust Spearman’s skipped correlations between average percent signal change (PSC) in each ROI in each condition, computed only 
for correlations with Spearman’s ρ < 0.05. Yellow cells represent significant (p < 0.05) values. 
ROI Behavioral rating 
PSC during which 
segment
Spearman Skipped 
correlation
Shepherd's Pi
l-AI
acceptability for 
accidental harm
acceptability judgment
r  = 0.318, 95% CI [-0.036, 
0.619] 
-
l-PI
acceptability for 
accidental harm
consequence
r = 0.524, 95%CI [0.215, 
0.730] 
Pi  = 0.52, p  = 
0.0100
l-PI
blame for 
accidental harm
consequence
r = 0.523, 95%CI [0.193, 
0.734] 
Pi = 0.52, p  = 
0.0102
r-AI
blame for 
accidental harm
mental-state 
information
r = 0.292, 95%CI [-0.045, 
0.568] 
-
 
 Robust correlation between acceptability rating and PSC in l-PI during consequence segment  
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 Robust correlation between blame rating and PSC in l-PI during consequence segment  
 
 Text S19: Whole-brain results 
Random-effects analyses of the whole brain were also conducted for the intent task for the same text segments (p < 0.05, FWE-
corrected, k > 10) to explore neural correlates of moral luck effect [(blame: accidental > neutral) > (acceptability: accidental > 
neutral)], but no suprathreshold activation was detected. Similar results were found for brain-behavior correlation analyses at the 
whole-brain level. These results are consistent with the higher power of functional ROI analyses to detect subtle but systematic 
response profiles (Saxe et al., 2006). 
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The only effect that survived multiple comparisons was interaction effect between belief and outcome observed in rTPJ for the 
mental-state information segment (x = 46, y = -54, z = 26; t = 4.88, p(FWE-corrected) = 0.011, k = 37). This result is in agreement 
with prior evidence that rTPJ is crucial in encoding belief information (Young et al., 2007).  
 
